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AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND CONDUCT
OF THE PASSIONS AND AFFECTIONS

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY SERIES

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The historically interesting works reprinted in this series helped to prepare the way for the science of psychology. Most of these books are long forgotten, but their relevance to the field is unmistakable. Many of the writings on mental and moral philosophy, published before the dawn of scientific procedures, have much to commend them to present-day scholars. These books serve as groundwork for a fuller account of the background from which the field emerged, and they should be attractive to students who seek in the past for hints of the future direction that certain types of research can take. Each work will have an Introduction stating the provenance and significance of the book and will add appropriate biographical information.

ROBERT I. WATSON

General Editor

University of New Hampshire

An Essay
ON THE
Nature and Conduct
OF THE
Passions and Affections
WITH
ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE
(*Third Edition, 1742*)

BY
Francis Hutcheson

A FACSIMILE REPRODUCTION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY
Paul McReynolds

GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA
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Introduction

The book presented here in facsimile, though not widely known, is one of the more important works on psychology and ethics produced during the first half of the eighteenth century. Its author, Francis Hutcheson, was a leading moral philosopher of that period, and his works exercised a considerable influence on developments in ethics, economics and the psychology of human motivation during the remainder of his century. Further, there are anticipations in his works of a number of current conceptions in psychology and ethics. Hutcheson's writings are thus of considerable historical significance.

Hutcheson's first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, was published in 1725, and the present volume, *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, first appeared in 1728. Both books went through several editions; it is the third (and final) edition (1742) of the *Passions* which is reproduced here. These two volumes together formed the basis of Hutcheson's system of thought—even though this underwent considerable elaboration later—and Hutcheson himself thought of them as jointly making up an integrated whole. Each book contains two treatises, and he referred to these as treatises I through IV (p. xx). The two works in the present volume (numbers III and IV in the overall ordering) were, respectively, on the Passions and Moral Sense; the two treatises in the earlier book (I and II in the overall ordering) were, respectively, on Beauty and Virtue. All four of the treatises have frequently been referred to in the critical literature, but for many years only the second one, on Virtue, has been generally available in complete form (in Selby-Bigge, L. A. (Ed.), *British Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, Vol. 1). Currently, the first treatise, on Beauty, is being reproduced in its entirety (McReynolds, Paul, ed., *Four Early Works on Motivation*,

Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1969), and the present volume makes the other two available.

I have noted that Hutcheson's works are relevant both to ethics and to motivational psychology. In current scholarship these two fields are, of course, quite separate, but this was not the case in Hutcheson's day. Thus, though the book reproduced here includes discussions of both moral and motivational issues, these are intermingled in such a manner that it is often difficult to separate them. Essentially, of course, ethics is concerned with the way people *should* behave, with the *rightness* or *wrongness* of acts, whereas motivation is concerned with the way people actually *do* behave, with the incitements and inhibitions to given acts. Ethics is interested in the *criteria* of moral behavior; motivation, with the *determinants* of actual behavior. Since the time of Aristippus and Democritus, in ancient Greece, there has been a tendency to confuse these two worlds of discourse, and it is only in modern times that the distinction between them has been formally and explicitly recognized. As we will see later, Hutcheson, despite his inconsistency in this regard, was one of the first—even before Hume—to attempt such a division.

The two fields are, of course, necessarily interdependent. Thus, the moral standards that a person holds, and the strength with which he holds them, are important motivating conditions in his on-going behavior. Further, broad considerations of morality necessarily involve the question of what "causes" or motivates a person to behave in a moral manner: i.e., discussions of ethical principles or criteria presuppose, in a sense, some motivation on the part of persons to follow, or at least to be influenced by, these standards. Such motivation is obviously worthy of study in its own right. Hutcheson, as we have noted, was interested in both ethical and motivational questions, and his concern with motivation—or with the "springs of action," to use the vernacular of his time—extended considerably beyond the role of motives in moral behavior. Other eighteenth-century philosophers who wrote on both motivational and moral issues include Hume and Bentham.

Before proceeding, let me comment briefly on Hutcheson himself. He was born in 1694, in Drumalig, Ireland. Both his father and his paternal grandfather, who had immigrated originally from Scotland, were Presbyterian ministers. It is reported that Francis was a favorite of this grandfather, who is supposed to have said to him at the age of three, "Francis, I predict thou wilt one day be a very eminent man" (W. R. Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*. Cambridge,

University Press, 1900, p. 6). In 1717 Hutcheson completed his own theological training, at the University of Glasgow, and in 1721 or 1722 he became head of a new private Academy in Dublin. In 1724, or possibly 1725, Hutcheson was married to a Mary Wilson. During the courtship, and while he was still organizing the new Academy, he was working also on his first book, the *Inquiry* referred to above. The *Essay on the Passions* (I will use this short term, or simply the *Essay*, to refer to the entire book reproduced here) then appeared, as already noted, in 1728. These books received considerable critical acclaim, and in 1729 Hutcheson was elected to the position of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, his alma mater.

His best known works, then, were written before he returned to Glasgow. Here he was evidently a warm, dynamic, and conscientious teacher, and seems to have been esteemed and even loved by a wide circle of associates, students, and friends. In short, it appears that he practiced in his own life the benevolence and goodwill that he commended to others. Most prominent among his students was Adam Smith. The influence of Hutcheson on Smith was especially great, not only with regard to the latter's moral philosophy (Smith, A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Edinburgh: John D. Lowe, 1849; originally published 1759), but also with respect to his economic theory (*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. New York: Modern Library, 1937. Originally published 1776). The relation between Hutcheson and Smith has been traced by Scott (*op. cit.*) and W. L. Taylor (*Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith*. Durham, N. C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1965).

At Glasgow, Hutcheson, though not as prolific and innovative as before, continued to write, along with his teaching and administrative duties. In addition to bringing out subsequent editions of the *Inquiry* (4 editions) and the *Essay on Passions* (3 editions), he wrote, between 1734 and 1737, *A System of Moral Philosophy*—which he used for class lectures, and which was not published until 1755. In 1742 he published, in Latin, his *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria*; this was translated into English and published under the title *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, in 1747. These are the major works of Hutcheson: for a complete bibliography the reader is referred to Scott (*op. cit.*, pp. 143-5). Hutcheson died in 1746, in his fifty-third year. His son, also named Francis, brought out the *System* in 1755, as already noted. This work also includes an account of Hutcheson's life, by William Leechman, who had been a

colleague of Hutcheson's at the University of Glasgow. This work is one of the basic biographies for Hutcheson scholars. The others are those by Thomas Fowler (*Shaftesbury and Hutcheson*, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882) and Scott (*op. cit.*). The writings of Hutcheson were popular not only in England but in the American colonies as well (Fiering, *N. S. Moral Philosophy in America from 1700 to 1750, and its British Context*, unpublished manuscript, 1968, lent to me by the author).

Let us consider now something of the historical background of the *Essay on Passions*, and of the cultural context in which it was written. I will comment first on the concept of "the passions" in psychology. Though the term "passion" is no longer used as a technical psychological term, it was widely used in and before Hutcheson's time to refer to strong, overpowering affects, and included some of the meanings of both contemporary "emotion" and "motive." The term, historically, is one of the most hallowed concepts in the long course of psychological thought. Inaugurated originally by Plato (Levi, A., *French Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), it represented for some 2,000 years a major, continuing strain of psychological theory, and was the primary subject of affective and motivational taxonomies. There has, in fact, been no unifying concept in psychology which served longer than that of "the passions," and beside it today's concepts are the merest infants. After Plato's distinction between what came to be termed the irascible and the concupiscible passions—a dichotomy also followed by Aristotle—Zeno, Chrysippus and other Greek Stoics further developed the concept, suggesting four fundamental passions: pleasure, pain, desire, and fear. From the Stoics the theory passed on to Cicero, who apparently was one of the main influences on Hutcheson. From Cicero and Saint Augustine the doctrine was transmitted to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote at length on the passions, which by now had attained a highly complex taxonomy. In the late Renaissance the early Spanish pedagogist, Juan Luis Vives, developed a somewhat different conception of the passions in his *De Anima et Vita* (1538), as did de la Chambre, the early French psychologist, in his *Les Caracteres des Passions* (1648). De la Chambre's work was contemporary with that of Renè Descartes, whose *Les Passions de l'Âme* (1649) was extremely influential. Malebranche, Spinoza, and Hobbes also wrote extensively on this topic.

At the time Hutcheson wrote, then, the concept of passion was the primary means for expressing dynamic psychological functions.

The long reign of the usefulness of the concept of "passion" was, however, nearing its end: Hutcheson's was perhaps the last major book to use this term in its title. After it Hume, in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1740), included a major section on the passions, but by the time of Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), other concepts, in particular "motive" and "affection," were coming into general use.

Hutcheson lived in an age when there was tremendous interest in ethical questions. The moral superstructure that had lent stability throughout the long medieval period had lost its effectiveness some time before, and the need in his time was to discover, or to develop, a new and more stable moral paradigm. Though a number of systematic proposals, including that of Hutcheson, were put forth, none of these, as it turned out, gained general acceptance—nor, indeed, have any of the metaethical systems developed since that time, and the moral crisis that we face today is fundamentally a part of the same crisis that confronted Hutcheson's era.

Among Hutcheson's predecessors several are crucial to an understanding of his *Essay*. Thomas Hobbes, in his *Leviathan* (1651), had maintained that people's behavior is determined solely by egoistic motives, and that all apparently benevolent behavior is based ultimately on self-interest. This viewpoint was extremely unsettling to most moralists of that period, and in the half-century following Hobbes' classic a large number of tracts vehemently opposing his position were published. Probably the most important of these was *Enchiridion Ethicum* (1666; translated into English in 1690 as *An Account of Virtue*) by Henry More. This book contradicted Hobbes by positing an inherent tendency toward goodness, a "boniform faculty of the soul." John Locke, in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), however, held that all knowledge comes through the senses, and this ruled out the possibility of innate knowledge of good and evil. In effect, Locke supported Hobbes' conclusion that moral behavior is based upon self-interest. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, then proposed, in his *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times* (1711), a more altruistic conception of human nature, suggesting that man has an innate "moral sense." Shaftesbury's position, in turn, was criticized by Bernard Mandeville, whose position was similar to that of Hobbes, in the 1723 edition of his *The Fable of the Bees*.

Shaftesbury died in 1713, but his works exercised a major influence upon Hutcheson, who on the title page of his first book—the

Inquiry—described that work as one “In which the principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain’d and defended, against the author of the *Fable of the Bees*.” It would, however, be an error to assume that Hutcheson’s writings were simply an elaboration of the views of Shaftesbury. It is true that both authors emphasized an innate inclination toward benevolent behavior—as, indeed, did Henry More before them—but Hutcheson’s system, particularly in the book reproduced here, and in later works, differed in a number of respects from Shaftesbury’s. In broad terms, Hutcheson, as compared with Shaftesbury, was less metaphysical, more empirical, and more systematic. More specifically, Hutcheson did not accept Shaftesbury’s equation of the esthetic and moral senses; he developed the conception of a number of “internal senses”; and he was instrumental in laying the general foundations for the later-to-be-developed Utilitarian theory of ethics.

Hutcheson was also strongly indebted—particularly in his *Essay*—to Bishop Joseph Butler, whose very influential *Sermons* had been published in 1726. In particular, Hutcheson appears to have adopted part of his taxonomy of motives and affections from Butler. Further, Hutcheson’s conceptions were significantly influenced by Locke’s *Essay*, as indeed most psychological theories were at that time. While Hutcheson’s assumption of a multiplicity of “internal senses” that in many respects have roles similar to motives or instincts was hardly in keeping with Locke’s notion of a single “internal sense” serving the function of “reflection,” Hutcheson’s theorizing in this regard was nevertheless clearly derived from Locke’s, if only by analogy. Further, Hutcheson’s empiricist—as opposed to rationalist—approach to moral philosophy was in accord with Locke’s position; as Blackstone (*Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory*. Athens, Ga.: Univ. Georgia Press, 1965) put it, Hutcheson “accepted Locke’s epistemology as a matter of course” (p. 6).

An interesting aspect of the popular moral philosophy of Hutcheson’s day, and for a period thereafter, was a peculiar combination of theism (or of deism) and optimism that drew many adherents. This point of view—that God is good, that everything is for the best, that ours is the best of all possible worlds—has a long history: it can be found in some degree in Plato, in the Greek Stoic philosophy, and elsewhere, but it seems to have been particularly widely believed during the first half of the eighteenth century. Its popularity was due, in part, to be optimistic philosophies of Leibnitz and of Shaftesbury,

and of the powerful poetry of Alexander Pope, whose *Essay on Man* (1733-34) contains the proud claim:

"One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right."

One gets a strong feeling of this general attitude of all things working together for good in certain parts of Hutcheson's *Essay*, especially in Section VI. "Our Mechanism," says Hutcheson, "as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good" (p. 182). But though Hutcheson was convinced of the "Prevalence of Good in the World," yet he was not unaware of the presence of Evil: "The many," he concluded, "are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison with the whole and yet in a great *Multitude*" (p. 188). This last concern was more in keeping with the eventual outcome of this particular philosophic tangent. A great earthquake in Portugal in 1755, which killed some 15,000 persons, many of them while praying in churches, made any naive optimism clearly untenable, and the rout of this position was completed by Voltaire's classic story, *Candide*, in 1759.

Before turning to an examination of Hutcheson's work reproduced here it may be well to examine briefly the content of his first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. The first half of this work (treatise I) presented Hutcheson's hypothesis that the perception of beauty is invoked by objects presenting an appropriate balance of "unity amidst variability," and the second half (treatise II) set forth his argument that individuals have an innate moral sense, and are motivated toward acts of benevolence. Now, the present work, though it followed the *Inquiry*, should not be thought of as simply an extension of that book; though this is true to some extent, the present work is best seen as an independent contribution. To a considerable degree it treats topics not covered in the *Inquiry*, and where there is overlap—as on moral issues—the present treatment reflects Hutcheson's position at a somewhat later period.

The first treatise in the present work, on the *Passions*, is primarily of psychological interest, though, like all of Hutcheson's output, it carries a strong emphasis upon the ethical concept of benevolence. Even this concept, however, is proposed as an aspect of motivation, and thus has psychological as well as moral significance. Of particular interest is Hutcheson's overall schematization of the springs of action. He first proposes a distinction between external and internal "senses" (pp. 4-7), and under the latter lists four "Classes of Per-

ceptions": "Imagination," including the perceptions of harmony, grandeur and novelty; a "Publick Sense," referring to sympathy and compassion for others; a "Moral Sense"; and a "Sense of Honour." With respect to each of these classes certain experiences lead to "Pleasant Perceptions," whereas certain other experiences are the occasion of an "uneasy Sensation." Further, Hutcheson assumes that people are motivated "to obtain for *ourselves* or *others* the *agreeable Sensation* . . . or to prevent the *uneasy Sensation*" (p. 7). This assumption leads to five "Desires," or approach motives, and five "Aversions," corresponding to the five "Classes of our Senses" (external sense plus four internal senses).

Hutcheson also proposed a distinction between "primary" and "secondary" Desires (p. 8) which, while not precisely like the contemporary distinction between primary and secondary drives, is nevertheless somewhat suggestive of it. Examples of secondary Desires are the appeals of "Wealth and Power": the universality of such secondary desires is due to the fact that they are "Means of gratifying all other Desires" (p. 8). Another division made by Hutcheson is that between the selfish and benevolent Desires (p. 13). It was a fundamental tenet of his system that the latter of these is not descended or derived from the former, and the reader will note a number of places in the book at which he comes back to this basic insistence. It is particularly important to note that, though Hutcheson accepts the reality of associative learning (p. 9), he holds that one's desire for the happiness of others is not a learned motivation, but rather is—as he puts it—a "most *natural* Instinct" (p. 24).

It is unnecessary to review here the rest of Hutcheson's conception of human motivation and affection, but there are several aspects of his theory that I want to point up briefly. The first of these concerns the appetites (pp. 91-94). Hutcheson notes that certain of our desires follow from feelings of pain or uneasiness, which themselves inevitably arise when certain objects are absent, quite independently of any prior experience with these objects. Examples of this class, which he calls "appetites," are hunger, thirst, and sex. The "Desire of *Society*, or the Company of our Fellow-creatures" (p. 91) is also included in this class. Hutcheson noted, however—and I think this is an astute and important observation—that certain other desires depend upon one's prior experience with given objects. "No Man," he writes, "is distressed for want of *fine Smells, harmonious Sounds, beautiful Objects, Wealth, Power, or Grandeur*, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good, or some *prior Sensa-*

tion of their Pleasures" (p. 92). In other words, there are certain objects that we naturally miss, and certain others that we have to learn to miss.

Another noteworthy aspect of Hutcheson's psychology is his concern with the concepts of reward and punishment, and of success and failure. He notes that the "Sensations of *Joy* or *Sorrow*, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit—have directly the effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments*, to excite us to act with utmost Vigor" and further, "since we have some considerable *Power* over our Desires . . . we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleasures of Joy* upon our success, than *Pains of Sorrow* upon Disappointment" (p. 56). This last sentence is of particular interest, in that a topic of major interest in contemporary motivational psychology concerns the relative strengths of the motive to attain success and the motive to avoid failure (McReynolds, Paul. "The motives to attain success and to avoid failure: historical background." *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1968, 24, 157-161).

A particularly intriguing part of the *Essay on the Passions* is that portion termed "Maxims, or natural Laws of *calm Desire*" (pp. 39-43). There are 20 such maxims, which, according to Hutcheson, "seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise" (p. 43): in other words, we have here an early theory of the nature of motivated behavior. The "laws" are stated in brief, axiomatic fashion and reflect an attempt at mathematical precision. Hutcheson had been interested in mathematics as a student, and in the *Inquiry* had proposed a mathematical analysis of moral behavior. The presentation of the Maxims in the *Essay*, though clearly related to that in the *Inquiry*, is more sophisticated in that a greater number of important variables are taken into account. Essentially, Hutcheson proposed that the strength of motivation to perform a given act is proportional to the "imagined *Quantity of Good*" (p. 39) ("Good" can be interpreted here in the sense of "benefit") that would result from that event (Maxim 3). In computing the amount of Good or Evil ("Evil" can be read as "discomfort") that would result from an act, it is necessary to take into account the *duration* and the *intensity* of the pleasure ("Good") that would result (Maxims 7, 8); the "*Trouble, Pain, or Danger*" that would be incurred in carrying out the act (Maxim 9); the "Hazard" or "Uncertainty" of both Good and Evil results (Maxim 10); and the delay between accomplishment of the act and the enjoyment to be obtained (Maxim 14). These suggestions, taken in their entirety, constitute a highly prescient schematiza-

tion of factors that later—in our own time—were incorporated into decision theory; the adumbration of the concept of delay of gratification (Maxim 14) is also noteworthy.

It is not clear to what extent the ideas expressed in these axioms were original with Hutcheson, and to what extent they were part of the psychological climate of ideas of the time. This question cannot be examined in detail here, but several pertinent facts may be noted briefly. It seems clear that in the period we are considering the idea of axiomatizing the factors involved in behavioral preferences—conceptualized in terms of maximizing pleasure—was very great. William Wollaston, in *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (London: S. Palmer, 1726) discussed the relation of duration and “intenseness” to the “quantity” of pleasure and pain (Sec. 2). And John Maxwell, in his translation (1727) of Richard Cumberland’s *De Legibus Naturae* (1672), under the title *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature* (London: R. Phillips) included a footnote of his own pointing out that as between two competing “Motives” the one which prevails is a function not only of the relative strengths of the two motives, but also of the “Probability” or “Chances” of each motive being accomplished (p. 257). Maxwell also quoted Wollaston at length, and refers to Hutcheson’s *Inquiry*. Then, in 1728—the same year in which Hutcheson’s *Essay* appeared, a work by Archibald Campbell (sometimes incorrectly attributed to Alexander Innes), titled *An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue* (Westminster: B. Creak) was published. This book—which, incidentally, included in its second edition (1733) criticisms of Hutcheson’s *Inquiry*—set forth a logic for estimating the quantities of pleasures yielded by given acts, in terms of Degree, Duration, and Consequents, i.e., “the degrees of pleasure or pain in the consequent perceptions” (quoted in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 107). Next in 1747, the author of *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections* (McReynolds, *op. cit.*, 1969; this work was published anonymously: its writer was probably James Long or John Gay), proposed an analysis of pleasure in terms of intensity and duration (pp. 192-3).

Of these several attempts at a systematic, and preferably mathematical, analysis of motivated acts, that of Hutcheson appears to have been the most sophisticated, as well as probably the earliest. Taken together the efforts represent something of a trend, not altogether unlike the attempts of Clark Hull, Kenneth Spence, and others of the present era to develop a viable mathematical formulation of motivated behaviors, though of course on a less sophisticated scale. The quan-

titative trend apparently inaugurated by Hutcheson reached its apogee in Jeremy Bentham's (*An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. New York: Hafner, 1948) so-called "hedonic calculus" (McReynolds, Paul. The motivational psychology of Jeremy Bentham. I and II. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 1968, 4, 230-44 and 349-64). This whole movement, though a failure in its attempt to develop adequate ways of assessing affect, can in a more positive sense be viewed as a forerunner of current decision theory.

Hutcheson's primary purpose in the second treatise in the present volume, *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, was to extend and defend the system of moral philosophy that he had put forward in the *Inquiry*. William Blackstone (*op. cit.*) has recently contrasted Hutcheson's ethical theory with the views of others of his period. He points out that Hutcheson adopted an empirical-inductive approach to ethical issues, in contradistinction to certain other ethical theorists of his time, such as Richard Price, William Wollaston, and Samuel Clarke, who maintained that morality is based upon reason. Thus Hutcheson, as we have already observed, held that there is an innate disposition toward benevolent behavior, and an inherent "moral sense" which causes individuals to react with approbation to perceptions of benevolent behavior. This, according to Hutcheson, is simply the way man is constituted. Man could, however, have been constituted differently—i.e., the basis of morality is in man's actual nature rather than in some external, independent logical necessity.

The position of the rationalists differed from this in that it asserted that morality is based upon eternal and immutable reality, that it reflects necessary truths, which can be ascertained through reason, and which exist quite independently of man's psychological makeup. For the rationalists there was something inadequate and unstable about the moral sense as a basis for ethical behavior. And contrasting with both the rationalist orientation and the empiricist position of Hutcheson was the associationist approach, which conceived of moral values in terms of learned associations, and which was espoused by John Gay (*Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality*. In Selby-Bigge, L. A. *British Moralists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, Vol. 2, Pp. 267-285) and the author of *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections* (see above). Both of these writers specifically criticized Hutcheson's moral sense theory. Only the former work was published in time for Hutcheson to have seen it, but whether he did so is not known. He

did, however, take specific issue with the position of the rationalists, as exemplified in particular by Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston: his criticisms of their positions are contained in the *Illustrations* (pp. 250-279).

Hutcheson's idea of an inherent moral sense was clearly an hypothesis about man's psychobiological makeup, as well as being an ethical theory. From Hutcheson the moral sense conception passed to Hume, and thence into the general body of psychology, where it remained a viable concept—under terms such as “moral faculty” (e.g., Dugald Stewart, *Collected Works*. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable, 1859, Vol. 6, Pp. 219-274) and “moral sentiment” (e.g., McCosh, J. *The Motive Powers*. New York: Scribners, 1890, p. 22)—until around the beginning of this century. One of the important by-products of the rather general assumption of an innate moral faculty, in the early development of psychiatry, was the postulation of specific aberrations in this faculty. This approach was seen in J. C. Prichard's (*A Treatise on Insanity and other Disorders Affecting the Mind*. Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington & Haswell, 1837) concept of “moral insanity” and, later, in the postulation of “constitutional psychopathic inferiority” as a nosological category.

Among later thinkers who assumed some kind of inherent moral sense the most prominent was Charles Darwin (*The Descent of Man*, New York: Burt, 1874, 2nd Ed., pp. 144-165), who posited the development of a moral faculty through natural selection and its transmission through instinctive mechanisms. William James (*Principles of Psychology*, New York: Holt, Vol. 2) did not consider moral behavior instinctive, nor did he go into the problem at length, but he did reject the idea that moral principles could be explicated in terms of habits, and he suggested that “our sensibility” of them “must assuredly be a phenomenon of supernumerary order,” something perhaps like “the higher musical sensibilities” (p. 673). Finally, there is an obvious, even though distant, family resemblance between Hutcheson's idea of an inherent tendency toward benevolence and Alfred Adler's (*Superiority and Social Interest*. Ed. by H. L. & Rowena R. Ansbacher. Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964) concept of an innate disposition of “social interest.”

In our own time there is under way something of a renaissance of interest in the psychological basis of moral behaviors. It is interesting, therefore, to look for parallels between the views of Hutcheson and contemporary research trends. One of these is in the focus on the concept of benevolence, which is now rather widely studied

under the heading of altruistic behaviors. Hutcheson was evidently the first to realize the need for, and to seek ways of metricizing such behaviors, and while his suggestions never advanced beyond the merely programmatic stage, their importance in the lineage of current approaches (for which see, e.g., Pittel, S. M., & Mendelsohn, G. A. "Measurement of moral values: a review and critique." *Psychological Bulletin*, 1966, 66, 22-35; and Sawyer, J. "The altruism scale: a measure of cooperative, individualistic and competitive interpersonal orientation." *American Journal of Sociology*, 1966, 71, 407-416) is obvious. Among current theoretical interpretations of moral judgment, that of Jean Piaget (*The Moral Judgment of the Child*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), while in most respects different from Hutcheson's system, bears at least some resemblance to it: this is in its apparent assumption that innate factors play a significant role in the stages of development of ethical judgment. Another, more recent theory, which gives a greater role to genetic factors in the development of "ethicizing" behavior, and thus is closer to Hutcheson's position, is that of C. H. Waddington (*The Ethical Animal*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), who posits an innate capacity to acquire ethical beliefs.

Hutcheson's conceptions are also highly relevant to contemporary ethical theory (as distinguished from theories of ethical behavior). Blackstone (*op. cit.*) has recently noted several respects in which this is the case. These include, first, an apparent relationship between the positions of Hutcheson and A. J. Ayer (*Language, Truth and Logic*, London: V. Gollancz, 2nd Edit., 1946) and Charles Stevenson (*Ethics and Language*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1944): Blackstone's view is that Hutcheson's arguments that moral judgments are largely expressions of approval or disapproval may be interpreted as a precursor of contemporary non-cognitive ethical theories. And second, Hutcheson's position that moral judgments must have adequate "justification" can be seen as related to the "good reasons" approach in ethics maintained by Stephen Toulmin (*An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950). As Blackstone further observes, Hutcheson—because of his interest in the analysis of given verbal concepts—can also be considered as a forerunner of contemporary analytic philosophy.

One of the most important topics discussed in the *Illustrations* is the distinction between what Hutcheson called "exciting Reasons" and "justifying Reasons" for given acts. The former (pp. 217-18) has to do with what nowadays would ordinarily be termed the moti-

vation for an act; it presupposes, says Hutcheson, the existence of "Instincts and Affections" (p. 218). An example of an "exciting Reason" is a man pursuing wealth in order "to purchase Pleasures" (p. 217). A "justifying Reason," on the other hand, has to do with the *grounds* that one has for carrying out an act; it presupposes, according to Hutcheson, a "Moral Sense" (p. 218). An example of a "justifying Reason" is a man hazarding his life in war on the grounds that "it tends to preserve our honest Countrymen" (p. 218). The distinction proposed here, though not as fundamental as Hutcheson supposed (Blackstone, *op. cit.*), is nevertheless important as one of the first attempts to disentangle the different conceptual orientations in terms of which behavior can be analyzed—in particular, to separate the notions of *explaining* and of *justifying* behavior, or—to put it another way, to distinguish between the motivational and ethical perspectives.

This, then, is the background of the book reproduced in the following pages. Though not a truly major work, in the sense that Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* or Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* were major, the *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* was nonetheless an important and influential contribution in the early history of psychology and moral philosophy. While it has frequently been cited in works on ethics, the book has, however, been almost entirely ignored in histories of psychology. The reasons for this are, probably, that the *Essay* represents a prescientific, essentially speculative approach, and—perhaps more important—that histories of psychology have tended to focus primarily upon the fields of perception and learning, which were the first to attain solid scientific status, rather than upon motivation and affection. Another reason may be simply that the *Essay on the Passions* has not been easily available. Because of this last possibility, as well as because of the intrinsic value of the book, the present reprinting is an especially gratifying event.

I am indebted to N. S. Fiering and R. G. Harris for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Introduction.

PAUL McREYNOLDS

University of Nevada
February, 1969

A N
E S S A Y
O N T H E
N A T U R E a n d C O N D U C T
O F T H E
Passions and Affections.
W I T H
I L L U S T R A T I O N S
O N T H E
M O R A L S E N S E.

The THIRD EDITION, with ADDITIONS.

*Hoc opus, hoc studium, parvi properemus, & ampli,
Si Patriæ volumus, si Nobis vivere chari.* Hor.

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. WARD, J. and P. KNAPTON,
T. LONGMAN, S. BIRT, C. HITCH, L. GILLIVER,
T. ASTLEY, S. AUSTEN, and J. RIVINGTON.
MDCCXLII.

T H E

P R E F A C E.

ALTHO' the main *practical Principles*, which are inculcated in this Treatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fear that renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well managed, may be looked upon as *superfluous*; especially since little is offered upon them which has not often been well said before. But beside that general Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such a Light by one, as will convince those who were not

moved by them, even when better expressed by another; since, for every Class of *Writers*, there are Classes of *Readers* adapted, who cannot relish any thing higher: Besides this, I say, the very *Novelty* of a Book may procure a little Attention, from those who over look the Writings which the World has long enjoyed. And if by *Curiosity*, or any other means, some few can be engaged to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects, about which a little *Reflection* will discover the Truth, and a thorough *Consideration* of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness; no Person need be ashamed of his Labours as useless, which do such Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.

IF any should look upon some Things in this *Inquiry into the Passions*, as too subtle for common Apprehension, and consequently not
necessary

necessary for the Instruction of Men in *Morals*, which are the common business of Mankind: Let them consider, that the Difficulty on these Subjects arises chiefly from some *previous Notions*, equally difficult at least, which have been already received, to the great Detriment of many a *Natural Temper*; since many have been discouraged from all Attempts of cultivating *kind generous Affections* in themselves, by a previous Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only *Dissimulation, Affectation*, or at best some *unnatural Enthusiasm*. And farther, that to discover Truth on these Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little *Attention to what passes in our own Hearts*, and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.

W H A T E V E R Confusion the *Schoolmen* introduced into Philosophy, some of their keenest *Adversaries* seem to threaten it with a worse kind of Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most *immediate simple Perceptions*, and to explain all *Approbation, Condemnation, Pleasure and Pain*, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the *External Senses*. In like manner they have treated our *Desires* or *Affections*, making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceed from *Self-Love*, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers.

LET this also still be remembered, that the *natural Dispositions* of Mankind may operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them, nor formed just Notions about them.

Many

Many are really *virtuous* who cannot explain what *Virtue* is. Some act a most generous disinterested Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by *Self-Love*, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in *Opticks*, contrary Accounts have been given of *Hearing*, *voluntary Motion*, *Digestion*, and other *natural Actions*. But the Powers themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the same manner our *moral Actions* and *Affections* may be in good order, when our Opinions are quite wrong about them. *True Opinions* however, about both, may enable us to *improve* our natural Powers, and to *rectify* accidental Disorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must cer-

tainly be attended with as much *Pleasure* as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.

IT may perhaps seem strange, that when in this *Treatise* Virtue is supposed *disinterested*; yet so much Pains is taken, by a *Comparison* of our several *Pleasures*, to prove the *Pleasures* of *Virtue* to be the greatest we are capable of, and that consequently it is our truest *Interest* to be *virtuous*. But let it be remembered here, that though there can be no *Motives* or *Arguments* suggested which can directly raise any *ultimate Desire*, such as that of our *own Happiness*, or *publick Affections* (as we attempt to prove in *Treatise* IV;) yet if both are *natural Dispositions* of our Minds, and nothing can stop the Operation of *publick Affections* but some *selfish Interest*, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them prevalent

valent in our Lives, must be to remove these *Opinions of opposite Interests*, and to shew a superior Interest on their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, a *natural Disposition* can scarce fail to exert itself to the full.

IN this *Essay on the Passions*, the Proofs and Illustrations of this Point, that we have a *moral Sense*, and a Sense of Honour, by which we discern an immediate Good in Virtue and Honour, not referred to any further Enjoyment, are not much insisted on since they are already laid down in the *Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil*, in the first and fifth *Sections*. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all *Proofs* in such Matters would be needless.

SOME strange Love of *Simplicity* in the Structure of human Nature,
or

or Attachment to some favourite *Hypothesis*, has engaged many *Writers* to pass over a great many *simple Perceptions*, which we may find in ourselves. We have got the Number *Five* fixed for our *external Senses*, though a larger Number might perhaps as easily be defended. We have Multitudes of Perceptions which have no relation to any *external Sensation*; if by it we mean *Perceptions immediately occasioned by Motions or Impressions made on our Bodies*, such as the Ideas of *Number, Duration, Proportion, Virtue, Vice, Pleasures of Honour, of Congratulation; the Pains of Remorse, Shame, Sympathy*, and many others. It were to be wished, that those who are at such Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that “all Ideas arise from *Sensation and Reflection*,” had so explained themselves, that none should take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either *external Sensations*,

tions, or *reflex Acts* upon *external Sensations* : Or if by *Reflection* they mean an *inward Power of Perception*, as Mr. *Locke* declares expressly, calling it *internal Sensation*, that they had as carefully examined into the several kinds of *internal Perceptions*, as they have done into the *external Sensations* : that we might have seen whether the former be not as *natural* and *necessary* and *ultimate*, without reference to any other, as the latter. Had they in like manner considered our *Affections* without a previous Notion, that they were all from *Self-Love*, they might have felt an *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, though perhaps not so strong as *Self-Love*.

THE Author hopes this imperfect *Essay* will be favourably received, till some Person of greater Abilities
and

and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Dispositions* of Mankind ; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be formed, than any which has yet appeared : and hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the human Temper, may be of some little use towards this great End.

THE Author takes nothing in bad part from any of his Adversaries, except that Outcry which one or two of them made against these Principles as opposite to *Christianity*, though it be so well known that they have been and are espoused by many of the most zealous Christians. There are Answers interspersed in the later Editions to these Objections, to avoid the disagreeable Work of *Replying* or *Remarking*, in which one is not generally upon his Guard
suffi-

sufficiently to avoid Cavils and offensive Expressions.

THE last Treatise had never seen the Light, had not some worthy *Gentlemen* mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledged to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several *Schemes* of accounting for our *moral Ideas*, which some apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that *Sense* which the Author attempts to establish in *Treat. IV.* The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these *Schemes* must necessarily pre-suppose this *moral Sense*, and be resolved into it: Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon the Foundation of a moral Sense; though what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the Terms
much

much used on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great *variety of Terms*, and diversity of *Schemes* invented, that all Men *feel* something in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of a small Number of *Senses*, so that we are unwilling to have recourse in our Theories to any more; and rather strain out some Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to some of the natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledged. The like difficulty attends several other *Perceptions*, to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned their *distinct Senses*; such as *natural Beauty*, *Harmony*, the Perfection of *Poetry*, *Architecture*, *Designing*, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, or Fancy: The Explanations or Theories on these Subjects
are

are in like manner full of Confusion and Metaphor.

To define *Virtue* by *agreeableness to this moral Sense*, or describing it to be *kind Affection*, may appear perhaps too uncertain ; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by *Custom, Habits, false Opinions, Company* : and that some *particular kind Passions* toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that “ every one calls that
“ Temper, or those Actions *virtu-*
“ *ous*, which are approved by his
“ *own Sense* ;” and withal, that
“ abstracting from particular Habits
“ or Prejudices, that Temper which
“ desires, and those Actions which
“ are intended to procure the great-
“ est Moment of Good toward the
“ most

“ most extensive System to which
“ our Power can reach, is approved
“ as the highest Virtue; and that the
“ *universal calm Good-will or Bene-*
“ *volence*, where it is the leading Af-
“ fection of the Soul, so as to limit
“ or restrain all other Affections,
“ Appetites, or Passions, is the Tem-
“ per which we esteem in the high-
“ est Degree, according to the na-
“ tural Constitution of our Soul:
“ And withal, that we in a lower
“ Degree approve every particular
“ kind *Affection* or *Passion*, which is
“ not inconsistent with these higher
“ and nobler Dispositions.”

OUR *moral Sense* shews this calm
extensive Affection to be the highest
Perfection of our Nature; what we
may see to be the *End* or *Design* of
such a Structure, and consequently
what is required of us by the Author
of our Nature: and therefore if any
one like these Descriptions better, he
may

may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, “ *Vita secundum naturam* ;” or “ acting according to what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended for by our Creator.”

IF this *Moral Sense* were once set in a convincing Light, those vain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish: alledging, that whatever we admire or honour in a *moral Species*, is the effect of *Art, Education, Custom, Policy*, or subtle Views of Interest; we should then acknowledge

*Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri
gignimur.* Perf.

IT is true, a *Power of Reasoning* is natural to us; and we must own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our
(a) Actions,

Actions, if not to be called *Natural*, yet are an *Improvement upon our Nature*: but if Virtue be looked upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suspicions against it; as if indeed it might tend to the Interest of *large Bodies* or *Societies* of Men, or to that of their *Governors*; while yet one may better find his *private Interest*, or enjoy greater Pleasures in the Practices counted *vicious*, especially if he has any Probability of *Secrecy* in them. These Suspicions must be entirely removed, if we have a *moral Sense* and *publick Affections*, whose Gratifications are constituted by Nature, our most intense and durable *Pleasures*.

GENTLEMEN, who have opposed some other Sentiments of the Author of the *Inquiry*, seem convinced of a *moral Sense*. Some of them have by a Mistake made a Compliment to the Author, which does not belong

belong to him ; as if the World were any way indebted to him for this Discovery. He has too often met with the *Sensus Decoris* & *Honesti*, and with the φιλόανθρωποι καὶ αγαθοεῖδεις, to assume any such thing to himself.

SOME Letters in the *London Journals* in 1728, subscribed *Philaretus*, gave the first Occasion to the *Fourth Treatise*; the Answers given to them in those weekly Papers bore too visible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the *Author* declined to continue the Debate that way; chusing to send a private Letter to *Philaretus*, to desire a more private Correspondence on the Subject of our Debate. He was soon after informed, that his Death disappointed the Author's great Expectations from so ingenious a Correspondent. The *Objections* proposed in the first *Section* of *Trea-*

tise IV, are not always those of *Philaretus*, though the Author endeavoured to leave no Objections of his unanswered ; but he also interspersed whatever Objections occurred in Conversation on these Subjects ; and has not used any Expressions inconsistent with the high Regard he has for the Memory of so ingenious a Gentleman, and of such Distinction in the World.

IN the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into *Beauty* is called *Treatise* I. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is *Treatise* II. The Essay on the Passions, *Treatise* III. And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, *Treatise* IV.

THE CONTENTS.

TREATISE I.

*An ESSAY on the Nature and Conduct of
the PASSIONS.*

SECT. I.

A *General Account of our several Senses and
Desires, Selfish or Publick.* Page 1

SECT. II.

*Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws
of pure Affection; The confused Sensations of
the Passions, with their final Causes,* 27

SECT. III.

*Particular Divisions of the Affections and Pas-
sions,* 59

SECT. IV.

*How far our several Affections and Passions are
under our Power, either to govern them when
raised,*

C O N T E N T S.

raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects, 89

S E C T. V.

A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intensity and Duration, 127

S E C T. VI.

Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness, 167

T R E A T I S E II.

ILLUSTRATIONS upon the MORAL SENSE, 207

S E C T. I.

Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason, 215

S E C T. II.

Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice; the Fitness or Unfitness of Actions, 250

S E C T. III.

Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue, considered, 258

S E C T. IV.

Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense, 280

S E C T.

C O N T E N T S.

S E C T. V.

*Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant
by Merit; and be rewardable upon the Supposi-
tion that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected
from Affection or Instinct,* 299

S E C T. VI.

*How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make
an Action virtuous,* 307

A N

(1)

A N

ESSAY

O N T H E

NATURE and CONDUCT

O F T H E

PASSIONS.

S E C T. I.

*A general Account of our several
SENSES and DESIRES, Selfish
or Publick.*


THE Nature of human Actions S E C T. I.
cannot be sufficiently understood
without considering the *Affections*
and *Passions*; or those *Modifica-*
tions, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon
the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events,
in which the Mind generally conceives Good or
Evil. In this Inquiry we need little *Reason-*
ing, or Argument, since Certainty is only
B attainable

SECT. attainable by distinct *Attention* to what we
I. are *conscious* happens in our Minds.



Art. I. “ OBJECTS, Actions, or Events
“ obtain the Name of *Good*, or *Evil*, ac-
“ cording as they are the Causes, or Occa-
“ sions, mediately, or immediately, of a
“ grateful, or ungrateful *Perception* to some
“ sensitive Nature.” To understand therefore
the several Kinds of *Good*, or *Evil*, we must
apprehend the several Powers of Perception
or *Senses* natural to us.

It is by some Power of Perception, or
Sense, that we first receive the Ideas of these
Objects we are conversant with, or by some
Reasoning upon these perceived Objects of
Sense. By Sensation we not only receive the
Image or *Representation*, but some Feelings
of *Pleasure* or *Pain*; nay sometimes the sole
Perception is that of Pleasure or Pain, as in
Smells, and the Feelings of *Hunger* and
Thirst. The Pleasures or Pains perceived,
are sometimes *simple*, without any other pre-
vious Idea, or any Image, or other con-
comitant Ideas, save those of *Duration* or *Time*,
which accompanies every Perception, whe-
ther of *Sense*, or *inward Consciousness*. Other
Pleasures arise only upon some *previous Idea*,
or *Image*, or *Assemblage*, or *Comparison of*
Ideas. These Pleasures presupposing previ-
ous Ideas, were called *Perceptions* of an *in-*
ternal

ternal Sense, in a former Treatise *. Thus S E C T. I.
Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than *Tastes*, or *Smells*; the *Har-*
mony of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds †. In like manner, *Affections*, *Tem-*
pers,

* INQUIRY into BEAUTY.

† It is not easy to divide distinctly our several *Sensations* into Classes. The Division of our *External Senses* into the five common Classes, seems very imperfect. Some *Sensations*, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the Sensations of *Hunger*, *Thirst*, *Weariness*, *Sickness*; or if we reduce them to the Sense of *Feeling*, they are Perceptions as different from the other *Ideas* of Touch, such as *Cold*, *Heat*, *Hardness*, *Softness*, as the *Ideas* of *Taste* or *Smell*. Others have hinted at an External Sense different from all of these. The following general Account may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain Motions raised in our Bodies are by a *general Law* constituted the Occasion of *Perceptions* in the Mind. (2.) These Perceptions never come entirely alone, but have some other *Perception* joined with them. Thus every Sensation is accompanied with the *Idea* of *Duration*, and yet *Duration* is not a sensible *Idea*, since it also accompanies *Ideas* of *Internal Consciousness* or Reflection: So the *Idea* of *Number* may accompany any sensible Ideas, and yet may also accompany any other Ideas, as well as external Sensations. Brutes, when several Objects are before them, have probably all the proper Ideas of Sight which we have, without the Idea of Number. (3.) Some *Ideas* are found accompanying the most different Sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some *sensible Quality*; such are *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, and *Rest*, which accompany the *Ideas* of Sight, or Colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the *Ideas* of Touch, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, or *Rest* seem therefore to be more properly called *Ideas accompanying* the Sensations of Sight and Touch, than the Sensations of either of these Senses; since they can be received sometimes without the Ideas of Colour, and sometimes without those of Touching, though never without the one or the other. The *Perceptions* which are purely sensible, received each by its proper Sense, are *Tastes*, *Smells*, *Colours*, *Sound*, *Cold*, *Heats*, &c. The universal Concomitant *Ideas*

SECT. *pers, Sentiments, or Actions*, reflected upon

I. in ourselves, or observed in others, are the constant *Occasions* of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call *Approbation*, or *Dislike*. These *Moral Perceptions* arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our *previous Opinion* or *Apprehension* of the *Affection*, *Temper*, or *Intention* of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.

IF we may call “ *every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, A SENSE,*” we shall find many other *Senses* beside those commonly explained. Though it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will

which may attend any *Idea* whatsoever, are *Duration*, and *Number*. The *Ideas* which accompany the most different Sensations, are *Extension*, *Figure*, *Motion*, *Rest*. These all arise without any previous *Ideas* assembled, or compared: the Concomitant *Ideas* are reputed Images of something External.

From all these we may justly distinguish “ those Pleasures perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Resemblance among them.” These are meant by *the Perceptions of the internal Sense*.

shew

shew that there are such *Natural Powers* in SECT.
the human Mind, in whatever Order we I.
place them. In the 1st Class are the *Exter-*

nal Sensës, univèrsally known. In the 2d,
the *Pleasant Perceptions*, arising from *regular*,
harmonious, *uniform* Objects; as also, from
Grandeur and *Novelty*. These we may call,
after Mr. ADDISON the Pleasures of the *I-*
magination; or we may call the Power of
receiving them an *Internal Sense*. Whoever
dislikes this Name may substitute another.


3. The next Class of Perceptions we may
call a *Publick Sense*, viz. "our Determina-
"tion to be pleased with the *Happiness* of
"others, and to be uneasy at their *Misery*."
This is found in some degree in all Men,
and was sometimes called *Κοινωνιαισθησις*, or
Sensus Communis by some of the Antients.
This inward Pain of Compassion cannot be
called a Sensation of Sight. It solely arises
from an Opinion of *Misery felt by another*,
and not immediately from a visible Form.
The same Form presented to the Eye by the
exactest Painting, or the Action of a Player,
gives no Pain to those who remember that
there is no Misery felt. When Men by Ima-
gination conceive real Pain felt by an Actor,
without recollecting that it is merely feigned,
or when they think of the real Story represent-
ed, then, as there is a confused Opinion of
real Misery, there is also Pain in Compassion.

4. The fourth Class we may call the *Moral*

SECT. *Sense*, by which “ we perceive *Virtue* or

I. “ *Vice*, in ourselves, or others.” This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon *Virtue* or *Vice*, in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in *Natural Affection*, *Compassion*, *Friendship*, or even *general Benevolence* to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own *Virtue*. 5. The fifth Class is a *Sense of Honour*, which makes the *Approbation*, or *Gratitude* of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasure; and their *Dislike*, *Condemnation*, or *Resentment* of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called *Shame*, even when we fear no further evil from them.

THERE are perhaps other *Perceptions* distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas “ of *Decency*, *Dignity*, *Suitableness* to “ *human Nature* in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an *Indecency*, *Mean-ness*, and *Unworthiness*, in the contrary “ Actions or Circumstances, even without “ any conception of *Moral Good*, or *Evil*.” Thus the Pleasures of *Sight*, and *Hearing*, are more esteemed than those of *Taste* or *Touch*:

Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of SECT. the *Imagination*, are more approved than I. those of simple external Sensations. *Plato*  makes one of his Dialogists* account for this difference from a constant opinion of *Innocence* in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their *Innocence*, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another *Class of Sensations*.

II. DESIRES arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of A like Division of our Desires. Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for *ourselves* or *others* the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the *uneasy Sensation*, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of *sensual Pleasure*, (by which we mean that of the external Senses, of Taste and Touch chiefly); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the *Pleasures of Imagination* or Internal Sense†, and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from *Publick Happiness*, and Aversion to the Pains arising

* Hippias Major. See also *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

† See *Treat. I.*

SECT. from the *Misery of others*. 4. Desires of

I. *Virtue*, and *Aversion to Vice*, according to
 the Notions we have of the Tendency of
 Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detri-
 ment. 5. Desires of *Honour*, and *Aversion*
 to Shame *.

*Secondary
 Desires of
 Wealth
 and Power.*

AND since we are capable of *Reflection*,
Memory, *Observation*, and *Reasoning* about
 the distant Tendencies of Objects and
 Actions, and not confined to things present,
 there must arise, in consequence of our *ori-
 ginal Desires*, "*secondary Desires* of every
 " thing imagined useful to gratify any of
 " the primary Desires, and that with strength
 " proportioned to the several original De-
 " sires, and the imagined Usefulness, or
 " Necessity, of the advantageous Object."
 Thus as soon as we come to apprehend the
 Use of *Wealth* or *Power* to gratify any of
 our original Desires, we must also desire
 them. Hence arises the *Universality* of these
 Desires of *Wealth* and *Power* since they are
 the Means of gratifying all other Desires.
 " How foolish then is the Inference, some
 " would make, from the universal Preva-
 " lence of these Desires, that human Nature
 " is wholly selfish, or that each one is only
 " studious of his *own Advantage*; since
 " *Wealth* or *Power* are as naturally fit to

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 3—8.*

" gratify

“ gratify our *Publick Desires*, or to serve
 “ *virtuous Purposes*, as the *selfish* ones?”


SECT.
 I.


“ How weak also are the Reasonings of
 “ some recluse Moralists, who condemn in
 “ general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power,
 “ as below a perfectly virtuous Character :”
 since Wealth and Power are the most effective
Means, and the most powerful *Instruments*,
 even of the greatest Virtues, and most
 generous Actions? The Pursuit of them is
 laudable, when the *Intention* is virtuous; and
 the Neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities
 offer, is really a Weakness. This
 justifies the Poet's Sentiments :

————— *Hic onus borret,*
Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus :
Hic subit & perfert : aut virtus nomen inane est,
Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.
 HOR. *Epist.* XVII.

FURTHER, the *Laws* or *Customs* of a
 Country, the *Humour* of our Company may
 have made strange *Associations* of *Ideas*, so
 that some Objects, which of themselves are
 indifferent to any Sense, yet by reason of
 some *additional* grateful *Idea*, may become
 very desirable; or by like *Addition* of an
 ungrateful *Idea* may raise the strongest Aversion.
 Thus many a Trifle, when once it is
 made a *Badge* of *Honour*, an Evidence of
 some *generous Disposition*, a Monument of
 some

SECT. some *great Action*, may be impatiently pursued, from our Desire of Honour. When

I.  any *Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture*, is constituted as a Mark of *Infamy*, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, though in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of *Living*, of *receiving Company*, of *shewing Courtesy*, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of all this, may be made uneasy at their Condition, though much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus *Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour*, and *Diversions* are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional *Ideas* *. Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the *publick Esteem*, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.

The Use of these Associations SHOULD any one be surprized at this *Disposition* in our Nature to associate any *Ideas* together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what

* See *Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 7.* and *Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 6.*

great *Evils*, and how much *Corruption* of S E C T. I.
 Affections is owing to it, it may help to ac-
 count for this Part of our Constitution, to
 consider, “ that all our *Language* and much
 “ of our *Memory* depends upon it:” So that
 were there no such *Associations* made, we
 must lose the use of *Words*, and a great part
 of our Power of *recollecting past Events*; be-
 side many other valuable *Powers* and *Arts*
 which depend upon them. Let it also be
 considered that it is much in our power by a
 vigorous *Attention* either to prevent *these Af-*
sociations, or by *Abstraction* to separate Ideas
 when it may be useful for us to do so.

CONCERNING our Pursuit of *Honour*, it
 is to be observed, that “ since our Minds are
 “ incapable of retaining a great Diversity of
 “ Objects, the *Novelty*, or *Singularity* of any
 “ Object is enough to raise a particular At-
 “ tention to it among many of equal Me-
 “ rit:” And therefore were Virtue *universal*
 among Men, yet, it is probable, the *Atten-*
tion of Observers would be turned chiefly to-
 ward those who distinguished themselves by
 some *singular Ability*, or by some Circum-
 stance, which, however trifling in its own
 Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas com-
 monly joined to it, such as those of *Magni-*
ficence, *Generosity*, or the like. We should
 perhaps, when we considered sedately the
 common

SECT. common Virtues of others, equally love and


I. esteem them*: And yet probably our *Attention* would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us an *Emulation* or desire of *Eminence*, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, through a *Confusion of Ideas*, is reputed honourable.

THIS Desire of *Distinction* has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very *Rarity*, *Difficulty*, or *Expence*; by a confused Imagination that they evidence *Generosity*, *Ability*, or a *finer Taste* than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A *Form of Dress*, a *foreign Dish*, a *Title*, a *Place*, a *Jewel*; an *useless Problem*, a *Criticisim on an obsolete Word*, the *Origin of a Poetic Fable*, the *Situation of a razed Town*, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:

*Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit.*————— H O R.

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 3.* last Parag.

Art. III. THERE is another Division of SECT.
our Desires taken from the Persons for whose I.

Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. 

“ The Desires in which one intends or pur- Desires,
sues what he apprehends advantageous to selfish and

“ himself, we may call publick. SELFISH; and those

“ in which we pursue what we apprehend

“ advantageous to others, and do not appre-

“ hend advantageous to *ourselves*, or do not

“ pursue with this view, we may call *Pub-*

“ *lick* or BENEVOLENT Desires.” If there

be a just Foundation for this Division, it is

more extensive than the former Division,

since each of the former Classes may come

under either Member of this Division, ac-

cording as we are desiring any of the five

sorts of Pleasures *for ourselves*, or desiring

them *for others*. The former Division may

therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the

latter.

THIS Division has been disputed since

Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and

some of late, who detest other parts of his

Scheme, maintain, “ that all our Desires are

“ *selfish*: or, that what every one intends or


“ designs ultimately, in each Action, is the

“ obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoid-


“ ing his own *Private Pain*.” *

* See *Cicero de Finib. lib. 1.*

SECT. IT requires a good deal of Subtilty to de-

I. fend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to
 *Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community*, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and *Affectation*. But some do * acknowledge a *publick Sense* in many Instances; especially in *natural Affection*, and *Compassion*; by which “ the Observation of
 “ the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their
 “ Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observer.” That this *Sympathy* with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon ourselves by any Choice, with view to any *selfish Advantage*, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the *Fortunate*, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the *Distressed*: And every one feels that this *publick Sense* will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man’s *Choice*, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, “ That by means


* See Mr. Clark of Hull, his *Remarks on Treat. II.* in his *Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice.*

“ of it there is a *Conjunction of Interest*: the S E C T.
 “ Happiness of others becomes the Means of I.
 “ private Pleasure to the Observer; and for 
 “ this Reason, or with a View to this private
 “ Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of ano-
 “ ther.” Others deduce our Desire of the
 Happiness of others from Self-love, in a less
 specious manner.

IF a *publick Sense* be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our *Love of others*, or for *generous Offices*, may be determined from the following Considerations; which being matters of *internal Consciousness*, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.

LET it be premised, that there is a certain *Pain* or *Uneasiness* accompanying most of our violent Desires. Though the Object pursued be Good, or the Means of Pleasure, yet the Desire of it generally is attended with an uneasy Sensation. When an Object or Event appears Evil, we desire to shun or prevent it. This Desire is also attended with uneasy Sensation of *Impatience*: Now this Sensation
 imme-

SECT. immediately connected with the Desire, is a

I. distinct Sensation from those which we dread,
 and endeavour to shun. It is plain then,

1. "THAT no Desire of any Event is
 " excited by any view of removing the *un-*
 " *easy Sensation attending this Desire itself.*"
 Uneasy Sensations previously felt, will raise a
 Desire of whatever will remove them; and
 this Desire may have its concomitant Unea-
 siness. Pleasant Sensations expected from any
 Object may raise our Desire of it; this De-
 sire too may have its concomitant uneasy
 Sensations: But the *uneasy Sensation, accompa-*
nying and connected with the Desire itself,
 cannot be a Motive to that *Desire* which
 it presupposes. The *Sensation* accompany-
 ing Desire is generally *uneasy*, and conse-
 quently our Desire is never raised with a view
 to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire
 raised with a view to *remove* this uneasy *Sen-*
sation, for the Desire is raised previously to
 it. This holds concerning all *Desire* publick
 or private.

THERE is also a peculiar pleasant *Sensa-*
tion of Joy, attending the *Gratification* of any
 Desire, beside the *Sensation* received from the
 Object itself, which we directly intended.
 " But Desire does never arise from a View of
 " obtaining that *Sensation of Joy*, connected
 " with the Success or Gratification of Desire;
 " other-

“ otherwise the strongest Desires might arise S E C T.
 “ toward any Trifle, or an Event in all re- I.
 “ spects indifferent: Since, if Desire arose
 “ from *this View*, the stronger the Desire
 “ were, the higher would be the *Pleasure of*
 “ *Gratification*; and therefore we might de-
 “ sire the turning of a Straw as violently as
 “ we do *Wealth* or *Power*.” This Expecta-
 tion of that *Pleasure which merely arises from*
gratifying of Desire, would equally excite us
 to desire the *Misery* of others as their Happi-
 ness; since this *Pleasure of Gratification*
 might be obtained from both Events alike.

2. IT is certain that “ *that Desire of the*
 “ *Happiness of others which we account*
 “ *virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects*
 “ *of any secular Advantage, Wealth, Pow-*
 “ *er, Pleasure of the external Senses, Re-*
 “ *ward from the Deity, or future Pleasures*
 “ *of Self-Approbation.*” To prove this let
 us consider, “ That no Desire of any Event
 “ can arise immediately or directly from an
 “ *Opinion in the Agent, that his having such*
 “ *a Desire will be the Means of private*
 “ *Good.*” This *Opinion* would make us
 wish or desire to have that *advantageous De-*
sire or Affection; and would incline us to use
 any means in our power to raise that Affe-
 ction: but no Affection or Desire is raised in
 us, directly by our *volition* or *desiring* it.
 That alone which raises in us from *Self-Love*
 C the

SECT. the Desire of any Event, is an *Opinion* that

I. *that Event* is the *Means* of private Good.

As soon as we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if *having the Desire, or the mere Affection*, be imagined the *Means* of private Good, and not the *Existence of the Event desired*, then from *Self-Love* we should only desire or wish to have the *Desire* of that Event, and should not desire the *Event* itself, since the *Event* is not conceived as the *Means* of Good.

FOR instance, suppose GOD revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our *Country were happy*; then from Self-Love we should have immediately *the subordinate Desire* of our Country's Happiness, as the *Means* of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we *desired the Happiness of our Country*; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the *Happiness of our Country*, since it is not now conceived as the *Means* of our future Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The *Means* of our Happiness is *the having a Desire of our Country's Happiness*; we should therefore from Self-Love only wish to have *this Desire*.

IT is true indeed in fact, that, because SECT.
Benevolence is natural to us, a little Attention I.
 to other Natures will raise in us good-will to-
 wards them, whenever by any Opinions we
 are persuaded that there is no real *Opposition*
of Interest. But had we no Affection distinct
 from *Self-Love*, nothing could raise our *De-*
sire of the Happiness of others, but conceiv-
 ing their Happiness as the Means of ours.
 An Opinion that our having *kind Affections*
 would be the Means of our private Happi-
 ness, would only make us desire to have those
 Affections. Now that Affections do not arise
 upon our *wishing* to have them, or our voli-
 tion of raising them; as conceiving the *Af-*
fections themselves to be the *Means* of private
 Good; is plain from this, that if they did
 thus arise, then a *Bribe* might raise any De-
 sire toward any Event, or any *Affection* to-
 ward the most improper Object. We might
 be hired to *love* or *hate* any sort of Persons,
 to be *angry*, *jealous*, or *compassionate*, as we
 can be engaged into external Actions; which
 we all see to be absurd. Now those who al-
 ledge, that our Benevolence may arise from
 prospect of *secular Advantage*, *Honour*, *Self-*
Approbation, or *future Rewards*, must own,
 that the two former are Motives only to *ex-*
ternal Actions; and the other two only shew
 that *having the Desire of the Happiness of*
others, would be the *Means* of private Good;

SECT. while the *Event* desired, viz. the Happiness

I. of others, is not supposed the *Means* of any private Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of *Epicurus*, acknowledge that “ Desires are not raised by “ *Volition*.”

This Distinction defended.

3. “ THERE are in Men *Desires of the Happiness of others*, when they do not conceive this *Happiness* as the *Means* of obtaining any sort of Happiness to themselves.” *Self-Approbation*, or *Rewards* from the DEITY, might be the *Ends*, for obtaining which we might possibly *desire* or *will* from Self-Love, to raise in ourselves *kind Affections*; but we could not from *Self-Love* desire the *Happiness of others*, except we imagined their Happiness to be the *Means* of our own. Now it is certain that sometimes we may have this *subordinate Desire* of the Happiness of others, conceived as the *Means* of our own; as suppose one had laid a *Wager* upon the Happiness of a Person of such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are *Partners in Stock*, and share in Profit or Loss; when one hopes to *succeed to*, or some way to *share in* the Prosperity of another; or if the DEITY had given such Threatnings, as they tell us *Telamon* gave his Sons when they went to War, that he would reward or punish one according as others were happy

happy or miserable: In such Cases one might have this *subordinate Desire* of another's Happiness from Self-Love. But as we are sure the DEITY has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the *Desire of the Happiness of others*, without any such Conception of it as the *Means* of our own; and are sensible that this *subordinate Desire* is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an *ultimate Desire*, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such *ultimate publick Desires* we often feel, without any *subordinate Desire* of the same Event, as the *Means* of private Good. The *subordinate* may sometimes, nay often does concur with the *ultimate*; and then indeed the *whole Moment* of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: But the *subordinate alone* is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.

Art. IV. THIS will clear our Way to answer the chief Difficulty: "May not our Benevolence be at least a *Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasure of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness?*" If it were so, it is very unaccountable, that we should approve this *subordinate Desire* as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a *Wager*, or other Considerations of Interest.

SECT. *terest.* Both Desires proceed from *Self-Love*

I. in the same manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the *Motive of Interest might*, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.

Do not we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a *Publick Sense*? Were it our only View, in *Compassion* to free ourselves from the *Pain of the publick Sense*; should the DEITY propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, or to harden our Hearts against all feelings of Compassion, on the one hand, while yet the Object continued in Misery; or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the DEITY assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be entirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the
pleasant


pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?

SECT.
I.


IT is true, our *Publick Sense* might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taste of Meat or Drink and his Sensations of Hunger and Thirst might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong *Desires* of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a view to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any *Desire* of the *Means of private Pleasure* can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, it is certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the *Happiness of others*, as in any part of his Life, which must be the Case with those who voluntarily hazard their Lives, or resolve on Death for their Country or Friends. We do not therefore desire it as the *Means of private Pleasure*.

SHOULD any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some *confused Association of Ideas*; as a Miser, who loves nobody, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death:

SECT. let any honest Heart try if the deepest Refle-

I. ction will break this *Association* (if there be
 any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. How would any *Spectator* like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it *refined Wisdom*, or a *Perfection* of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? It is plain then we feel this *ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others to be a most *natural Instinct*, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused *Ideas*.

THE Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving *disinterested Desires*, has probably been from the attempting to define this simple Idea, *Desire*. It is called an *uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good**. Whereas *Desire* is as distinct from any Sensation, as the *Will* is from the *Understanding* or *Senses*. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of *desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain*.

WE may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always towards *private Good*, that they are oftner employed about

* See Mr. Lock's *Essay on Human Understanding in the Chap. on the Passions*.

the State of others. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the *Means of private Good, or publick.* Thus an *Epicurean* who denies a future State; or, one to whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a *future Fame*, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no *selfish Being*, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this power, we must be content to be thus "outwitted by nature into a publick Interest against our Will;" as an ingenious Author expresses it.

THE Prospect of any *Interest* may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the *Means* of obtaining it. Particularly, "if *Rewards* of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, this would raise in us the Desire of having these *Affections*, and would incline us to use all Means to raise them in ourselves; particularly to *turn our Attention* to all those Qualities in the DEITY, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections." Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-balance all Motives to Vice.


THIS

SECT. THIS may let us see, that “ the Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, as proposed in the *Gospel*, are not rendered useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affections to be *disinterested* ;” since such *Motives of Interest*, proposed and attended to, must incline every Person to *desire* to have virtuous Affections, and to *turn his Attention* to every thing which is naturally apt to raise them ; and must *over-balance* every other *Motive of Interest*, opposite to these Affections, which could incline Men to suppress or counteract them.


S E C T.

S E C T. II.

Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes.

I. **A**FTER the general Account of **S E C T.**
Sensations, we may consider other II.
Modifications of our Minds, consequent upon 
these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are *Proper Af-*
Desire of the grateful Perceptions, and *Aver-* *sions are*
sion to the uneasy, either for ourselves or o- *Desire and*
thers. If we would confine the word *Affe-* *Aversion.*
ction to these two, which are entirely distinct
from all *Sensation*, and directly incline the
Mind to *Action* or *Volition of Motion*, we
should have less Debate about the Number or
Division of Affections. But since, by univer-
sal Custom, this Name is applied to other Mo-
difications of the Mind, such as *Joy*, *Sorrow*,
Despair, we may consider what universal *Di-*
stinction can be assigned between these *Mo-*
difications, and the several *Sensations* above-
mentioned; and we shall scarce find any o-
ther than this, that we call “ the *direct im-*
“ *mediate Perception* of Pleasure or Pain from
“ the

SECT. " the present Object or Event, the *Sensati-*

II. " on:" But we denote by the *Affection* or
 *Passion* some other " *Perceptions* of Pleasure
Other Af- " or Pain, not directly raised by the *Presence*
fections, " or *Operation* of the Event or Object, but
wherein " by our *Reflection* upon, or *Apprehension* of
different " their present or future Existence; so that
from Sen- " we expect or judge that the Object or E-
sation. " vent will raise the *direct Sensations* in us."

In beholding a regular Building we have the *Sensation* of Beauty; but upon our *apprehending* ourselves possessed of it, or that we can procure this pleasant *Sensation* when we please, we feel the *Affection* of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the *painful Sensation*; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the *Affection* of Sorrow, which might be called a Sort of *Sensation*: as the Physicians call many of our *Passions internal Senses*.

Affection
distinct
from Pas-
sion.

WHEN the word *Passion* is imagined to denote any thing different from the *Affections*, it includes a strong Brutal Impulse of the Will, sometimes without any distinct notions of Good, publick or private, attended with " a * *confused Sensation* either of Plea-


* Whoever would see subtle Divisions of those *Sensations*, let him read *Malebranche's Recherche de la Verite*, B. v. c. 3. Together with these *Sensations* there are also some strong *Propensities* distinct from any rational Desire: About which see *Sect. 3. Art. 2.* of this Treatise.

“ sure or Pain, occasioned or attended by SECT.
 “ some violent bodily Motions, which keeps II.
 “ the Mind much employed upon the pre-
 “ sent Affair, to the exclusion of every thing
 “ else, and prolongs or strengthens the Af-
 “ fection sometimes to such a degree, as to
 “ prevent all *deliberate Reasoning* about our
 “ Conduct.”

II. WE have little reason to imagine, that
 all other Agents have such *confused Sensations* General
 accompanying their Desires as we often have. Desires,
 Let us abstract from them, and consider in and parti-
 what manner we should act upon the several cular Af-
 Occasions which now excite our Passions, if fections or
 we had none of these *Sensations* whence our Passions.
 Desires become *passionate*.

THERE is a Distinction to be observed on
 this Subject, between “ the *calm Desire* of
 “ Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish
 “ or publick, as they appear to our *Reason*
 “ or *Reflection*; and the *particular Passions*
 “ towards Objects immediately presented to
 “ some Sense.” Thus nothing can be more
 distinct than the *general calm Desire* of pri-
 vate Good of any kind, which alone would
 incline us to pursue whatever Objects were
 apprehended as the Means of Good, and the
 particular *selfish Passions*, such as *Ambition*,
Covetousness, *Hunger*, *Lust*, *Revenge*, *An-*
ger, as they arise upon particular Occasions.
 In

SECT. In like Manner our publick Desires may be

II. distinguished into the *general calm Desire*
 of the *Happiness of others*, or *Aversion to their Misery* upon Reflection; and the *particular Affections* or *Passions* of *Love*, *Congratulation*, *Compassion*, *natural Affection*. These *particular Affections* are found in many Tempers, where, through want of Reflection, the *general calm Desires* are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. Sometimes the calm Motion of the *Will* conquers the *Passion*, and sometimes is conquered by it. Thus *Lust* or *Revenge* may conquer the calm Affection toward private Good, and sometimes are conquered by it. *Compassion* will prevent the necessary Correction of a Child, or the use of a severe Cure, while the calm *parental Affection* is exciting to it. Sometimes the latter prevails over the former. All this is beautifully represented in the 9th book of *Plato's Republick*. We obtain *Command* over the *particular Passions*, principally by strengthening the *general Desires* through frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so as to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*. *

AGAIN,

* The Schoolmen express this Distinction by the *Appetitus rationalis*, and the *Appetitus Sensitivus*. All Animals have in common the *External Senses* suggesting notions of things as pleasant

AGAIN, the *calm publick Desires* may be considered as "they either regard the Good of *particular Persons* or *Societies* presented to our Senses; or that of some more abstracted or general Community, such as a *Species* or *System*." This latter sort we may call *universal calm Benevolence*. Now it is plain, that not only *particular kind Passions*, but even *calm particular Benevolence* do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the *universal Benevolence*; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: and the former two may be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the *universal Benevolence* might be where there was neither of the former; as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.

sant or painful; and have also the *Appetitus Sensitivus*, or some instinctive Desires and Aversions. *Rational Agents* have, superadded to these, two higher analogous Powers; viz. the *Understanding*, or *Reason*, presenting farther notions, and attended with an higher sort of Sensations; and the *Appetitus rationalis*. This latter is a "constant natural Disposition of Soul to desire what the Understanding, or these sublimer Sensations, represent as Good, and to shun what they represent as Evil, and this either when it respects ourselves or others." This many call the *Will* as distinct from the *Passions*. Some later Writers seem to have forgot it, by ascribing to the *Understanding* not only *Ideas*, *Notions*, *Knowledge*; but *Action*, *Inclinations*, *Desires*, *Prosecution*, and their Contraries.

OUR

SECT. OUR *moral Sense*, though it approves all
 II. particular kind *Affection* or *Passion*, as well
 as *calm particular Benevolence* abstractedly
 considered; yet it also approves the *Restraint* or *Limitation* of all particular *Affections* or *Passions*, by the *calm universal Benevolence*. To make this *Desire* prevalent above all *particular Affections*, is the only sure way to obtain constant *Self-Approval*.

THE *calm selfish Desires* would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of *Good in general*, of *infinite Good*, or of the *greatest Aggregate*: Much less need we suppose any *actual Inclination* toward any of these, as the *Cause* or *Spring* of all particular Desires. It is enough to allow, “ that we are capable by *enlarging*, or “ by *Abstraction*, of coming to these Ideas: “ that we must, by the Constitution of “ our Nature, desire any apprehended Good “ which occurs a-part from any Evil: That “ of two Objects inconsistent with each other, we shall desire that which seems to “ contain the greatest *Moment of Good*.” So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any *finite Good*, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly
 have

have the Idea of a *Greater*, or see this to be SECT. II.
 inconsistent with some *more valuable Object*,
 or that it may bring upon him some *prepollent*
Evil. The certain Knowledge of any of
 these Things, or probable *Presumption* of
 them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite
 Good. If this be any sort of *Liberty*, it
 must be allowed to be in Men, even by those
 who maintain “ the *Desire* or *Will* to be
 “ necessarily determined by the *prepollent*
 “ *Motive*,” since this very *Presumption* may
 be a *prepollent* Motive, especially to those,
 who by frequent *Attention* make the Idea
 of the *greatest Good* always present to them-
 selves on all important Occasions. The
 same may easily be applied to our Aversion
 to finite Evils.

THERE seems to be this Degree of Li-
 berty even in the acts of the *Understanding*,
 or in *Judging*, that though the *highest Cer-*
tainty or *Demonstration* does necessarily en-
 gage our Assent, yet we can suspend any
absolute Conclusion from *probable* Arguments,
 until we examine whether this apparent
Probability be not opposite to *Demonstrati-*
on, or *superior Probability* on the other side.

THIS may let us see, that though it were
 acknowledged that “ Men are *necessarily* de-
 “ termined to pursue their own Happiness,
 “ and to be influenced by whatever Mo-


SECT. "tive appears to be *prepollent*;" yet they

II. might be proper *Subjects of a Law*; since
 the very *Sanctions* of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive *prepollent* to all others. In like manner, "Errors may be criminal,* where there are
 "sufficient *Data* or *Objective Evidence* for
 "the Truth;" since no Demonstration can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet *human Penalties* concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of *Argument*, or *Probability* to engage our *Assent*, however they may as *Motives* determine our *Election*.

IN the *calm publick Desires*, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Importance or *Moment* of the Good, and the *Number* of those who shall enjoy it.

WHEN the *publick Desires* are opposite to the *private*, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is *stronger* or more intense.

* See *Treat. II. Sect 6. Art. 6.* last Paragraph.

III. THE following *Definitions* of cer- S E C T.
tain Words used on this Subject, may shorten II.
our Expressions; and the *Maxims* subjoined 
may shew the manner of acting from *calm* *Definiti-*
Desire, with Analogy to the *Laws of Mo-*
tion. *ons.*

1. NATURAL *Good* is Pleasure: *Natural* *Natural*
Evil is Pain. *Good and*
Evil.

2. NATURAL *good Objects* are those which
are apt either mediately or immediately to
give Pleasure; the former are called *Advan-*
tageous. Natural *Evil Objects* are such as,
in like manner, give Pain.

3. ABSOLUTE *Good* is that which, confi- *Absolute.*
dered with all its Concomitants and Conse-
quences, contains more Good than what com-
pensates all its Evils.

4. ABSOLUTE *Evil*, on the contrary, con-
tains Evil which outweighs all its Good.

5. RELATIVE *Good or Evil*, is any parti- *Relative.*
cular Good or Evil, which does not thus
compensate its contrary Concomitants or
Consequences. This Distinction would have
been more exactly expressed by the *Bonum*
simpliciter, and *secundum quid* of the School-
men.

SECT. HENCE relative *Good* may be *Absolute*

II. *Evil*; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And *Absolute Good* may be *Relative Evil*; thus an *unpleasant Potion* may recover Health.


Good and *Evil*, according to the *Persons* whom they affect, may be divided into *Universal*, *Particular*, and *Private*.

Universal. 6. UNIVERSAL *Good* is what tends to the Happiness of the whole *System of sensitive Beings*; and *Universal Evil* is the contrary.

Particular. 7. PARTICULAR *Good* is what tends to the Happiness of a Part of this System: *Particular Evil* is the contrary.

Private. 8. PRIVATE *Good or Evil* is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either *Absolute* or *Relative*.

HENCE. 1. *Particular or private Good* may possibly be *universal Evil*: And *universal Good* may be *particular or private Evil*. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there
are

are some apparent Instances: such as the SECT.
Success of an unjust War; or the *Escape of* II.
an unrelenting Criminal. 

2. WHEN *particular* or *private Goods* are entirely innocent toward others, they are *universal Good*.

9. COMPOUND *good Objects* or *Events*, are *Compound*. such as contain Goods of several sorts at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the *Moral Sense* and of *Honour*. The same is easily applicable to *compound Evil*.

10. A MIXED *Object* is what contains at *Mixed*. once Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the *Pleasures* of the *Moral Sense*, and *Pains of the external Senses*. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the *publick Sense*, and the Pains of *Compassion* toward the Sufferer.

11. THE *greatest* or *most perfect Good* is *Greatest Good*. that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.

SECT. 12. AN ACTION is morally *good*, when it

II. flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend *universal absolute Good*; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing *particular absolute Good*, not inconsistent with universal Good.

*Moral
Good.*

*Moral
Evil.*

13. AN ACTION is *morally evil*, either from Intention of *absolute Evil*, universal, or particular, (*universal Evil is scarce ever intended, and particular Evil only in violent Passions) or from pursuit of *private* or *particular relative Good*, which they might have known did tend to *universal absolute Evil*. For even the want of a † just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.


Compound.

14. COMPOUND *moral Goodness* is that to which different *moral Species* concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand *compound moral Evil*. We cannot suppose *mixed moral Actions*. ‡

* See Treatise II. Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 143.

† Treatise IV. Sect. 6. Art. 4.

‡ See Treatise II. Sect. 7. Art. 9. last Parag.

15. AGENTS are denominated *morally* SECT.
good or evil, from their Affections and II.
 Actions, or Attempts of Action. 

IV. MAXIMS, or natural Laws of *calm* Axioms, or
Desire. general
Laws.

1. SELFISH *Desires* pursue ultimately on-
 ly the private Good of the Agent.

2. BENEVOLENT or *publick Desires* pur-
 sue the Good of others, according to the
 several *Systems* to which we extend our At-
 tention, but with different Degrees of
 Strength.

3. THE *Strength* either of the *private*
 or *publick* Desire of any Event, is propor-
 tioned to the imagined *Quantity of Good*,
 which will arise from it to the Agent, or
 the Person for whose sake it is desired.

4. MIXED *Objects* are pursued or shun-
 ned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned
 to the apprehended *Excess* of Good or Evil.

5. EQUAL *Mixtures* of Good and Evil
 stop all Desire or Aversion.

6. A COMPOUND *good or evil Object*, is
 prosecuted or shunned with a *Degree* of
 Desire

SECT. Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the *Sum*
 II. of Good, or of Evil.



7. IN computing the *Quantities* of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for ourselves or others, when the *Durations* are equal, the Moment is as the *Intenseness*, or Dignity of the Enjoyment: and when the *Intenseness* of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the *Duration*.

8. HENCE the *Moment* of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the *Duration* and *Intenseness*.

9. THE *Trouble*, *Pain*, or *Danger*, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the *Sum* of the Good. So the *Pleasures* which attend or flow from the means of *prepollent Evil*, are to be subtracted, to find the *absolute Quantity*.

10. THE Ratio of the *Hazard* of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the *Hazard* of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.

HENCE it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the
 greatest

greatest Good, if the *Uncertainty* of the S E C T. latter surpasses *that* of the former, in a greater II. Proportion than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with *smaller*, but more *probably successful* Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but *less Probability*.

11. To an *immortal* Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally *acute* in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.

12. BUT if the Duration of the Good be *infinite*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as *finite* added to *infinite*, surpasses *infinite* alone.

13. To Beings of *limited certain Duration*, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the *Duration* of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.

14. To Beings of *limited uncertain Duration*, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according

SECT. ing to the Hazard of the *Possessor's Duration*.

II. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledge to be a *natural Disposition* of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, *viz.* that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the *nearer* Enjoyments than the more distant, tho' of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.

15. THE *Removal of Pain* has always the Notion of Good, and sollicitus us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by *Intenseness* and *Duration*, and affected by the *Hazard* and by the *Uncertainty* of our Existence.

THESE are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,

16. THAT our Desires toward *publick Good* are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.

17. OUR publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when
the

the *Moments* and other Circumstances are equal. SECT. II.



18. WHEN the *Moments* themselves, and *Numbers* of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the *Strength* or *Nearness* of the *Ties* or *Attachments* to the Persons.

19. WHEN all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended *Moral Excellence* of the Persons.

20. IN general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the *Quantity of the Good itself*, and the *Number*, *Attachment*, and *Dignity* of the Persons.


THESE seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our *Senses* constitute Objects, Events or Actions *good*; and “ we have Power to *reason*, reflect and compare the several Goods, and “ to find out the proper and effectual Means “ of obtaining the greatest for ourselves or “ others, so as not to be led aside by every “ Appearance of *relative* or *particular* “ Good.”

V. IF it be granted, that we have im-^{Abion}planted in our Nature the several *Desires*^{from pure} above-mentioned, let us next inquire “ into ^{Desire or}*Affection*, “ what

SECT. " what *State* we would incline to bring
 II. " ourselves, upon the several Accidents
 ~~~~~ " which now raise our *Passions*; supposing  
 " that we had the Choice of our own State  
 " entirely, and were not, by the Frame of  
 " our Nature, subjected to certain *Sensa-*  
 " *tions*, independently of our Volition."

IF it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between *Affections* and *Passions*, or that *Desire* may subsist without any *uneasiness*, since perhaps we are never conscious of any *Desire* absolutely free from all *uneasiness*; " let  
 " it be considered, that the simple Idea of  
 " *Desire* is different from that of Pain of  
 " any kind, or from any *Sensation* whatso-  
 " ever: Nor is there any other Argument  
 " for their Identity than this, that they oc-  
 " cur to us at once: But this Argument is  
 " inconclusive, otherwise it would prove  
 " *Colour* and *Figure* to be the same, or *In-*  
 " *cision* and *Pain*."

THERE is a *middle State* of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any *important Good*, nor know of any great *Indigence* of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to ourselves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely *desire* and *pursue* it, without any considerable *Sensation* of *Pain* or *Uneasiness*. Some Tempers seem  
 to


to have as strong *Desires* as any, by the Con- S E C T.  
 stancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of II.  
 publick or private Good ; and yet give small 

Evidence of any *uneasy Sensation*. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others : Nay, if we consult our Hearts, we shall perhaps find, that “ the noblest Desire “ in our Nature, that of *universal Happiness*, is generally calm, and wholly free “ from any confused uneasy Sensation : ” except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively *Imagination*, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward *universal Nature*.\* Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly future Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any *Pain* attending such Desires. But tho’ this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them ; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.

UPON this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it *difficult* or *uncertain* to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost ; we would set

\* See *Marcus Aurelius*, in many places.


SECT. about it with Diligence, but would never

II. chuse to bring upon ourselves any *painful*  
 *Sensation* accompanying our Desire, nor to  
 increase our Toil by *Anxiety*. Whatever  
 Satisfaction we had in our State before the  
 Prospect of this additional Good, we should  
 continue to enjoy it while this Good was in  
 suspense; and if we found it unattainable,  
 we should be just as we were before: We  
 should never chuse to bring upon ourselves  
 those *Frettings* which now commonly arise  
 from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of  
 any impending Evil, we should *desire* and  
*use all means* to prevent it, but should never  
 voluntarily bring upon ourselves the uneasy  
 Sensation of *Fear*, which now naturally an-  
 ticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste  
 of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the  
 Suffering itself. If the Evil did befall us,  
 we should never chuse to increase it, by the  
 Sensations of *Sorrow* or *Despair*; we should  
 consider what was the Sum of Good remain-  
 ing in our State, after subtracting this Evil;  
 and should enjoy ourselves as well as a Be-  
 ing, who had never known greater Good,  
 nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the *abso-*  
*lute Good* yet remaining with us; or perhaps  
 we should pursue some other attainable  
 Good. In the like manner, did our *State*  
 and the *Modifications* of our Mind depend  
 upon our Choice, should we be affected up-  
 on the apprehended Approach of Good or  
 Evil,

Evil, to those whom we love; we should have *desires* of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no *uneasy Sensations*. We indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with *uneasy Sensations*; but these Sensations seem not the necessary *Result* of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present *Constitution of our Nature*, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some *sedate Tempers* equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of *Ferment, Confusion, and Pain*, which attend the same Desires in the *Passionate*. SECT. II.

ACCORDING to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the *Modifications* or *Passions* of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon ourselves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for ourselves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with *uneasy confused Sensations*, which often occasion *Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience*. We find violent *Motions* in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the

SECT. the Good desired. When it is first obtain-

II. ed, we find violent confused *Sensations of*  
 Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good  
 itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If  
 we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of  
*Sorrow* and *Dejection*, which is often entire-  
 ly useless to our present State. Foreseen  
 Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of  
*Fear*; and Reflection, attended with Sen-  
 sations of *Sorrow*, gives a tedious Existence  
 to transitory Misfortunes. Our *publick De-*  
*sires* are in the same manner accompanied  
 with painful Sensations. The Presence or  
 Suspence of Good or Evil *to others*, is made  
 the Occasion of the like confused Sensations.  
 A little Reflection will shew, that none of  
 these Sensations depend upon our Choice,  
 but arise from the very *Frame of our Na-*  
*ture*, however we may regulate or moderate  
 them.

*The Necessi-*  
*ty for*  
*these Sen-*  
*sations.*

VI. LET us then examine “ for what  
 “ Purpose our Nature was so constituted,  
 “ that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in  
 “ us.” Would not those *first sorts of Sen-*  
*sations*, by which we apprehend Good and  
 Evil in the Objects themselves, have been  
 sufficient, along with our *Reason* and *pure*  
*Desires*, without those Sensations attending  
 the very Desires themselves, for which they  
 are called *Passions*, or those *Sensations* which  
 attend

attend our Reflection upon the Presence, SECT.  
Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil? II.



THE common Answer, that “ they are  
“ given to us as useful *Incitements* or *Spurs*  
“ to Action, by which we are roused more  
“ effectually to promote our private Good,  
“ or that of the Publick,” is too general  
and undetermined. What need is there for  
rousing us to Action, more than a *calm*  
*pure Desire of Good*, and Aversion to Evil  
would do, without these confused Sensa-  
tions? Say they, “ we are averse to *La-*  
“ *bour*; we are apt to be hurried away  
“ by Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*; we  
“ are often so *indolent* and averse to the vi-  
“ gorous Use of our Powers, that we should  
“ neglect our true Interest without these  
“ soliciting Sensations.” But may it not  
be answered, that if Labour and vigorous  
Use of our Powers be attended with *Uneasi-*  
*ness* or *Pain*, why should not this be brought  
into the Account? The Pursuit of a small  
Good by great Toil is really foolish; vio-  
lent *Labour* may be as pernicious as any  
thing else: Why should we be excited to  
any *uneasy Labour*, except for prepollent  
Good? And, when the Good is *prepollent*,  
what need of any further *Incitement* than  
the calm Desire of it? The same may be  
said of the Avocations of *Curiosity* or *Mirth*;  
if their *absolute Pleasures* be greater than

E

that

SECT. that of the Good from which they divert

II. us, why should we not be diverted from it?  
 ~~~~~ If not, then the *real Moment* of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.

IF indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other *Desires* should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthening and fixing our *private Desires*, the like Sensation joined to *publick Affections* is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve an *Equilibrium*. But the first Question is, “ whence arose “ the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?”

IT must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of *Nature*, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the *whole*. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There are
 perhaps

perhaps Orders of rational Beings also with- S E C T.
out these particular limited Attachments, II.

to which our Natures are subjected; who may perhaps have no *Parental Affection*, Friendships, or Love to a Country, or to any special smaller Systems; but have *Universal Good-will* to all, and this solely proportioned to the moral Excellencies of the several Objects, without any other Bonds of Affection. There is probably an infinite *Variety* of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is *absolutely Good*, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the *inferior Natures*, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude,* that there are in the Universe as many Species of *superior Natures*, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted on by *Simplicius*, that the universal Cause must produce τα μέσα, as well as τα πρώτα, καὶ τα ἔχστα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its *imperfect*

* See *Simplicius* on *Epicetus*, Cap. 34. And the Archbishop of *Dublin*, *De Origine Mali*, above all others on this Subject.

SECT. *Inhabitants*, whose State is absolutely Good,
 II. than that it should be desolate.




ALL then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew, that “ these
 “ confused Sensations are necessary to such
 “ Natures as we are in other *respects*: Par-
 “ ticularly that Beings of such Degrees of
 “ *Understanding*, and such *Avenues* to
 “ Knowledge as we have, must need these
 “ *additional Forces*, which we call Passions,
 “ beside the first *Sensations* by which Ob-
 “ jects are constituted Good or Evil, and
 “ the *pure Desire* or *Aversion* arising from
 “ Opinion or Apprehension of Good or
 “ Evil.”

*From the
 Imperfec-
 tion of our
 Under-
 standing,
 which re-
 quired Sen-
 sations of
 Appetite.*

Now our *Reason*, or *Knowledge of the Relations* of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some *pleasant Sensation* which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some *painful Sensation* which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed *when* our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then appears the first Necessity of *uneasy Sensation*, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, our Bodies could not be preserv- S E C T.
ed without a Sense of Pain, connected with II.
Incisions, Bruises, or violent Labour, or 
whatever else tends to destroy any part of
their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does
not extend so far, as to judge in time what
would be pernicious to it: And yet, with-
out a great deal of human Labour, and
many Dangers, this Earth could not support
the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Na-
ture therefore required a Sensation, accom-
panying its Desires of the *Means of Preser-*
vation, capable to surmount the Uneasiness
of *Labour*: this we have in the Pains or
Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of
Food.

IN like manner, the *Propagation of Ani-*
mals is a Mystery to their *Reason*, but easy
to their *Instinct*. An Offspring of such
Creatures as Men are, could not be preserv-
ed without perpetual Labour and Care;
which we find could not be expected from
the more general Ties of *Benevolence*. Here
then again appears the Necessity of strength-
ning the Στοργη, or *natural Affection*, with
strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, suffi-
cient to counter-balance the Pains of *La-*
bour, and the Sensations of the *selfish Appe-*
tites; since Parents must often check and

SECT. disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify
II. those of their Children.



“ When a Necessity of joining strong
“ Sensations to one Class of Desires appears,
“ there must appear a like Necessity of
“ strengthening the rest by like Sensations,
“ to keep a just Ballance.” We know, for
instance, that the Pleasures of the *Imagina-
tion* tend much to the Happiness of Man-
kind: the Desires of them therefore must
have the like Sensations assisting them, to
prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxu-
ry. The Happiness of human Life cannot
be promoted without *Society* and *mutual
Aid*, even beyond a Family; our *publick
Affections* must therefore be strengthened as
well as the private, to keep a Ballance; so
must also our Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*.
Anger, which some have thought an useless
Passion, is really as necessary as the rest;
since Men’s Interests often seem to interfere
with each other; and they are thereby led
from Self-Love to do the worst *Injuries* to
their Fellows. There could not therefore
be a wiser Contrivance to restrain *Injuries*,
than to make every mortal some way *formi-
dable* to an unjust Invader, by such a violent
Passion. We need not have recourse to a
Prometheus in this matter, with the old Po-
ets: they might have ascribed it to their
Optimus Maximus.

—*Insani*


—*Infani Leonis,
Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.*

SECT.
II.

VII. WITH this *Ballance* of publick Passions against the private, with our *Passions* toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by *pure Desires*; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also *publick Passions*, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to *Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries*. *Compassion* will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.


THE Sensations of *Joy* or *Sorrow*, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of *Rewards* or *Punishments*, to excite us to act with the utmost Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of

SECT. others, for the future, and to punish past

II. Negligence. The Moment of every Event
 is thereby increased: as much as the Sensations of *Sorrow* add to our *Misery*, so much those of *Joy* add to our *Happiness*. Nay, since we have some considerable *Power* over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent *Pleasures of Joy* upon our Success, than *Pains of Sorrow* upon Disappointment.

A just Balance very rare.

'Tis true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein these Sensations of the several Passions are in such a *Balance*, as in all Cases to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Sensations of *Anger* in some Tempers are violent above their proportion; those of *Ambition*, *Avarice*, *desire of sensual Pleasure*, and even of *natural Affection*, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its Passions. The best State of human Nature possible, might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is requisite for this End. *Custom*, *Education*, *Habits*, and *Company*, may often

often contribute much to this Disorder, S E C T.
however its Original may be ascribed to II.
some more universal Cause. But it is not 
so great, but that human Life is still a de-
sireable State, having a superiority of Good-
ness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply our-
selves to it, does it hinder us from discern-
ing that just *Ballance* and *Oeconomy*, which
would constitute the most happy State of
each Person, and promote the greatest Good
in the whole.

LET Physicians or Anatomists explain the *Disposi-*
several Motions in the *Fluids* or *Solids* of the *ons to some*
Body, which accompany any Passion; or *particular*
the *Temperaments* of Body which either *Passions.*
make Men prone to any Passion, or are
brought upon us by the long Continuance,
or frequent Returns of it. It is only to our
Purpose in general to observe, “ that pro-
“ bably certain *Motions* in the Body accom-
“ pany every Passion by a fixed Law of Na-
“ ture; and alternately, *that Temperament*
“ which is apt to receive or prolong these
“ Motions in the Body, does influence our
“ *Passions* to heighten or prolong them.”
Thus a certain *Temperament* may be brought
upon the Body, by its being frequently put
into Motion by the Passions of *Anger*, *Joy*,
Love, or *Sorrow*; and the Continuance of
this Temperament shall make Men prone to
the several Passions for the future. We find
our-

SECT. ourselves after a long Fit of *Anger* or *Sor-*

II. *row*, in an uneasy State, even when we are
 not reflecting on the particular *Occasion* of
 our *Passion*. During this State, every trifle
 shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the
 contrary, after *good Success*, after strong
friendly Passions, or a State of *Mirth*, some
 considerable *Injuries* or *Losses*, which at o-
 ther times would have affected us very much,
 shall be overlooked, or meekly received, or
 at most but slightly resented; perhaps be-
 cause our Bodies are not fit easily to receive
 these *Motions* which are constituted the Oc-
 casion of the uneasy Sensations of *Anger*.
 This *Diversity* of Temper every one has felt,
 who reflects on himself at different Times.
 In some Tempers it will appear like *Mad-*
ness. Whether the only *Seat* of these Ha-
 bits, or the Occasion rather of these *Dispo-*
sitions, be in the Body; or whether the *Soul*
 itself does not, by frequent Returns of any
 Passion, acquire some greater Disposition to
 receive and retain it again, let those deter-
 mine, who sufficiently understand the Na-
 ture of either the one or the other.

S E C T.

S E C T. III.

*Particular Divisions of the Affections
and Passions.*


I. **T**HE Nature of any *Language* has considerable Influence upon Men's Reasonings on all Subjects, making them often take all those Ideas which are denoted by the same Word to be the same; and on the other hand, to look upon different Words as denoting different Ideas. We shall find that this Identity of Names has occasioned much Confusion in Treatises of the Passions; while some have made larger, and some smaller Collections of Names, and have given the Explications of them as an Account of the Passions.

S E C T.
III.


CICERO, in the Fourth Book of *Tusculan Questions*, gives from the Stoicks, this general Division of the *Passions*: First, into *Love* and *Hatred*, according as the Object is good or evil; and then subdivides each, according as the Object is *present* or *expected*. About Good we have these two, *Libido* & *Lætitia*, *Desire* and *Joy*: About Evil we have likewise two, *Metus* & *Ægritudo*, *Fear* and *Sorrow*. To this general Division he subjoins

*The Division of the
Stoicks.*

SECT. subjoins many *Subdivisions* of each of these


III. four Passions; according as in the *Latin*
 Tongue they had different Names for the
 several *Degrees* of these Passions, or for the
 same Passion employed upon different Ob-
 jects. A Writer of *Lexicons* would proba-
 bly get the most precise Meanings of the *La-
 tin* Names in that Book; nor would it be
 useless in considering the Nature of them.

THE *Schoolmen*, as their Fund of Lan-
 guage was much smaller, have not so full
 Enumerations of them, going no further
 than their admired *Aristotle*.

II. IT is strange that the thoughtful
 MALEBRANCHE did not consider, that “*De-
 sire* and *Aversion* are obviously different
 “ from the other Modifications called *Pas-
 sions*; that these two directly lead to
 “ Action, or the Volition of Motion, and
 “ are wholly distinct from all sort of Sen-
 “ sation.” Whereas Joy and Sorrow are
 only a sort of Sensations; and other Affe-
 ctions differ from Sensations only, by inclu-
 ding Desire or Aversion, or their correspon-
 dent Propensities: So that *Desire* and *Aver-
 sion* are the only pure Affections in the strict-
 est Sense.

*Sensation
 and Affec-
 tion di-
 stinct.*

IF, indeed, we confine the Word *Sensa-
 tion* to the “ immediate Perceptions of
 “ Plea-

" Pleasure and Pain, upon the very Presence SECT.
 " or Operation of any Object or Event, III.
 " which are occasioned by some Impression 
 " on our Bodies;" then we may denote by
 the Word *Affection*, those *Pleasures* or *Pains*
 not thus excited, but " resulting from some
 " *Reflection* upon, or *Opinion* of our Posses-
 " sion of any Advantage, or from a certain
 " Prospect of future pleasant Sensations on
 " the one hand, or from a like *Reflection* or
 " *Prospect* of evil or painful Sensations on
 " the other, either to ourselves or others."*

WHEN more violent *confused Sensations* *Passion*.
 arise with the *Affection*, and are attended
 with, or prolonged by bodily Motions, we
 call the whole by the Name of *Passion*, es-
 pecially when accompanied with some *na-*
tural Propensities, to be hereafter explained.

IF this Use of these Words be allowed, *Division*
 the Division of MALEBRANCHE is very nat- *by Male-*
 tural. Good Objects excite *Love*; evil Ob- *branche.*
 jects *Hatred*: each of these is subdivided,
 as the Object is *present* and *certain*, or *doubt-*
fully expected, or *certainly removed*. To
 these three Circumstances correspond three
 Modifications of the original Affections;
viz. Joy, Desire, and Sorrow. Good pre-
 sent, raises *joyful Love*: Good in suspense,

* See above, Sect. 2. Art. 1.

SECT. the *Love of Desire*, or *desirous Love*: Good
 III. lost, *sorrowful Love*. Evil present, raises
 ~~~~~ *sorrowful Aversion*: Evil expected, *desirous*  
*Aversion*; and Evil removed, *joyful Aversion*. The joyful Love, and joyful Hatred,  
 will possibly be found nearly the same sort  
 of Sensations, though upon different Occasi-  
 ons; the same may be said of the sorrowful  
 Love, and the sorrowful Aversion: and thus  
 this Division will amount to the same with  
 that of the Stoicks.

*Desire and*  
*Aversion.*

*Joy and*  
*Sorrow.*


PERHAPS it may be more easy to conceive  
 our *Affections* and *Passions* in this manner.  
 The Apprehension of Good, either to our-  
 selves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*:  
 The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the  
 Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of  
 removing or preventing it. These two are  
 the proper *Affections*, distinct from all *Sen-*  
*sation*: We may call both *Desires* if we  
 please. The Reflection upon the Presence  
 or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the  
 Sensation of Joy, which is distinct from  
 those immediate Sensations which arise from  
 the Object itself.\* A like Sensation is rai-  
 sed, when we reflect upon the Removal or  
 Prevention of Evil which once threatned  
 ourselves or others. The *Reflection* upon  
 the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect

of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occa-  
 sion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*, distinct from  
 those *immediate Sensations* arising from the  
 Objects or Events themselves.

THESE Affections, *viz. Desire, Aversion, Affections*  
*Joy and Sorrow*, we may, after MALE-  
 BRANCHE, call *spiritual or pure Affections*; <sup>may be dis-</sup>  
 because the purest Spirit, were it subject to <sup>tinguished</sup>  
 any Evil, might be capable of them. But <sup>from Pas-</sup>  
 beside these Affections, which seem to arise  
 necessarily from a rational Apprehension of  
 Good or Evil, there are in our Nature vio-  
 lent *confused Sensations*, connected with *bo-*  
*dily Motions*, from which our *Affections* are  
 denominated *Passions*.

WE may further observe something in *Affections*  
 our Nature, determining us very frequently <sup>attended</sup>  
 to Action, distinct both from *Sensation* and <sup>with unde-</sup>  
*Desire*; if by Desire we mean a distinct In- <sup>signing</sup>  
 clination to something apprehended as Good <sup>Propensi-</sup>  
 either publick or private, or as the Means  
 of avoiding Evil: *viz. a certain Propensi-*  
*ty of Instinct* to Objects and Actions, with-  
 out any Conception of them as Good, or  
 as the Means of preventing Evil. These  
 Objects or Actions are generally, tho' not  
 always, in effect the *Means* of some Good;  
 but we are determined to them even with-  
 out this Conception of them. Thus, as we  
 observed

SECT. observed above,\* the *Propensity to Fame*

III. may continue after one has lost all notion  
 of *Good*, either publick or private, which could be the Object of a distinct Desire. Our *particular Affections* have generally some of these *Propensities* accompanying them; but these *Propensities* are sometimes without the *Affections* or distinct Desires, and have a stronger Influence upon the Generality of Men, than the *Affections* could have alone. Thus in *Anger*, beside the Intention of removing the uneasy Sensation from the Injury received; beside the Desire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and Security for the future, which are some sort of *Goods* intended by Men when they are calm, as well as during the Passion, there is in the passionate Person a Propensity to occasion *Misery* to the Offender, a Determination to *Violence*, even where there is no *Intention* of any Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. And it is principally this Propensity which we denote by the Name *Anger*, tho' other Degrees may often accompany it.

*Anger*

So also our *Presence* with the distressed is generally necessary to their relief; and yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention of relieving them, we shall find a *Propensity* to

\* SECT. 1. near the End.

run to such Spectacles of Pity. Thus also, SECT. III.  
beside the calm *Desire* of the Happiness of a Person beloved, we have a strong Propensity to their *Company*, to the very *Sight* of them, without any Consideration of it as a Happiness either to ourselves or to the Person beloved. The sudden Appearance of great Danger, determines us to shriek out or fly, before we can have any distinct Desires, or any Consideration that a Shriek or Flight are proper Means of Relief. These *Propensities*, along with the Sensations above-mentioned, when they occur without rational Desire, we may call *Passions*, and when they happen along with Desires, denominate them *passionate*. This part of our Constitution is as intelligible as many others universally observed and acknowledged; such as these, that Danger of falling makes us stretch out our Arms; noise makes us wink; that a Child is determined to suck; many other Animals to rise up and walk; some to run into Water, before they can have any Notion of Good to be obtained, or Evil avoided by these means.

It may perhaps be convenient to confine *Love and Hatred* to our Sentiments toward Moral Agents; *Love* denoting “ *Desire* of  
“ the Happiness of another, generally attended with some *Approbation* of him as  
“ innocent at least, or being of a mixed  
F Cha-

SECT. " Character, where Good is generally pre-  
 III. " valent:" And *Hatred* " denoting Disap-

~ " probation by our *Sense*, with the Absence  
 " of Desire of their Happiness." *Benevo-*  
*lence* may denote only " the Desire of ano-  
 " ther's Happiness;" and *Malice*, " the De-  
 " sire of their Misery," abstractly from any  
 Approbation or Condemnation by our *Mor-*  
*al Sense*. This sort of Malice is never  
*Envy.* found in our Nature, when we are not trans-  
 ported with Passion. The Propensities of  
 Anger and Envy have some Resemblance of  
 it; yet Envy is not an ultimate Desire of  
 another's Misery, but only a subordinate De-  
 sire of it, as the Means of advancing our-  
 selves, or some Person more beloved than  
 the Person envied.

*Fear.* FEAR, as far as it is an *Affection*, and not  
 an undesigning Propensity, is " a Mixture  
 " of *Sorrow* and *Aversion*, when we appre-  
 " hend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss  
 " of Good befalling ourselves, or those we  
 " love:" There is more or less of Sorrow,  
 according to the apprehended Degrees of  
*Hope.* Probability. Hope, if it be any way an  
 Affection, and not an Opinion, is " a Mix-  
 " ture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon the proba-  
 " bility of obtaining Good, and avoiding  
 " Evil." Both these Passions may have some  
*Propensities* and *Sensations* attending them,  
 distinct from those of the other Affections.

THE



THE confused Use of the Names, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Delight*, has made some of the most important Distinctions of our Affections and Passions, to be overlooked. No Modifications of Mind can be more different from each other, than a *private Desire*, and a *publick*; yet both are called *Love*. The *Love of Money*, for Instance, the *Love of a generous Character*, or a *Friend*: The *Love of a fine Seat*, and the *Love of a Child*. In like manner, what can be more different than the *Sorrow for a Loss befallen ourselves*, and *Sorrow for the Death of a Friend*? Of this Men must convince themselves by Reflection.

THERE is also a considerable Difference even among the *selfish Passions*, which bear the same general Name, according to the different *Senses* which constitute the Objects good or evil. Thus the Desire of *Honour*, and the Desire of *Wealth*, are certainly very different sorts of Affections, and accompanied with different Sensations: The *Sorrow* in like manner for our Loss by a *Shipwreck*, and our *Sorrow* for having done a *base Action*, or *Remorse*: *Sorrow* for our being subject to the *Gout* or *Stone*, and *Sorrow* for our being *despised* and *condemned*, or *Shame*: *Sorrow* for the Damage done by a *Fire*, and that *Sorrow* which arises upon an

SECT. apprehended *Injury* from a Partner, or any other of our Fellows, which we call *Anger*.

III. Where we get some special distinct *Names*, we more easily acknowledge a Difference, as it may appear in *Shame* and *Anger*; but had we other *Names*, appropriated in the same manner, we should imagine, with good ground, as many distinct *Passions*. The like Confusion is observable about our Senses.\*

*False Representations of our Nature rectified.*

To say that the *Sensation* accompanying all sorts of Joy is pleasant, and *that* accompanying Sorrow uneasy, will not argue that there is no farther Diversity. Pains have many differences among themselves, and so have Pleasures, according to the different *Senses* by which they are perceived. To enumerate all these *Diversities*, would be difficult and tedious. But some Men have piqued themselves so much upon representing “all  
“ our Affections as *selfish*; as if each Person  
“ were in his whole Frame only a *seperate*  
“ *System* from his Fellows, so that there was  
“ nothing in his Constitution leading him  
“ to a *publick Interest*, further than he ap-  
“ prehended it subservient to his own pri-  
“ vate Interest; and this Interest made no-  
“ thing else, than the gratifying our *exter-  
“ nal Senses* and *Imagination*, or obtaining  
“ the Means of it:” that thereby the Wif-

\* Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 10.

dom and Goodness of the AUTHOR of our SECT. Nature is traduced, as if he had given us III.

the strongest *Dispositions* toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; and directed us, by the Frame of our Nature, to the meanest and most contemptible Pursuits; as if *what* all good Men have represented as the *Excellence* of our Nature, were a *Force* or *Constraint* put upon it by *Art* or *Authority*. It may be useful to consider our Affections and Passions more particularly, as "they are ex-  
" cited by something in our Frame different  
" from *Self-Love*, and tend to something  
" else than the private Pleasures of the ex-  
" ternal Senses or Imagination." This we may do under the following Heads, by shewing, 1. How our Passions arise from the *Moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*. 2. How our Passions tend toward the *State of others*, abstractly from any Consideration of their *Moral Qualities*. 3. How the *publick Passions* are diversified by the *Moral Qualities* of the Agents, when they appear to our Moral Sense as virtuous or vicious. 4. How the publick Passions are diversified by the *Relations* of several Agents to each other, when we consider at once their *State* as to Happiness or Misery, and their past as well as present *Actions* towards each other. 5. How all these Passions may be complicated with the *selfish*. Under each of these Heads we may find the six Passions of *Malebranche*, or

SECT. the four of *Zeno*; with many other Combinations of them.



1. *Passions about our own Actions.*

*The Passion of Heroism in Castle building.*

*Moral Joy or Self-Approbation.*

*Remorse.*

III. I. THE Passions about our own Actions occasioned by the *Moral Sense*. When we form the Idea of a *morally good Action*, or see it represented in the *Drama*, or read it in *Epicks* or *Romance*, we feel a *Desire* arising of doing the like. This leads most Tempers into an imagined Series of *Adventures*, in which they are still acting the generous and virtuous Part, like to the Idea they have received. If we have executed any good Design, we feel inward *Triumph of Joy*: If we are disappointed through our own *Negligence*, or have been diverted from it by some *selfish View*, we shall feel a Sorrow called *Remorse*.

WHEN the Idea is in like manner formed of any *morally evil Action*, which we might possibly accomplish, if we reflect upon the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of it, there arises *Reluctance*, or Aversion: If we have committed such a Crime, upon like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called *Remorse*: If we have resisted the Temptation, we feel a secret *Joy* and *Self-Approbation*, for which there is no special Name.

WE might enumerate six other Passions from the Sense of *Honour*, according as we  
appe-

apprehend our Actions, or any other Cir-  
stances, shall affect the *Opinions* which  
others form concerning us. When any  
Action or Circumstance occurs, from which  
we imagine Honour would arise, we feel  
*Desire*; when we attain it, *Joy*; when we  
are disappointed, *Sorrow*. When we first  
apprehend any Action or Circumstance as  
*dishonourable*, we feel *Aversion* arising; if  
we apprehend ourselves involved in it, or in  
danger of being tempted to it, we feel a  
Passion we may call *Modesty* or *Shame*;  
when we escape or resist such Temptations,  
or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a  
*Joy*, for which there is no special Name.

WE give the Name *Ambition* to a violent  
Desire of Honour, but generally in a bad  
Sense, when it would lead the Agent into  
*immoral Means* to gratify it. The same  
Word often denotes the *Desire of Power*.  
*Pride* denotes sometimes the same Desires  
of Honour and Power, with *Aversion* to  
their contraries; sometimes *Pride* denotes  
*Joy* upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim*  
to Honour; generally it is taken in a bad  
Sense, when one claims that to which he  
has no Right.

MEN may feel the Passion of *Shame* for  
the dishonourable Actions of others, when  
any part of the Dishonour falls upon them-

SECT. *selves*; as when the Person dishonoured is

III. one of their *Club*, or *Party*, or *Family*.

~ The general Relation of *human Nature* may produce some uneasiness upon the Dishonour of another, tho' this is more owing to our *publick Sense*.

2. *Publick  
Passions  
abstractly.*

IV. 2. THE second Class are the *publick Passions* about the *State of others*, as to Happiness or Misery, abstractly from their *Moral Qualities*. These Affections or Passions extend to all perceptive Natures, when there is no real or imagined Opposition of Inter-

*Good-will.  
Compassion.  
Pity.*

rest. We naturally *desire* the Happiness of others while it is in suspense; *rejoice* in it when obtained, and *sorrow* for it when lost.

We have *Aversion* to any impending Misery; we are *sorrowful* when it befalls any Person, and *rejoice* when it is removed. This Aversion and Sorrow we often call Pity or Compassion; the Joy we may call *Congratulation*.

*Congratulation.*

SINCE our Moral Sense represents *Virtue* as the greatest Happiness to the Person possessed of it, our publick Affections will naturally make us desire the *Virtue of others*. When the Opportunity of a great Action occurs to any Person against whom we are no way prejudiced, we *wish* he would attempt it, and desire his good Success. If he succeeds, we feel *Joy*; if he is disappointed,

or

or quits the Attempt, we feel *Sorrow*. Up-  
 on like Opportunity of, or Temptation to  
 a base Action, we have *Aversion* to the  
 Event: If he resists the Temptation, we  
 feel *Joy*; if he yields to it, *Sorrow*. Our  
 Affections toward the *Person* arise jointly  
 with our Passions about this Event, accord-  
 ing as he acquits himself virtuously or basely.

V. 3. THE Passions of the third Class  
 are our *publick Affections*, jointly with *mo-*  
*ral Perceptions* of the Virtue or Vice of the  
 Agents. When Good appears attainable by  
 a Person of *Moral Dignity*, our Desire of  
 his Happiness, founded upon *Esteem* or *Ap-*  
*probation*, is much stronger than *that* sup-  
 posed in the former Class. The Misfortune  
 of such a Person raises stronger *Sorrow*, *Pi-*  
*ty*, or *Regret*, and *Dissatisfaction* with the  
 Administration of the World, upon a light  
 View of it, with a Suspicion of the *real*  
*Advantage* of Virtue. The Success of such  
 a Character raises all the contrary Affections  
 of *Joy* and *Satisfaction* with Providence,  
 and *Security* in Virtue. When Evil threatens  
 such a Character, we have strong *Aversion*  
 to it, with *Love* toward the Person: His  
 escaping the Evil raises *Joy*, *Confidence* in  
 Providence, with *Security* in Virtue. If the  
 Evil befalls him, we feel the contrary Pas-  
 sions, *Sorrow*, *Dissatisfaction* with Provi-  
 dence,

3. *Publick*  
*Passions*  
 with *mo-*  
*ral Percep-*  
*tions.*

*Regret.*

SECT. dence, and *Suspicion* of the Reality of  
 III. Virtue.

*Which of  
 them fit for  
 the Drama.*


HENCE we see how unfit such Representations are in *Tragedy*, as make the perfectly Virtuous miserable in the highest degree. They can only lead the Spectators into *Dis-trust* of Providence, *Diffidence* in Virtue; and into such Sentiments, as some Authors, who probably mistake his meaning, tell us *Brutus* expressed at his Death, "That the  
 " Virtue he had pursued as a solid Good,  
 " proved but an empty Name." But we must here remember, that, notwithstanding all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated upon us of the *King of Terrors*, yet an *honourable Death* is far from appearing to a generous Mind, as the greatest of Evils. The *Ruin of a Free State*, the *Slavery of a generous Spirit*, a *Life upon shameful Terms*, still appear vastly greater Evils; beside many other exquisite *Distresses* of a more private nature, in comparison of which, an honourable Death befalling a favourite Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance.

*Passions to-  
 ward mo-  
 ral evil  
 Agents.*

*No disinte-  
 rested or ul-  
 timate Ma-  
 lice in Men.*

UNDER this Class are also included the Passions employed about the Fortunes of Characters, apprehended as *morally Evil*. Such Characters raise *Dislike* in any Observer, who has a moral Sense: But *Malice*, or the *ultimate Desire* of their Misery, does  
 not



not necessarily arise toward them. Perhaps SECT.  
 our Nature is not capable of desiring the III.  
 Misery of any Being calmly, farther than it   
 may be necessary to the Safety of the innocent: We may find, perhaps, that there is  
 no Quality in any Object which would excite in us *pure disinterested Malice*, or calm  
 Desire of Misery for its own sake.\* When  
 we apprehend any Person as *injurious* to  
 ourselves, or to any innocent Person, especially to a Person beloved, the Passion of  
*Anger* arises toward the Agent. By *Anger* *Anger.*  
 is generally meant “ a Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him:” This  
 violent Propensity is attended generally,  
 when the Injury is not very sudden, with  
*Sorrow* for the Injury sustained, or threatened, and *Desire* of repelling it, and making  
 the Author of it *repent* of his Attempt, or  
*repair* the Damage.

THIS Passion is attended with the most *Its Effects.*  
 violent *uneasy Sensations*, and produces as  
 great Changes in our Bodies as any whatsoever. We are precipitantly led by it, to apprehend the *injurious* as *directly malicious*,  
 designing the Misery of others without farther Intention. While the Heat of this Passion continues, we naturally pursue the Mi-

\* See Sect. 5. Art. 5. of this Treatise.

SECT. fery of the injurious, until they relent, and  
 III. convince us of their better Intentions, by  
 ~~~~~ expressing their Sense of the Injury, and offering  
 Reparation of Damage, with Security against future Offences.

Now as it is plainly necessary, in a System of Agents *capable of injuring* each other, that every one should be made *formidable* to an Invader, by such a violent Passion, till the Invader shews his Reformation of Temper, as above, and no longer ; so we find it is thus ordered in our Constitution. Upon these Evidences of Reformation in the Invader, our Passion naturally abates ; or if in any perverse Temper it does not, the *Sense of Mankind* turns against him, and he is looked upon as cruel and inhumane.

IN considering more fully the Passions about the Fortunes of evil Characters, distinct from *Anger*, which arises upon a fresh Injury, we may first consider the evil Agents, such as a sudden View sometimes represents them, *directly evil* and *malicious* ; and then make proper Abatements, for *what* the worst of Men come short of this compleatly evil Temper. As Mathematicians suppose perfect *Hardness* in some Bodies, and *Elasticity* in others, and then make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees in natural Bodies.

THE Prospect of Good to a Person apprehended as *entirely malicious*, raises *Aversion* in the Observer, or *Desire* of his Disappointment; at least, when his Success would confirm him in any evil Intention. His Disappointment raises *Joy* in the Event, with *Trust* in Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. His Success raises the contrary Passions of *Sorrow*, *Distrust*, and *Suspicion*. The Prospect of Evil, befalling an evil Character, at first, perhaps, seems grateful to the Observer, if he has conceived the Passion of *Anger*; but to a sedate Temper, no Misery is farther the Occasion of *Joy*, than as it is necessary to some prepollent Happiness in the whole. The *escaping* of Evil impending over such a Character, by which he is confirmed in Vice, is the Occasion of *Sorrow*, and *Distrust* of Providence and Virtue; and the Evil befalling him raises *Joy*, and *Satisfaction* with Providence, and *Security* in Virtue. We see therefore, that the Success of evil Characters, by obtaining Good, or avoiding Evil, is an unfit Representation in *Tragedy*.

LET one reflect on this Class of Passions, as they arise upon Occasions which do not affect himself, and he will see how little of *Self-Love* there is in them; and yet they are frequently as violent as any Passions
what-

SECT. whatsoever. We seem conscious of some

III. *Dignity* in these Passions above the selfish ones, and therefore never conceal them, nor are we ashamed of them. These *complicated Passions* the Philosophers have confusedly mentioned, under some general Names, along with the simple selfish Passions. The *Poets* and *Criticks* have sufficiently shown, that they felt these Differences, however it did not concern them to explain them. We may find Instances of them in all Dramatick Performances, both Antient and Modern.


Passions about mixed Characters.

THE *Abatements* to be made for what human Nature comes short of the highest Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be thus conceived: When the Good in any *mixed Character* surpasses the Evil, the Passions arise as toward the *Good*; where the Evil surpasses the Good, the Passions arise as toward the *Evil*, only in both Cases with less Violence. And further, the Passions in both Cases are either *stopped*, or turned the contrary way, by want of due *Proportion* between the *State* and *Character*. Thus an imperfect good Character, in pursuit of a Good too great for his Virtue, or to the exclusion of more worthy Characters, instead of raising *Desire* of his Success, raises *Aversion*; his Success raises *Envy*, or a Species of *Sorrow*, and his Disappointment, *Joy*.
An

An imperfectly evil Character, threatned by SECT.
 an Evil greater than is necessary to make III.
 him relent and reform, or by a great Calamity, which has no direct tendency to reform him, instead of raising *Desire* toward the Event, raises *Aversion*; his escaping it raises *Joy*, and his falling under it raises *Pity*. *Pity*, a Species of Sorrow.

THERE is another Circumstance which The best Plots in Tragedy.
 exceedingly varies our Passions of this Class, when the Agents themselves, by their *own*
Conduct, procure their Misery. When an imperfect good Character, by an evil Action, procures the highest Misery to himself; this raises these complicated Passions, *Pity* toward the Sufferer, *Sorrow* for the State, *Abhorrence* of Vice, *Awe* and *Admiration* of Providence, as keeping strict Measures of Sanctity and Justice. These Passions we may all feel, in reading the *Oedipus* of *Sophocles*, when we see the Distress of that Prince, occasioned by his superstitious Curiosity about his future Fortunes; his rash Violence of Temper, in Duelling without Provocation, and in pronouncing Execrations on Persons unknown. We feel the like Passions from the Fortunes of *Creon* in the *Antigone*; or from the Fates of *Pyrhus* and *Orestes*, in the *Andromache* of *Racine*, or our *Distressed Mother*. We heartily

SECT. tily pity these Characters, but without re-

III.  pining at Providence; their Misery is the Fruit of their own Actions. It is with the justest Reason, that *Aristotle* * prefers such Plots to all others for *Tragedy*, since these Characters come nearest to those of the Spectators, and consequently will have the strongest Influence on them. We are generally conscious of some good Dispositions, mixed with many Weaknesses: few imagine themselves capable of attaining the *height* of perfectly good Characters, or arriving to their high Degrees of Felicity; and fewer imagine themselves capable of sinking into the Baseness of perfectly *evil Tempers*, and therefore few dread the Calamities which befall them.

*How these
Passions
are raised
high and
complica-
ted.*

THERE is one farther Circumstance which strengthens this Class of Passions exceedingly, that is, the *greatness of the Change of Fortune* in the Person, or the *Surprise* with which it comes. As this gives the Person a more *acute Perception* either of Happiness or Misery, so it strengthens our *Passions*, arising from Observation of his State. Of this the Poets are very sensible, who so often represent to us the former Prosperity of the Person, for whom they

* *Aristotle Poetic. Chap. 13.*

would

would move our pity; his *Projects*, his *Sect.*
Hopes, his *half-executed Designs*. One left III.
 his *Palace unfinished*, another his *betrothed*
Mistress, or *young Wife*; one promised him-
 self *Glory*, and a fortunate *old Age*; another
 was heaping up *Wealth*, boasted of his
Knowledge, was honoured for his *fine Ar-*
mour, his *Activity*, his *Augury*.

Ἀλλ' ἐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρύσασα κῆρα μέλαινα.
 —οὐδὲ τί' οἱ τόγ' ἐπ' ἤρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον. Homer.

Sed non Augurio potuit depellere pestem;
Sed non Dardaniæ medicari cuspidis ictum
Invaluit. ————— Virg.

THE Joy is in like manner increased up-
 on the Misfortunes of evil Characters, by
 representing their former *Prosperity*, *Pride*
 and *Insolence*.

THIS Sorrow or Joy is strangely diversifi-
 ed or complicated, when the Sufferers are
multiplied, by representing the Persons at-
 tached to the principal Sufferer, and setting
 before us their *Affections*, *Friendships*, *ten-*
der Solitudes, *care in Education*, *succour*
in former Distresses; this every one will
 find in reading the Stories of *Pallas*, *Ca-*
milla, *Nisus*, and *Euryalus*; or in general,
 any Battle of *Homer* or *Virgil*. What there

SECT. is in Self-Love to account for these Effects,
 III. let all Mankind judge.



4. *Publick
 Passions
 and Rela-
 tions of A-
 gents.*

*Contrasts
 and Com-
 plications
 of Passions.*

VI. THE Passions of the fourth Class arise from the same *moral Sense* and *publick Affections*, upon observing the Actions of Agents some way *attached* to each other, by prior Ties of Nature or good Offices, or disengaged by *prior Injuries*; when these *Relations* are known, the moral Qualities of the Actions appear considerably different, and our Passions are much diversified by them: there is also a great *Complication* of different Passions, and a sort of *Contraste*, or assemblage of opposite Passions toward the several Persons concerned. The most moving *Peripeties*, and *Remembrances*, in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry, are calculated to raise these complicated Passions; and in *Oratory* we study to do the same.

THUS strong Sentiments of *Gratitude*, and vigorous Returns of good Offices observed, raise in the Spectator the highest *Love* and *Esteem* toward both the *Benefactor*, and even the *Person obliged*, with *Security* and *Delight* in Virtue.—*Ingratitude*, or returning bad Offices designedly, raises the greatest *Detestation* against the Ungrateful; and *Love* with *Compassion* toward the Bene-


Benefactor, with *Dejection* and *Diffidence* S E C T.
in a virtuous Course of Life.—*Forgiving* III.

of Injuries, and much more *returning Good* ~~~~~
for Evil, appears wonderfully great and beautiful to our moral Sense: it raises the strongest *Love* toward the Forgiver, *Compassion* for the Injury received; toward the Injurious, if *relenting*, some degree of *Goodwill*, with *Compassion*; if not *relenting*, the most violent *Abhorrence* and *Hatred*.—Mutual *good Offices* done designedly between morally *good Agents*, raise *Joy* and *Love* in the Observer toward both, with *delight* in *Virtue*.—*Mutual Injuries* done by evil Agents designedly, raise *Joy* in the Events, along with *Hatred* to the Agents, with *Detestation* of *Vice*.—*Good Offices* done designedly by *good Agents* toward *Evil*, but not so as to encourage, or enable them to further *Mischief*, raise *Love* toward the *good Agent*; *Displacence*, with some *Goodwill* toward the evil Agent.—*Good Offices* designedly done mutually among *evil Agents*, if these Offices do not promote their evil Intentions, diminish our *Dislike* and *Hatred*, and introduce some *Compassion* and *Benevolence*.—*Good Offices* from *good Agents*, to *Benefactors unknown* to the Agent, or to their unknown *Friends* or *Posterity*, increase *Love* toward both; and raise great *Satisfaction* and *Trust* in *Providence*, with

SECT. *Security in Virtue, and Joy in the Event.*

III. — *Undesigned evil Returns* in like Case with the former, raise *Sorrow* in the Observer upon account of the Event, *Pity* toward both, with *Suspicion* of Providence and Virtue. — An *undesigned Return of Evil* to an evil Agent from a good one, whom he had injured, raises *Joy* upon account of the Event, and *Trust* in Providence. — *Undesigned evil Offices mutually done* to each other by evil Agents, raise *Joy* in the Event, *Abhorrence* of Vice, and *Satisfaction* with Providence. — *Undesigned good Offices* done by good Agents toward the evil, by which they are further excited or impowered to do evil, raise *Pity* toward the good Agent, *Indignation* and *Envy* toward the Evil, with *Distrust* in Providence. — *Undesigned good Offices* done by good to evil Agents, by which they are not excited or enabled to do further mischief, raise *Envy* or *Indignation* toward the evil Agent, if the Benefit be great; if not, they scarce raise any new Passion distinct from that we had before, of *Love* toward the one, and *Hatred* or *Dislike* toward the other.

THESE Passions might have been diversified, according to *Malebranche's* Division, as the Object or Event was *present*, or in *suspence*, or *certainly removed*: And would appear in different Degrees of Strength, according

cording as the Persons concerned were more S E C T.
 nearly attached to the Observer, by *Nature*, III.
Friendship, or *Acquaintance*. 

VII. THE Passions of the last Class, are ^{ζ. Publick} those in which any of the former Kinds are ^{Passions} complicated with *selfish Passions*, when our ^{joined with} own Interest is concerned. It is needless ^{the selfish.} here to repeat them over again: Only this may be noted in general, that, as the Conjunction of selfish Passions will very much increase the Commotion of Mind, so the Opposition of any *selfish Interests*, which appear of great Importance, will often conquer the *publick Desires* or Aversions, or those founded upon the Sense of *Virtue* or *Honour*; and this is the Case in vicious Actions done against *Conscience*.

THESE Complications of Passions are often not reflected on by the Person who is acted by them, during their Rage: But a judicious Observer may find them by Reflection upon himself, or by Observation of others; and the Representation of them never fails to affect us in the most lively manner.

—*Æstuat ingens*

Imo in Corde Pudor, mixtoque Insania Luctu,
Et Furiis agitatus Amor, & conscia Virtus. Virg.

SECT. IN all this tedious Enumeration, let any

III. one consider, “ How few of our Passions
 “ can be any way deduced from *Self-Love*,
 “ or desire of private Advantage? And
 “ how improbable it is, that Persons in
 “ the Heat of Action, have any of those
 “ *subtle Reflections*, and *selfish Intentions*,
 “ which some Philosophers invent for
 “ them? How great a part of the Com-
 “ motions of our Minds arise upon the
 “ *moral Sense*, and from *publick Affections*
 “ toward the good of others? We should
 “ find, that without these Principles in
 “ our Nature, we should not feel the
 “ one half at least of our present *Plea-*
 “ *ures* or *Pains*; and that our Na-
 “ ture would be almost reduced to *Indo-*
 “ *lence*.”

*How Cha-
 racters and
 Tempers of
 Men are
 formed.*

AN accurate Observation of the several
 distinct *Characters* and *Tempers* of Men,
 which are constituted by the various De-
 grees of their *natural Sagacity*, their
Knowledge, their *Interests*, their *Opinions*,
 or *Associations* of Ideas, with the *Passions*
 which are prevalent in them, is a most
 useful and pleasant Entertainment for those,
 who have Opportunities of large Acquain-
 tance and Observation. But our present
 Purpose leads only to consider the first ge-
 neral

neral *Elements*, from the various Combina-
 tions of which, the several *Tempers* and
Characters are formed.

SECT.
 III.


THIS account of our Affections will, however, prepare the way for discerning considerable Evidences for the Goodness of the Deity, from the Constitution of our Nature; and for removing the Objections of voluptuous luxurious Men, against the Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Reflection. While no other Ideas of *Pleasure* or *Advantage* are given us, than those which relate to the external Senses; nor any other *Affections* represented as natural, save those toward private Good: it may be difficult to persuade many, even of those who are not Enemies to Virtue from *Inclination*, of the Wisdom of the Deity, in making the *Bias* of our Nature opposite to the Laws he gives us; and making all *Pleasure*, the most natural Character of Good, attend the *prohibited Actions*, or the *indifferent* ones; while *Obedience* to the Law must be a *constrained* Course of Action, enforced only by *Penalties* contrary to our *natural Affections* and *Senses*. Nature and Grace are by this Scheme made very opposite: Some would question whether they could have the same Author. Whereas, if the preceding Account be just, we see no


SECT. such Inconsistency: " Every Passion or Af-

III. " fection in its *moderate Degree* is inno-
 cent, many are directly *amiable*, and *mo-*
 rally good: we have *Senses* and *Affections*
 leading us to *publick Good*, as well as to
 private; to *Virtue*, as well as to other
 sorts of *Pleasure*."

SECT.

S E C T. IV.

How far our several Affections and Passions are in our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Observations about their Objects.

I. FROM what was said above it appears, S E C T. IV.
 that our Passions are not so much in our *Power*, as some seem to imagine, from the *Topicks* used either to raise or allay them. 
Affections and Passions depend much upon Opinions.
 We are so constituted by Nature, that, as soon as we form the Idea of certain Objects or Events, our *Desire* or *Aversion* will arise toward them; and consequently our Affections must very much depend upon the *Opinions* we form, concerning any thing which occurs to our Mind, its *Qualities*, *Tendencies*, or *Effects*. Thus the Happiness of every sensitive Nature is desired, as soon as we remove all *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of *Opposition* of *Interest* between this Being and others. The *Apprehension* of morally good Qualities, is the necessary Cause of *Approbation*, by our moral Sense, and of stronger
Love.

SECT. *Love.* The Cause of *Hatred*, is the *Apprehension* of the opposite Qualities. *Fear*, in like manner, must arise from *Opinion of Power*, and *Inclination* to hurt us: *Pity* from the *Opinion* of another's *undeserved Misery*: *Shame* only arises from *Apprehension* of *Contempt* from others, or *Consciousness* of moral Evil: *Joy*, in any Event, must arise from an *Opinion* of its Goodness. Our *selfish Passions* in this, do not differ from our *publick ones*.

THIS may shew us some Inconsistency in *Topicks* of Argument, often used to inculcate *Piety* and *Virtue*. Whatever *Motives* of Interest we suggest, either from a present or future *Reward*, must be ineffectual, until we have first laboured to form *amiable Conceptions* of the *Deity*, and of our *Fellow-Creatures*. And yet in many Writers, even in this Cause, “Mankind are represented as *absolutely evil*, or at best as *entirely selfish*; nor are there any nobler Ideas of the DEITY suggested. It is grown a *fashionable Topick*, to put some *fly selfish Construction* upon the most generous human Actions; and he passes for the *shreudest Writer*, or *Orator*, who is most artful in these Insinuations.”

*Appetites
and Affec-
tions di-
stinguished.*

II. THE Government of our Passions must then depend much upon our *Opinions*:
But

But we must here observe an obvious Difference among our Desires, *viz.* that “ some

SECT.
IV.

“ of them have a *previous*, painful, or uneasy Sensation, antecedently to any Opinion of Good in the Object; nay, the Object is often chiefly esteemed good, only for its *allaying this Pain* or Uneasiness; or if the Object gives also positive Pleasure, yet the *uneasy Sensation* is previous to, and independent of this Opinion of Good in the Object.” These Desires we may call *Appetites*. “ Other Desires and Aversions necessarily pre-suppose an Opinion of Good and Evil in their Objects; and the Desires or Aversions, with their concomitant uneasy Sensations, are produced or occasioned by this Opinion or *Apprehension*.” Of the former kind are *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Desires between the *Sexes*; to which Desires there is an uneasy Sensation *previous*, even in those who have little other Notion of Good in the Objects, than allaying this *Pain* or *Uneasiness*. There is something like to this in the Desire of *Society*, or the Company of our Fellow-creatures. Our Nature is so much formed for this, that altho’ the *Absence of Company* is not immediately painful, yet if it be long, and the Person be not employed in something which tends to *Society* at last, or which is designed to fit him for *Society*, an uneasy *Fretfulness*, *Sullenness*, and *Discontent*,

SECT. *content*, will grow upon him by degrees,

IV. which Company alone can remove. He
 ~~~~~ shall not perhaps be sensible always, that  
 it is the Absence of Company which occasions his Uneasiness: A painful Sensation dictates nothing of itself: it must be therefore some *Reflection* or *Instinct*, distinct from the Pain, which suggests the Remedy. Our Benevolence and Compassion pre-suppose indeed some *Knowledge* of other sensitive Beings, and of what is good or evil to them: But they do not arise from any previous *Opinion*, that “the Good of others” tends to the Good of the Agent.” They are *Determinations of our Nature*, previous to our Choice from Interest, which excite us to Action, as soon as we know other sensitive or rational Beings, and have any Apprehension of their Happiness or Misery.

IN other Desires the Case is different. No Man is distressed for want of *fine Smells*, *harmonious Sounds*, *beautiful Objects*, *Wealth*, *Power*, or *Grandeur*, previously to some Opinion formed of these things as good, or some *prior Sensation* of their Pleasures. In like manner, *Virtue* and *Honour* as necessarily give us Pleasure, when they occur to us, as Vice and Contempt give us Pain; but, antecedently to some *Experience* or *Opinion* of this Pleasure, there is no previous uneasy Sensation in their Absence, as there  
 is

is in the Absence of the Objects of *Appetite*. SECT. IV.  
 The Necessity of these Sensations previous to our Appetites, has been considered already. \* The Sensations accompanying or subsequent to our other Desires, by which they are denominated *Passions*, keep them in a just Ballance with our *Appetites*, as was before observed. ~~~~~

BUT this holds in general, concerning all our Desires or Aversions, that according to the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil, the Desire or Aversion is increased or diminished: Every *Gratification* of any Desire gives at first Pleasure; and Disappointment Pain, generally proportioned to the Violence of the Desire. In like manner, the *escaping* any Object of Aversion, tho' it makes no permanent Addition to our Happiness, gives at first a pleasant *Sensation*, and relieves us from Misery, proportioned to the Degree of *Aversion* or *Fear*. So when any Event, to which we had an Aversion, befalls us, we have at first Misery proportioned to the Degree of Aversion. So that some Pain is subsequent upon all *Frustration* of Desire or Aversion, but it is previous to those Desires only, which are called *Appetites*.

\* Sect. 2. Art. 6.

SECT. III. HENCE we see how impossible it is  
 IV. for one to judge of the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery in others, unless he knows their *Opinions*, their *Associations* of Ideas, and the *Degrees* of their Desires and Aversions. We see also of how much Consequence our *Associations* of Ideas and *Opinions* are to our Happiness or Misery, and to the Command of our Passions.

*Associations of Ideas and Opinions increase or diminish the strength of our Desires.*

FOR tho' in our *Appetites* there are uneasy Sensations, previous to any Opinion, yet our very Appetites may be strengthened or weakened, and variously altered by *Opinion*, or *Associations* of Ideas. Before *their* Intervention, the bodily Appetites are easily satisfied; Nature has put it in almost every one's power, so far to gratify them, as to support the Body, and remove Pain. But when *Opinion*, and *confused Ideas*, or *Fancy* comes in, and represents some particular kinds of Gratifications, or great Variety of them, as of great Importance; when Ideas of *Dignity*, *Grandeur*, *Magnificence*, *Generosity*, or any other *moral Species*, are joined to the Objects of Appetites, they may furnish us with endless Labour, Vexation, and Misery of every kind.

As to the other Desires which pre-suppose some *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good,  
 previous

previous to any Sensation of uneasiness; SECT. they must still be more directly influenced IV. by *Opinion*, and *Associations* of Ideas. The higher the *Opinion* or *Apprehension* of Good or Evil is, the stronger must the *Desire* or *Aversion* be; the greater is the Pleasure of *Success* at first, and the greater the Pain of *Disappointment*. Our publick Desires are influenced in the same manner with the private: what we conceive as Good, we shall desire for those we love, as well as for ourselves; and that in proportion to the *Degree of Good* apprehended in it: whatever we apprehend as Evil in any degree to those we love, to that we shall have proportionable Aversion.

THE common Effect of these *Associations* of Ideas is this, “ that they raise the  
“ Passions into an extravagant Degree, beyond the proportion of real Good in the  
“ Object: And commonly beget some secret Opinions to justify the Passions. But  
“ then the Confutation of these false Opinions is not sufficient to break the *Association*, so that the *Desire* or *Passion* shall  
“ continue, even when our Understanding has suggested to us, that the Object is not  
“ good, or not proportioned to the Strength of the Desire.” Thus we often may observe, that Persons, who by reasoning have laid aside all Opinion of *Spirits being in the dark*

SECT. *dark* more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in the dark.\* Thus the *luxurious*, the *extravagant Lover*, the *Miser*, can scarce be supposed to have *Opinions* of the several Objects of their Pursuit, proportioned to the Vehemence of their Desires; but the constant *Indulgence* of any Desire, the frequent *Repetition* of it, the *diverting* our Minds from all other Pursuits, the Strain of *Conversation* among Men of the same Temper, who often haunt together, the *Contagion* in the very Air and Countenance of the passionate, beget such wild *Associations* of Ideas, that a sudden *Conviction of Reason* will not stop the Desire or Aversion, any more than an Argument will surmount the *Loathings* or *Aversions*, acquired against certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or emetick Preparations.


THE *Luxurious* are often convinced, when any Accident has revived a *natural Appetite*, of the superior Pleasures in a plain Dinner, with a sharp Stomach:† but

- \* Ac veluti pueri trepidant, atque omnia cæcis  
In tenebris metuunt, sic nos in luce timemus  
Interdum nihilo quæ sunt metuenda magis.

LUC.

- † ——— Leporem scélatus, equove  
Lassus ab in domito, vel si Romana fatigat  
Militia assuetum Græcari ———  
Cum labor extuderit fastidia  
——— Cum sale panis  
Iatrantem stomachum bene leniet ———

HOC.  
this

this does not reform them; they have got SECT. IV.  
 all the Ideas of *Dignity, Grandeur, Excellence*, and *Enjoyment of Life* joined to their Table. Explain to a Miser the Folly of his Conduct, so that he can alledge nothing in his Defence; yet he will go on, 

*Ut locuples moriatur egenti vivere fato.* JUV.

He has likewise all Ideas of *Good*, of *Worth*, and *Importance* in Life confounded with his Coffers.

A ROMANTICK Lover has in like manner no Notion of Life without his *Mistress*, all *Virtue* and *Merit* are summed up in his *inviolable Fidelity*. The *Connoisseur* has all Ideas of valuable *Knowledge*, *Gentleman-like Worth* and *Ability* associated with his beloved Arts. The Idea of *Property* comes along with the Taste, and makes his Happiness impossible, without *Possession* of what he admires. A plain Question might confute the *Opinion*, but will not break the *Association*: “What Pleasure  
 “ has the Possessor more than others, to  
 “ whose Eyes they are exposed as well as  
 “ his?

OUR *publick Desires* are affected by confused Ideas, in the same manner with our private Desires. What is apprehended as  
H
Good,

SECT. Good, thro' an Association of foreign Ideas,

IV. shall be pursued for *those we love*, as well as  
 ~~~~~ what is really good for them. Our *benevolent Passions* in the nearer Ties, are as apt to be too violent as any whatsoever: this we may often experience in the *Love of Offspring, Relations, Parties, Cabals*. The Violence of our Passion makes us sometimes incapable of pursuing effectually their Good, and sinks us into an useless State of Sorrow upon their Misfortunes. *Compassion* often makes the Evil greater to the Spectator than to the Sufferer; and sometimes subjects the Happiness of a Person of great Worth, to every Accident befalling one entirely void of it.

THE Desire of Virtue, upon extensive impartial Schemes of publick Happiness, can scarce be too strong; but, upon *mistaken or partial Views* of publick Good, this Desire of Virtue may often lead Men into very pernicious Actions. One may conceive a sort of *Extravagancy*, and *effeminate Weakness* even of this Desire; as when Men are dissatisfied with themselves for *Disappointments* in good Attempts, which it was not in their Power to accomplish; when some *heroick Tempers* shew no Regard to private Good; when the Pursuit of the lovely Form is so passionate, that the Agent
 does

does not relish his *past Conduct* by agreeable S E C T.
Reflection, but like the Ambitious, IV.



Nil actum reputat si quid superesset agendum. Lucan.


BUT the most pernicious *Perversions* of this Desire are “ some *partial Admirations* “ of certain moral Species, such as *Fortitude*, *Propagation of true Religion*, *Zeal for a Party*; while other Virtues are “ overlooked, and the very *End* to which “ the admired Qualities are subservient is “ forgotten. Thus some *Phantoms* of Virtue are raised, wholly opposite to its true “ Nature, and to the sole End of it, *the publick Good.*”

HONOUR, in like manner, has had its foolish Affociations, and the true Nature of it has been overlooked, so that the Desire of it has run into *Enthusiasm*, and pernicious *Madness*. Thus, “ however our Desires, when our *Opinions* are true, and “ the Desire is proportioned to the *true Opinion*, are all calculated for good, either “ publick or private; yet *false Opinions*, “ and *confused Ideas*, or too great a *Violence* “ in any of them, above a due Proportion “ to the rest, may turn the best of them into “ destructive Follies.”

SECT. THIS is probably the Case in those Affections which some suppose *natural*, or at least incident to our Natures, and yet *absolutely evil*: Such as *Rancour*, or *disinterested Malice*, *Revenge*, *Misanthropy*. We indeed find our Nature determined to disapprove an *Agent* apprehended as evil, or malicious, thro' *direct Intention*; we must desire the Destruction of such a Being, not only from Self-Love, but from our Benevolence to others. Now when we rashly form Opinions of *Seets*, or *Nations*, as absolutely evil; or get associated Ideas of *Impiety*, *Cruelty*, *Profaneness*, recurring upon every mention of them: when, by repeated Reflection upon Injuries received, we strengthen our Dislike into an *obdurate Aversion*, and conceive that the Injurious are *directly malicious*; we may be led to act in such a manner, that Spectators, who are unacquainted with our *secret Opinions*, or *confused Apprehensions of others*, may think we have *pure disinterested Malice* in our Nature; a very *Instinct* toward the Misery of others, when it is really only the *overgrowth* of a just natural Affection, upon false Opinions, or confused Ideas; even as our *Appetites*, upon which our natural Life depends, may acquire accidental *Loathings* at the most wholesome Food. Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are often very rashly formed,

but

Malicious
or cruel
Temper,
how they
arise.

but our *Affections* are generally suited to our SECT.
Opinions. When our Ideas and Opinions IV.
of the moral Qualities of others are just, 
our Affections are generally regular and
good: But when we give loose Reins to our
Imagination and *Opinion*, our Affections
must follow them into all Extravagance and
Folly; and inadvertent Spectators will ima-
gine some *Dispositions* in us wholly useless,
and absolutely and directly *evil*.

Now the *Gratification* of these destru-
ctive Desires, like those of all the rest, gives
at first some *Pleasure*, proportioned to their
Violence; and the *Disappointment* gives pro-
portioned *Pain*. But as to the *Continuance*
of these Pleasures or Pains, we shall find
hereafter great Diversity.

FROM this view of our Desires, we may
see “ the great Variety of *Objects*, *Circum-*
“ *stances*, *Events*, which must be of Im-
“ portance to the Happiness of a Creature,
“ furnished with such a *Variety of Senses*
“ of Good and Evil, with equally various
“ *Desires* corresponding to them: especially
“ considering the strange *Combinations of*
“ *Ideas*, giving Importance to many Objects,
“ in their own Nature indifferent.”

*How far
the several
Desires
must neces-
sarily arise
in us.*

IV. WE must in the next Place enquire
“ how far these several *Desires* must neces-

SECT. "farily arise, or may be prevented by our
IV. "Conduct."



1. *That of
external
Pleasures.*

THE Pleasures and Pains of the *external Senses* must certainly be perceived by every one who comes into the World; the one raising some Degree of Desire, and the other Aversion: the *Pains of Appetites* arise yet more certainly than others, and are previous to any *Opinion*. But then it is very much in our power to keep these Sensations *pure* and *unmixed* with any foreign Ideas: so that the plainest Food and Raiment, if sufficiently nourishing and healthful, may keep us easy, as well as the *rarest* or most *expensive*. Nay the Body, when accustomed to the simpler Sorts, is easiest in the Use of them: And we are raised to an higher Degree of *Chearfulness*, by a small Improvement in our Table, than it is possible to bring a *pampered Body* into, by any of the Productions of Nature. Whatever the Body is once accustomed to, produces no considerable Change in it.

2. *The Desires of the
Pleasures
of the Imagination.*

THE Pleasures of the *Imagination*, or of the *internal Sense of Beauty*, and *Decency*, and *Harmony*, must also be perceived by us. The *Regularity*, *Proportion* and *Order* in external Forms, will as necessarily strike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the external Senses. But then, as we have no uneasiness

finest of *Appetite*, previous to the Reception SECT. IV.
 of those grateful Ideas, we are not *necessa-*
rily made miserable in their Absence; unless
 by some fantastick *Habit* we have rais'd
 very violent Desires, or by a long Pursuit of
 them, have made ourselves incapable of
 other Enjoyments.

AGAIN, the Sense and Desire of *Beauty*
 of several kinds is entirely abstracted from
Possession or *Property*; so that the finest *Re-*
lish of this kind, and the strongest subse-
 quent *Desires*, if we admit no foolish Con-
 junctions of Ideas, may almost every where
 be gratified with the Prospects of *Nature*,
 and with the Contemplation of the more
 curious *Works of Art*, which the Proprietors
 generally allow to others without Re-
 straint. But if this Sense or Desire of Beau-
 ty itself be accompanied with the Desire of
Possession or *Property*; if we let it be guided
 by *Custom*, and receive *Associations* of so-
 reign Ideas in our Fancy of *Dress*, *Equi-*
page, *Furniture*, *Retinue*; if we relish on-
 ly the Modes of the *Great*, or the Marks of
Distinction as beautiful; if we let such De-
 sires grow strong, we must be very *great* in-
 deed, before we can secure constant Pleasure
 by this Sense: and every Disappointment or
 Change of Fortune must make us miserable.
 The like Fate may attend the Pursuit of
speculative Sciences, *Poetry*, *Musick*, or
H 4 *Painting*;

SECT. *Painting*; to excel in these things is granted

IV. but to few. A violent Desire of *Distinction* and *Eminence* may bring on Vexation and Sorrow for the longest Life.

3. *The publick Desires.*

THE Pleasures and Pains of the *publick Sense* will also necessarily arise in us. Men cannot live without the *Society* of others, and their *good Offices*; they must observe both the *Happiness* and *Misery*, the *Pleasures* and *Pains* of their Fellows: *Desire* and *Aversion* must arise in the Observer. Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more near Attachments of Love, either from the Instinct between the *Sexes*, or that toward *Offspring*, or from Observation of the *benevolent Tempers* of others, or their particular *Virtues* and *good Offices*, we must feel the Sensations of *Joy* and *Sorrow*, from the State of others even in the stronger Degrees, and have the publick Desires in a greater Height. All we can do to prevent the *Pains* of general Benevolence, will equally lessen the *Pleasures* of it. If we restrain our *publick Affection* from growing strong, we abate our Pleasures from the good Success of others, as much as we lessen our Compassion for their Misfortunes: If we confine our Desires to a small *Circle* of Acquaintance, or to a *Cabal* or *Faction*, we contract our Pleasures as much as we do our Pains. The Distinction of Pleasures and Pains into *real* and

and *imaginary*, or rather into necessary and *voluntary*, would be of some use, if we could correct the *Imaginations* of others, as well as our own ; but if we cannot, we are sure, whoever thinks himself miserable, is really so ; however he might possibly, by a better Conduct of his Imagination, have prevented this Misery. All we can do in this affair, is to obtain a great Share of the Pleasures of the *stronger Ties*, with fewer Pains of them, by confining the stronger Degrees of Love, or our Friendships, to Persons of *corrected Imaginations*, to whom as few of the uncertain Objects of Desire are necessary to Happiness as is possible. Our Friendship with such Persons may probably be to us a much greater Source of Happiness than of Misery, since the Happiness of such Persons is more probable than the contrary.


SINCE there is nothing in our Nature determining us to *disinterested Hatred* toward any Person ; we may be secure against all the Pains of *Malice*, by preventing false *Opinions* of our Fellows as absolutely evil, or by guarding against *habitual Anger*, and rash *Aversions*.

THE *moral Ideas* do arise also necessarily in our Minds. We cannot avoid observing the *Affections* of those we converse with ;
their

SECT. their *Actions*, their *Words*, their *Looks* betray them. We are conscious of our own

IV. Affections, and cannot avoid Reflection upon them sometimes: the kind and generous Affections will appear amiable, and all Cruelty, Malice, or even very selfish Affections, will be disapproved, and appear odious. Our *own Temper*, as well as that of others, will appear to our moral Sense either lovely or deformed, and will be the Occasion either of Pleasure or Uneasiness. We have not any proper *Appetite* toward Virtue, so as to be uneasy, even antecedently to the Appearance of the lovely Form; but as soon as it appears to any Person, as it certainly must very early in Life, it never fails to raise *Desire*, as Vice does raise *Aversion*. This is so rooted in our Nature, that no *Education*, *false Principles*, *depraved Habits*, or even *Affectation* itself can entirely root it out. LUCRETIVS and HOBBS shew themselves in innumerable Instances struck with some *moral Species*; they are full of Expressions of *Admiration*, *Gratitude*, *Praise*, *Desire of doing Good*; and of *Censure*, *Disapprobation*, *Aversion to some Forms of Vice*.

SINCE then there is no avoiding these Desires and Perceptions of *Morality*, all we can do to secure ourselves in the possession of Pleasures of this kind, without Pain, consists in “ a vigorous Use of our Reason, to
“ discern

“ discern what Actions really tend to the SECT.
 “ publick Good in the *whole*, that we may IV.
 “ not do *that* upon a partial View of Good, 
 “ which afterwards, upon a fuller Exami-
 “ nation, we shall condemn and abhor our-
 “ selves for; and withal, to fix our *Friend-*
 “ *ships* with Persons of like Dispositions,
 “ and just Discernment.” Men of partial
 Views of publick Good, if they never ob-
 tain any better, may be easy in a very pernicious
 Conduct, since the *moral Evil* or *De-*
formity does not appear to them. But this
 is seldom to be hoped for in any partial Con-
 duct. Those who are injured by us fail not
 to complain; the Spectators, who are dis-
 engaged from our partial Attachments, will
 often take the Freedom to express their
 Sentiments, and set our Conduct in a full
 Light: This must very probably occasion
 to us *Shame* and *Remorse*. It cannot there-
 fore be an indifferent Matter, to an Agent
 with a moral Sense, what *Opinions* he forms
 of the Tendency of Actions; what partial
Attachments of Love he has toward *Parties*
 or *Factions*. If he has true *Opinions* of the
 Tendencies of *Actions*; if he carefully ex-
 amines the real Dignity of *Persons* and *Cau-*
ses, he may be sure that the Conduct which
 he now approves he shall always approve,
 and have delight in Reflection upon it,
 however it be censured by others. But if
 he takes up at hazard *Opinions* of Actions;
 if

SECT. if he has a foolish *Admiration* of particu-

IV. lar Sects, and as foolish *Aversions* and Dis-
 ~~~~~ like to others, not according to any real  
 Importance or Dignity, he shall often find  
 occasion for *Inconstancy* and *Change* of his  
 Affections, with *Shame* and *Remorse* for his  
 past Conduct, and an inward *Dislike* and  
*Self-Condemnation*.

WHAT most deeply affects our Happi-  
 ness or Misery, are the Dispositions of those  
 Persons with whom we voluntarily contract  
 some *nearer Intimacies* of Friendship: If  
 we act wisely in this Point, we may secure  
 to ourselves the greatest Pleasures with the  
 fewest Pains, by attaching ourselves to Per-  
 sons of real Goodness, good Offices toward  
 whom are useful to the World. The Ties  
 of *Blood* are generally very strong, especi-  
 ally toward *Offspring*; they need rather the  
 Bridle than the Spur, in all Cases wherein  
 the Object is not recommended to a singu-  
 lar Love by his good Qualities. We may,  
 in a considerable measure, restrain our *na-*  
*tural Affection* toward a worthless Offspring,  
 by setting our *publick Affections* and our  
*moral Sense* against it, in frequent Contem-  
 plation of their Vices, and of the Mischief  
 which may arise to Persons of more worth  
 from them, if we give them any Counte-  
 nance in their Vices.

THE regulating our Apprehensions of SECT.  
 the *Actions of others*, is of very great Im- IV.  
 portance, that we may not imagine Man-  
 kind worse than they really are, and there-  
 by bring upon ourselves a Temper full of  
*Suspicion, Hatred, Anger and Contempt* to-  
 ward others; which is a constant State of  
 Misery, much worse than all the Evils to  
 be feared from *Credulity*. If we examine  
 the true *Springs* of human Action, we shall  
 seldom find their Motives worse than *Self-*  
*Love*. Men are often subject to *Anger*, and  
 upon sudden *Provocations* do Injuries to  
 each other, and that only from Self-Love,  
 without Malice; but the greatest part of  
 their Lives is employed in Offices of *natu-*  
*ral Affection, Friendship, innocent Self-*  
*Love, or Love of a Country*. The little  
*Party-Prejudices* are generally founded up-  
 on Ignorance, or false Opinions, rather apt  
 to move *Pity* than *Hatred*. Such Consid-  
 erations are the best Preservative against *An-*  
*ger, Malice, and Discontent* of Mind with  
 the Order of Nature. “ When you would  
 “ make yourself chearful and easy (says the  
 “ Emperor\*) consider the *Virtues* of your  
 “ several Acquaintances, the *Industry* and  
 “ *Diligence* of one, the *Modesty* of ano-  
 “ ther, the *Generosity* or *Liberality* of a

\* Marcus Antoninus, *Lib. vi. C. 48.*

“ third;

SECT. " third; and in some Persons some other  
 IV. " Virtue. There is nothing so delightful,  
 ~~~~~ " as the Resemblances of the *Virtues* ap-  
 " pearing in the Conduct of your Contem-
 " poraries as frequently as possible. Such
 " Thoughts we should still retain with us."

WHEN the *moral* Sense is thus assisted by a sound Understanding and Application, our own Actions may be a constant Source of solid Pleasure, along with the Pleasures of *Benevolence*, in the highest Degree which our Nature will admit, and with as few of its Pains as possible.

*How far
 our Sense
 of Honour
 is in our
 power.*

As to the Desires of *Honour*, since we cannot avoid observing or hearing of the Sentiments of others concerning our Conduct, we must feel the Desire of the *good Opinions* of others, and Aversion to their *Censures* or *Condemnation*: since the one necessarily gives us Pleasure, and the other Pain. Now it is impossible to bring all Men into the same Opinions of particular Actions, because of their different Opinions of *publick Good*, and of the *Means* of promoting it; and because of *opposite Interests*; so that it is often impossible to be secure against all Censure or Dishonour from some of our Fellows. No one is so much Master of *external Things*, as to make his honourable Intentions successful; and yet *Suc-*
cess

cess is a Mark by which many judge of the S E C T.
 Goodness of Attempts. Whoever therefore IV.
 suffers his Desire of *Honour* or *Applause* to
 grow violent, without Distinction of the
Persons to whose Judgment he submits,
 runs a great hazard of Misery. But our
 natural Desire of Praise, is in a compounded
 Proportion of the *Numbers* of Applauders,
 and their *Dignity*. “ He therefore who
 “ makes *Distinction* of Persons justly, and
 “ acts wisely for the *publick Good*, may se-
 “ cure himself from much uneasiness up-
 “ on injudicious Censure, and may obtain
 “ the Approbation, of those whose Esteem
 “ alone is valuable, or at least far over-bal-
 “ lances the Censure of others.”

THE *Desire of Wealth* must be as necessary The Desire
of Wealth
and Power.
 as any other Desires of our Nature, as soon
 as we apprehend the usefulness of Wealth
 to gratify all other Desires. While it is
 desired as the *Means* of something farther,
 the Desire tends to our Happiness, propor-
 tionably to the good Oeconomy of the *prin-
 cipal Desires* to which it is made subservient.
 It is in every Man's power, by a little Re-
 flection, to prevent the Madness and Enthu-
 siasm with which Wealth is insatiably pur-
 sued even for itself, without any direct In-
 tention of using it. The Consideration of
 the small Addition often made by Wealth
 to the Happiness of the Possessor, may check
 this


SECT this Desire, and prevent that *Insatiability*
 IV. which sometimes attends it.



POWER in like manner is desired as the Means of gratifying other *original Desires*; nor can the Desire be avoided by those who apprehend its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the *Extravagance* of this Desire, and many of its consequent Pains, by considering “ the *Danger* of affecting it by injurious Means, supporting it by *Force*, without Consent of the Subject, and employing it to *private Interest*, in Opposition “ to publick Good.” No Mortal is easy under such Subjection; Every Slave to such a Power is an *Enemy*: The Possessor must be in a continual State of *Fear*, *Suspicion* and *Hatred*.

*The Occa-
 sion of fanta-
 stick De-
 sires.*

THERE is nothing in our Nature leading us necessarily into the *fantastick Desires*; they wholly arise through our *Ignorance* and *Negligence*; when, through want of Thought, we suffer foolish *Associations* of Ideas to be made, and imagine certain trifling Circumstances to contain something *honourable and excellent* in them from their being used by Persons of *Distinction*. We know how the *Inadvertencies*, *Negligences*, *Infirmities*, and even *Vices*, either of great or ingenious Men, have been affected, and imitated by those who were incapable of imi-

imitating their Excellencies. This happens SECT.
 often to young Gentlemen of plentiful For- IV.
 tunes which set them above the Employ- 
 ments necessary to others, when they have
 not cultivated any relish for the Pleasures
 of the *Imagination*, such as *Architecture*,
Musick, *Painting*, *Poetry*, *Natural Philo-*
sophy, *History*: When they have no farther
 Knowledge of these things, than stupidly
 to praise what they hear others praise:
 When they have neglected to cultivate their
publick Affections, are bantered a long time
 from *Marriage* and *Offspring*; and have
 neither themselves Minds fit for *Friendships*,
 nor any intimate Acquaintance with such as
 are fit to make Friends of: When their *mo-*
ral Sense is weakened, or, if it be strong in
 any points, these are fixed at random, with-
 out any *regular Scheme*: When thro' Igno-
 rance of *publick Affairs*, or want of *Eloquence*
 to speak what they know, they despair of the
Esteem or *Honour* of the wise: When their
 Hearts are too gay to be entertained with
 the dull Thoughts of increasing their *Wealth*,
 and they have not Ability enough to hope
 for *Power*; such poor empty Minds have
 nothing but Trifles to pursue; any thing be-
 comes agreeable, which can supply the Void
 of Thought, or prevent the sullen Discon-
 tent which must grow upon a Mind consci-
 ous of no *Merit*, and expecting the *Con-*
tempt of its Fellows; as a *Pack of Dogs*,

SECT. an *Horse*, a *Jewel*, an *Equipage*, a *Pack of*
 IV. *Cards*, a *Tavern*; any thing which has got
 any confused Ideas of *Honour*, *Dignity*, *Liberality*, or *genteel Enjoyment of Life* joined to it. These fantastick Desires any Man might have banished at first, or entirely prevented. But if we have lost the *Time* of substituting better in their stead, we shall only change from one sort to another, with a perpetual Succession of *Inconstancy* and *Dissatisfaction*.

—Cui si vitiosa Libido


Fecerit Auspicium—

Iidem eadem possunt horum durare probantes.

Hor. Ep. 1.

V. THE End of all these Considerations, is to find out the most effectual Way of advancing the Happiness of Mankind; in order to which, they may perhaps appear of considerable Consequence, since Happiness consists in “ the highest and most durable
 “ Gratifications of, either all our *Desires*,
 “ or, if all cannot be gratified at once, of
 “ those which tend to the greatest and
 “ most durable *Pleasures*, with exemption
 “ either from all *Pains* and Objects of *A-*
 “ *version*, or at least from those which are
 “ the most grievous.” The following general Observations may be premised concerning their Objects.

I. “ IT

I. "IT is plainly impossible that any SECT.
 " Man should pursue the Gratifications of IV.
 " all these *Desires* at once, with Prudence, 
 " Diligence, and Vigour, sufficient to ob- *The full*
 " tain the highest Pleasures of each kind, *Pursuit of*
 " and to avoid their opposite Pains." For, *all kinds of*
Pleasure is
 not to mention the *Narrowness* of the Pow-
 ers of our Minds, which makes them in-
 capable of a Multiplicity of Pursuits at
 once; the very *Methods* of obtaining the
 highest Gratification of the several Senses
 and Desires, are directly inconsistent with
 each other. For example, the violent Pur-
 suit of the Pleasures of the *external Senses*,
 or *Sensuality*, is opposite to the Pleasures
 of the *Imagination*, and to the Study of
 the ingenious *Arts*, which tend to the Or-
 nament of Life; These require Labour and
 Application, inconsistent with the *Volup-
 tuousness* of the external Senses, which by
 itself would engross the whole Application
 of our Minds, through vain Associations of
 Ideas.

AGAIN: The violent Pursuits of either
 of the former kinds of Pleasures, is often
 directly inconsistent with *publick Affections*,
 and with our *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Ho-
 nour*. These Pleasures require a quite diffe-
 rent Temper, a Mind little set upon selfish
 Pleasures, strongly possessed with Love for

SECT. others, and Concern for their Interests capable of Labour and Pain. However our

VI. desire of Honour be really *selfish*, yet we know it is never acquired by Actions appearing selfish; but by such as appear publick-spirited, with Neglect of the Pleasures of the external Senses and Wealth. *Selfishness* is generally attended with *Shame*; * and hence we conceal even our *Desire of Honour* itself, and are ashamed of *Praise* in our own Presence, even when we are doing beneficent Actions, with design to obtain it. The Pursuits of *Wealth* and *Power* are often directly opposite to the Pleasures of all the other kinds, at least for the present, however they may be intended for the future Enjoyment of them.

No Certainty of Success in any Pursuit, save that of Virtue.

2. " THERE is no such *Certainty* in human Affairs, that a Man can assure himself of the perpetual Possession of these Objects which gratify any one Desire," except that of *Virtue* itself: which, since it does not depend upon external Objects and Events†, but upon our own *Affections* and *Conduct*, we may promise to ourselves that we shall always enjoy. But then Virtue consists in Benevolence, or Desire of the publick Good: *The Happiness of others* is

* *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.*

† *Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

very uncertain, so that our publick Desires SECT. IV.
 may often be disappointed; and every Dis-
 appointment is uneasy, in proportion to the
 Degree of Desire. And therefore, how-
 ever the *Admiration* and fixed *Pursuit of*
Virtue may always secure one stable and
 constant Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, yet
 this Enjoyment presupposes a *Desire of pub-*
lick Good, subject to frequent Disappoint-
 ments, which will be attended with Uneasi-
 ness proportioned to the Degree of publick
 Desire, or the *Virtue* upon which we re-
 flect. There seems therefore no possibility
 of securing to ourselves, in our present
 State, an *unmixed Happiness* independently
 of all other Beings. Every Apprehension
 of Good raises desire, every Disappoint-
 ment of Desire is uneasy; every Object of
 Desire is uncertain except *Virtue*, but the
Enjoyment of Virtue supposes the Desire of
 an uncertain Object, *viz.* the *publick Hap-*
piness. To secure therefore independently
 of all other Beings invariable and pure Hap-
 piness, it would be necessary either to have
 the *Power* of directing all Events in the U-
 niverse, or to root out all *Sense of Evil*, or
 Aversion to it, while we retained our *Sense*
of Good, and that without previous Desire,
 the Disappointment of which could give
 Pain. The *rooting* out of all Senses and
 Desires, were it practicable, would cut off
 all Happiness as well as Misery: The re-
moving


SECT. moving or stopping a part of them, might

IV. indeed be of consequence to the Happiness
 of the *Individual* on some occasions, however pernicious it might be to the *Whole*. But it is plain, we have not in our power the modelling of our *Senses or Desires*, to form them for a private Interest: They are fixed for us by the AUTHOR of our Nature, subservient to the Interest of the *System*; so that each Individual is made, previously to his own Choice, a Member of a *great Body*, and affected with the Fortunes of the *Whole*; or at least of many Parts of it; nor can he break himself off at Pleasure.

The Mistakes of the Stoicks about complete Happiness.

THIS may shew the Vanity of some Expressions of the *Stoicks*, boasting, one would imagine, who did not remember other parts of their Scheme, of an undisturbed Happiness and Serenity, independently even of the DEITY, as well as of their Fellow-Creatures, wholly inconsistent with the *Order* of Nature, as well as with the Principles of some of their great Leaders: For which, Men of Wit in their own Age did not fail to ridicule them.

THAT must be a very fantastick Scheme of Virtue, which represents it as a *private sublimely selfish Discipline*, to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the
 Changes


Changes of Fortune as to our *Wealth* or SECT.
Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain, IV.
 but even in all *external Events* whatsoever, 
 in the Fortunes of our dearest *Friends* or
Country, solacing ourselves that we are easy
 and undisturbed. If there be any thing ami-
 able in human Nature, the Reflection upon
 which can give us pleasure, it must be kind
disinterested Affections towards our Fellows,
 or towards the *whole*, and its AUTHOR and
Cause. These Affections, when reflected
 upon, must be one constant Source of Plea-
 sure in *Self-Approbation*. But some of these
 very Affections, being toward an uncertain
 Object, must occasion Pain, and directly
 produce one sort of Misery to the virtuous
 in this Life. It is true indeed, it would be
 a much greater Misery to want such an ami-
 able Temper, which alone secures us from
 the basest and most detestable State of *Self-*
Condemnation and *Abhorrence*. But, allow-
 ing such a Temper to be the necessary Oc-
 casion of one sort of Happiness, even the
 greatest we are capable of, yet it may also be
 the Occasion of no inconsiderable Pains in
 this Life.

THAT this *affectionate Temper* is true
 Virtue, and not that *undisturbed Selfishness*,
 were it attainable, every one would readily
 own who saw them both in Practice.
 Would any honest Heart relish such a Speech

SECT. as this from a *Cato* or an *Æmilius Paulus*?

IV. “ I foresee the Effects of this Defeat, my
 ~~~~~ “ *Fellow-Creatures*, my *Countrymen*, my  
 “ honourable *Acquaintances*; many a ge-  
 “ nerous gallant *Patriot* and *Friend*, *Fa-*  
 “ *thers*, *Sons*, and *Brothers*, *Husbands* and  
 “ *Wives*, shall be enslaved, tortured, torn  
 “ from each other, or in each other’s sight  
 “ made subject to the *Pride*, *Avarice*, *Pe-*  
 “ *tulancy*, or *Lust* of the Conqueror. I  
 “ have, for my own *Pleasure*, to secure  
 “ agreeable *Reflections*, laboured in their  
 “ Defence. I am unconcerned in their Mis-  
 “ fortunes; their *bodily Tortures*, or more  
 “ exquisite *Distresses of Mind* for each o-  
 “ ther, are to me indifferent. I am entire-  
 “ ly absolute, compleat in myself; and can  
 “ behold their Agonies with as much Ease  
 “ or Pleasure, as I did their Prosperity.”  
 This is the plain Language of some boasting  
*Refiners* upon Virtue; Sentiments as disa-  
 greeable as those of *Catiline*.

THE Desire of Virtue is toward an Ob-  
 ject ἐκ τῶν ἐπ’ ἡμῶν, or *in our power*, since all  
 Men have naturally *kind Affections*, which  
 they may increase and strengthen; but these  
 kind Affections tend toward an *uncertain*  
*Object*, which is not in our power. Sup-  
 pose the *Stoick* should alledge, “ Vice is the  
 “ only Evil, and Virtue the only Good.”  
 If we have *Benevolence* to others, we must  
 wish

wish them to be virtuous, and must have SECT.  
 compassion toward the vicious: thus still IV.  
 we may be subjected to Pain or Uneasiness,   
 by our *very Virtue*; unless we suppose,  
*what* no Experience can confirm, that Men  
 may have strong Desires, the Disappoint-  
 ment of which will give no *Uneasiness*, or  
 that Uneasiness is no Evil. Let the *Philoso-*  
*pher* regulate his own Notions as he pleases  
 about Happiness or Misery; whoever ima-  
 gines himself unhappy, is so in reality; and  
 whoever has *kind Affections* or Virtue, must  
 be uneasy to see others really unhappy.

BUT tho' a pure unmixed Happiness is  
 not attainable in this Life, yet all their Pre-  
 cepts are not rendered useless.

*Est quâdam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.*

3. FOR we may observe, thirdly, that  
 " the *Sense of Good* can continue in its full  
 " Strength, when yet we shall have but  
 " *weak Desires.*" In this case we are capa-  
 ble of enjoying all the Good in any Object,  
 when we obtain it, and yet exposed to no  
 great Pain upon *Disappointment*. This may  
 be generally observed, that " the *Violence*  
 " *of Desire* does not proportionably enliven  
 " the Sensation of Good, when it is obtain-  
 " ed: nor does *diminishing the Desire* weak-  
 " en the Sensation, tho' it will diminish the  
 " *Unca-*

*3. The full  
 Sense of  
 Good may  
 be prefer-  
 red, with-  
 out the  
 Pains of  
 Desire, in  
 many Ca-  
 ses.*

SECT. " *Uneasiness of Disappointment, or the Mi-*  
 IV. " *tery of contrary Evils.*" Our high Ex-  
 ~~~~~ pectations of Happiness from any Object,  
 either thro' the *Acuteness* of our Senses, or
 from our *Opinions* or *Associations* of Ideas,
 never fail to increase Desire: But then the
Violence of Desire does not proportionably
 enliven our *Sensation* in the Enjoyment.
 During the first confused Hurry of our Suc-
 cess, our Joy may perhaps be increased by
 the Violence of our *previous Desire*, were
 it only by allaying the great Uneasiness ac-
 companying the Desire itself. But this Joy
 soon vanishes, and is often succeeded by
Disgust and *Uneasiness*, when our *Sense* of
 the Good, which is more fixed in Nature
 than our *Fancy* or *Opinions*, represents the
 Object far below our Expectation. Now
 he who examines all *Opinions* of Good in
 Objects, who prevents or corrects *vain Asso-*
ciations of Ideas, and thereby prevents *ex-*
travagant Admirations, or *enthusiastick De-*
sires, above the real Moment of Good in the
 Object, if he loses the *transient Raptures* of
 the first Success, yet he enjoys all the *per-*
manent Good or Happiness which any Object
 can afford; and escapes, in a great measure,
 both the uneasy Sensations of the more *vi-*
olent Desires, and the *Torments of Disap-*
pointment, to which Persons of irregular
 Imaginations are exposed.

THIS

THIS is the Case of the *Temperate* and *Sect.*
the *Cibaste*, with relation to the Appetites; *IV.*
of the Men of *Moderation* and *Frugality*,
and *corrected Fancy*, with regard to the Plea-
sures of *Imagination*; of the *Humble* and
the *Content*, as to *Honour*, *Wealth* or *Pow-*
er. Such Persons upon good Success, want
only the first *transitory Ecstacies*; but have
a full and lively *Sense* of all the lasting
Good in the Objects of their Pursuit; and
yet are in a great measure secure against both
the Uneasiness of *violent Desire*, and the
Dejection of Mind, and *abject Sorrow* upon
Disappointment, or upon their being exposed
to the contrary Evils.

FURTHER, Persons of *irregular Imagi-*
nations are not soon reformed, nor their As-
sociations of Ideas broke by every *Experi-*
ence of the Smallness of the Good in the ad-
mired Object. They are often rather set
upon *new Pursuits* of the same kind, or of
greater *Variety* of like Objects. So their
experience of *Disappointment*, or of contra-
ry Evils, does not soon correct their Imagi-
nations about the Degrees of Good or Evil.
The Loss of Good, or the Pressure of any
Calamity, will continue to torment them,
thro' their *vain Notions* of these Events, and
make them insensible of the real Good
which they might still enjoy in their present
State.


SECT. State. Thus the *Covetous* have smaller Pleasure in any given *Degree of Wealth*; the *Luxurious* from a *splendid Table*; the *Ambitious* from any given *Degree of Honour or Power*, than Men of more moderate Desires: And on the other hand, the Miseries of *Poverty, mean Fare, Subjection, or Contempt*, appear much greater to them, than to the moderate. Experience, while these confused Ideas remain, rather increases the Disorder: But if just *Reflection* comes in, and tho' late, applies the proper Cure, by correcting the *Opinions* and the *Imagination*, every Experience will tend to our Advantage.

THE same way may our *publick Desires* be regulated. If we prevent confused Notions of Good, we diminish or remove many Anxieties for our *Friends* as well as ourselves. Only this must be remembered, that weakening our *publick Affections*, necessarily weakens our *Sense* of publick Good founded upon them, and will deprive us of the Pleasures of the *moral Sense*, in reflecting on our Virtue.

4. Laying
our account
to meet
with Evil,
often lessens
our Misery.

4. WE may lastly remark, " That the *Expectation* of any Pain, or the frequent *Consideration* of the Evils which may befall us, or the Loss of Good we now enjoy, before these Events actually threaten

" us,

“ us, or raise any *Consternation* in our Minds S E C T.
 “ by their Approach, does not diminish our IV.
 “ *Joy* upon escaping Evil, or our *Pleasure* 
 “ upon the arrival of any Good beyond Ex-
 “ pectation: But this previous Expectation
 “ generally diminishes our *Fear*, while the
 “ Event is in suspense, and our *Sorrow* up-
 “ on its arrival;” Since thereby the Mind
 examines the *Nature* of the Event, sees how
 far it is necessarily Evil, and what Supports
 under it are in its power: This *Consideration*
 may break vain Conjunctions of foreign
 Ideas, which occasion our greatest Fears in
 Life, and even in Death itself. If, indeed,
 a *weak Mind* does not study to correct the
Imagination, but still dwells upon its possi-
 ble Calamities, under all their *borrowed*
Forms of Terror; or if it industriously ag-
 gravates them to itself, this previous Consi-
 deration may embitter its whole Life, with-
 out arming it against the smallest Evil.

THIS Folly is often occasioned by that
 Delight which most Men when under Mis-
 fortunes find in being pitied by others; those
 especially, who are continually indulged as
 the *Favourites of Families or Company*, be-
 ing long enured to the Pleasure arising from
 the perpetual *Marks of Love* toward them
 from all their Company, and from their ten-
 der *Sympathy* in Distress: this often leads
 them even to *feign Misery* to obtain Pity,
and

SECT. and to raise in themselves the most dejected

IV. Thoughts, either to procure *Consolation*, or
the Pleasure of observing the *Sympathy* of
others. This *peevish* or *pettish Temper*, tho'
it arises from something sociable in our
Frame, yet is often the Fore-runner of the
greatest Corruption of Mind. It disarms the
Heart of its natural *Integrity*; it induces us
to throw away our true *Armour*, our *natural*
Courage, and cowardly to commit our-
selves to the vain Protection of others, while
we neglect our own Defence.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

A Comparifon of the Pleafures and Pains of the feveral Senses, as to Intenfeneffs and Duration.

I. **H**AVING considered how far these S E C T. V.
 Defires must necessarily affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain; since by the first general *Observation*, the Pursuits of the several Pleasures, and the avoiding the several Pains, may often be inconsistent with each other; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are *the most valuable*, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others; and which of these Pains are *most grievous*, so as to be shunned even by the enduring of other Pains if necessary.

“ THE *Value* of any Pleasure, and the
 “ *Quantity* or *Moment* of any Pain, is in a
 “ compounded Proportion of the *Intenfeneffs*
 “ and *Duration*.” In examining the Duration of Pleasure, we must include not only the Constancy of the *Object*, but even of our *Fancy*; for a Change in either of these will put an end to it.

To

SECT. To compare these several Pleasures and

V. Pains as to their *Intenseness*, seems difficult, because of the Diversity of *Tastes*, or *Turns* of *Temper* given by *Custom* and *Education*, which make strange *Associations of Ideas*, and form *Habits*; from whence it happens, that, tho' all the several kinds of original Senses and Desires seem equally natural, yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind, as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some pursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, and all other Pursuits are made subservient to them: Others are chiefly set upon the Pleasures of *Imagination* or *internal Senses*; *social* and *kind Affections* employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high *moral Sense*, and *Love of Honour*. We may sometimes find an high *Sense of Honour* and desire of *Applause*, where there is indeed a *moral Sense*, but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced by *popular Opinion*, and made subservient to it: In this *Character* the Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the Imagination, have little room, except so far as they may produce *Distinction*. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the *Luxurious* would

The difficulty in comparing the several Pleasures, as to *Intenseness*.

would be quite opposite to that of the *Vir- S E C T.*
tuous. The *Ambitious* would differ from V.
both. Those who are devoted to the *inter- ~*
nal Senses or *Imagination*, would differ from
all the three. The *Miser* would applaud
himself in his *Wealth* above them all. Is
there therefore no disputing about *Tastes*?
Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain
the several Enjoyments for which they have
a *Relish*? If they are, the *Dispute* is at an
end: A *Fly* or *Maggot* in its proper haunts,
is as happy as a *Hero*, or *Patriot*, or *Friend*,
who has newly delivered his *Country* or
Friend, and is surrounded with their grate-
ful *Praises*. The *Brute* or *Insect* may
think so of itself; but who will stand to
its *Judgment*, when we are sure that it has
experienced only one sort of *Pleasure*, and
is a stranger to the others? May we not in
like manner find some *Reasons* of *appealing*
from the *Judgment* of certain Men? Or
may not some *Characters* be found among
Men, who alone are capable of judging in
this matter?

II. It is obvious that “ those alone are *The Plea-*
“ capable of judging, who have experien- *ures of a*
“ ced all the several *kinds of Pleasure*, and *moral Kind*
“ have their *Senses* acute and fully exerci- *proved su-*
“ fed in them all.” Now a high *Relish* *perior by*
for *Virtue*, or a strong *moral Sense*, with *the Testimo-*
ny of the
Virtuous.
K its

SECT. its concomitant *publick Sense and Affections*,

V. and a *Sense of Honour*, was never alledged
 to impair our *external Senses*, or to make
 us incapable of any pleasure of the *Imagi-
 nation*; *Temperance* never spoiled a good
Palate, whatever *Luxury* may have done;
 a generous affectionate publick Spirit, re-
 flecting on itself with delight, never viti-
 ated any Organ of *external Pleasure*, nor
 weakened their Perceptions. Now all vir-
 tuous Men have given *Virtue* this Testimo-
 ny, that its Pleasures are superior to any
 other, nay to all others jointly; that a
 friendly generous *Action* gives a *Delight* su-
 perior to any other; that other Enjoyments,
 when compared with the Delights of *Inte-
 grity, Faith, Kindness, Generosity, and pub-
 lick Spirit*, are but trifles scarce worth any
 regard.*

By the Te-
 stimony of
 the Vicious.

NAY, we need not confine our Evidence
 to the Testimony of the *perfectly Virtuous*.
 The *vicious Man*, tho' no fit judge, were he
 entirely abandoned, since he loses his *Sense*
 of the Pleasures of the *moral Kind*, or at
 least has not experienced them fully, yet he
 generally retains so much of human Na-
 ture, and of the *Senses and Affections* of our

* See this Argument in *Plato de Repub. Lib. IX.* And
Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.

Kind,

Kind, as sometimes to experience even *moral Pleasures*. There is scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible to all *Species of Morality*. SECT. V.

A DEBAUCHEE has never perhaps felt the *Pleasures* of a wise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social, and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own *moral Worth*, and merited *Esteem* and *Love*; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he may despise in comparison of his *Pleasures*. But if in any particular Affair, a *moral Species*, or *Point of Honour* has affected him, he will soon despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his *Friend*, whom he loves upon whatever fantastick Reasons, he can quit his *Debauch* to serve him, nay can run the Hazard of *Wounds* and *Death* to rescue him from Danger? If his *Honour* be concerned to resent an *Affront*, will he not quit his Pleasures, and run the hazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of *Cowardice* or *Falshood*? He will scorn one who tells him, that “a *Liar*, or a *Coward*, may be “happy enough, while he has all things necessary to *Luxury*.” It is in vain to alledge, “that there is no disputing about “*Tastes*.” To every Nature there are certain *Tastes* assigned by the great AUTHOR

SECT. of all. To the *human Race* there are assign-

V. ed a *publick Taste*, a *moral one*, and a *Taste*
 ~~~~~ for *Honour*. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more than their *external Senses*: They may pervert them, and weaken them by false *Opinions*, and foolish *Associations* of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them. The Happiness of an *Insect* or *Brute*, will only make an *Insect* or *Brute* happy. But a Nature with further *Powers*, must have further *Enjoyments*.

NAY, let us consider the different *Ages* in our own Species. We once knew the time when an *Hobby-Horse*, a *Top*, a *Rattle*, was sufficient Pleasure to us. We grow up, we now relish *Friendships*, *Honour*, *good Offices*, *Marriage*, *Offspring*, *serving a Community or Country*. Is there no difference in these Tastes? We were happy before, are we no happier now? If not, we have made a foolish Change of Fancy. Our former Toys we more easily procured, kept in good order, and managed, than the present Objects of our Cares, an Employment, a Son, a Friend, a Country, a Party. But this Change of Fancy does not depend upon our *Will*. “ Our Nature determines us to certain Pursuits in our several Stages; and following her Dictates, is the only way to our Happiness. Two States may both be  
 “ happy,

“ happy, and yet the one infinitely prefe-  
 “ rable to the other: Two Species may  
 “ both be *content*, and yet the Pleasures of  
 “ the one, greater beyond all comparison,  
 “ than those of the other.” The *virtuous*  
*Man*, who has as true a Sense of all external  
 Pleasure as any, gives the preference to  
*moral Pleasures*. The Judgment of the  
*Vicious* is either not to be regarded, because  
 of his Ignorance on one side; or, if he  
 has experience of *moral Sentiments* in any  
 particular Cases, he agrees with the *Vir-*  
*tuous*.

III. AGAIN, we see in fact, that in the *Experience*  
 virtuous Man, *publick Affections*, a *moral* <sup>proves the</sup>  
*Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*, actually over-  
 come all other Desires or Senses, even in  
 their full Strength. Here there is the fair-  
 est Combat, and the Success is on the side  
 of Virtue.

THERE is indeed an obvious Exception  
 against this Argument. “ Do not we see,  
 “ in many Instances, the *external Senses*  
 “ overcome the *moral*?” But the Reply is  
 easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures  
 of the external Senses can never become  
 agreeable, without an Opinion of *Innocence*,  
 or the *Absence* of moral Evil; so that here  
 the moral Sense is not engaged in the Com-

SECT. bat. Do not our \* Debauchees, among their  
 V. Intimates, continually defend their Practi-  
 ces as *innocent*? Transient Acts of Injustice  
 may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Evil, or upon some violent Motion of *Appetite*: and yet even in these cases, Men often argue themselves into some *moral Notions* of their *Innocence*. But for a continued Course of Life disapproved by the Agent, how few are the Instances? How avowedly miserable is that State, wherein all *Self-Approbation*, all *consciousness of Merit or Goodness* is gone? We might here also alledge, what universal Experience confirms, that not only an Opinion of *Innocence* is a necessary Ingredient in a Course of *selfish Pleasures*, so that there should be no Opposition from the moral Sense of the Agent; but that some *publick Affections*, some *Species of moral Good*, is the most powerful *Charm* in all sensual Enjoyments. And yet, on the other hand,  
 “ *Publick Affections, Virtue, Honour*, need  
 “ no Species of sensual Pleasure to recom-  
 “ mend them; nor even an Opinion or  
 “ Hope of Exemption from external Pain.  
 “ These powerful Forms can appear amia-  
 “ ble, and engage our Pursuit thro’ the rug-

\* *Treat. II. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.*

“ged Paths of *Hunger, Thirst, Cold, Labour, Expences, Wounds and Death.* SECT.  
V.




THUS, when a Prospect of external Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the *moral Sense* of the Agent is not really overcome by the *external Senses*. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The *Temptation* seems to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a *Point of Honour*, or a *moral Species*, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Pains of the *external Senses*, there can be no question made of a real Victory. The external Senses represent these Objects in the same manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the *Virtuous* their *Sense of Pain, Toil or Wounds*. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all *external Pleasure* of every kind. The Expences of *Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion*, are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be known to the full. But the moral Sense, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known *external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage*: but, where there is a depraved *Taste*, and a weak *Understanding*, private Advantage, or the avoiding of some external Evil, may make Actions appear *innocent*, which are not; and then the moral Sense gives no Opposition. All the Con-

SECT. quest on such Occasions is only this, that  
 V. private external *Advantage* surmounts our  
 ~~~~~ Aversion to *Dis honour*, by making us do  
 Actions which *others* will censure, but we
 esteem *innocent*. In these Cases we general-
 ly fear only the Reproach of a *Party*, of
 whom we have conceived an unfavourable
 Opinion.*

NAY farther: It was before observed,
 that fantastick *Associations* of Ideas do not
 really increase the Pleasure of *Enjoyment*,
 however they increase the previous *Desire*.
 The want of such Associations does not
 abate the external *Pain*, tho' it diminishes
 the previous *Fear*, or takes away some far-
 ther *Fears* which may attend the Pain. So
 that a Man of the most correct Imagina-
 tion does feel and know all the *Good* in ex-
 ternal Pleasure, and all the *Evil* in Pain.
 " When therefore the *moral Sense*, and pub-
 " lick *Affections*, overcome all *sensual Plea-*
 " *sure*, or *bodily Pain*, they do it by their
 " own Strength, without *foreign Aids*.
 " *Virtue* is never blended with *bodily Plea-*
 " *sure*, nor *Vice* with *bodily Pain* in our
 " Imaginations. But when the external
 " Senses seem to prevail against the moral
 " Sense, or publick Affections, it is con-
 " tinually by *Aid* borrowed from the mo-

* SECT. 4. Art. 3.

"*ral Sense, and publick Affections* them- S E C T.
 " *selves, or from our Sense of Honour.*" V.

The Conquest is over a weakned moral 
 Sense, upon partial views of Good, not by
 external Pleasure alone, but by some *moral*
Species, raised by a false Imagination.

SET before Men in the clearest Light
 all external Pleasures, but strip them of
 their borrowed Notions of *Dignity, Hospi-*
tality, Friendship, Generosity, Liberality,
Communication of Pleasure; let no regard
 be had to the *Opinions* of others, to *Credit*,
 to avoiding *Reproach*, to *Company*: Sepa-
 rate from the Pursuit of Wealth all
 Thoughts of a *Family, Friends, Relations,*
Acquaintance; let Wealth be only regarded
 as the Means of private Pleasure of the
external Senses, or of the *Imagination*, to
 the Possessor alone; let us divide our con-
 fused Ideas,* and consider things barely and
 apart from each other: and in opposition
 to these Desires, set but the weakest *moral*
Species, and see if they can prevail over it.
 On the other hand, let us examine as much
 as we please, a *friendly, generous, grateful,*
 or *publick-spirited Action*; divest it of all
 external Pleasure, still it will appear the
 more lovely; the longer we fix our Atten-

* See *Marcus Antoninus*, Lib. III. c. 11. and often else-
 where.

SECTION to it, the more we admire it. What

V. is it which we feel in our own Hearts, determining as it were our Fate as to Happiness or Misery? What sort of Sensations are the most lively and delightful? In what sort of Possessions does the highest Joy and Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has ever felt the Pleasure of a generous friendly *Temper*, of *mutual Love*, of *compassionate Relief and Succour* to the distressed; of having *served a Community*, and rendered Multitudes happy; of a strict *Integrity*, and *thorough Honesty*, even under external Disadvantages, and amidst Dangers; of Congratulation and publick Rejoicing, in the Wisdom and Prosperity of Persons beloved, such as Friends, Children, or intimate Neighbours? Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer that *State of Mind*, these *Sensations of Pleasure*, to all the Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, and of the *Imagination* without them? *

Our Judgments in the Case of others proves the same.

IV. THE truth, in a Question of this nature, one might expect would be best known by the Judgment of *Spectators*, concerning the Pursuits of others. Let them see one entirely employed in Solitude, with the most exquisite Tastes, Odors,

* See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*.

Prospects,

Prospects, Painting, Musick; but without SECT. V.
 any *Society*, *Love* or *Friendship*, or any
 Opportunity of doing a kind or generous
Action; and see also a * Man employed in
 protecting the Poor and Fatherless, receiving
 the Blessings of those who were ready to
 perish, and making the Widow to sing for
 Joy; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger
 of Oppression; who never despised the
 Cause of his very Slave, but considered him
 as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same
 Hand; who never eat his Morsel alone,
 without the Orphan at his Table, nor cau-
 sed the Eyes of the Poor to fail; who ne-
 ver suffered the Naked to perish, but warm-
 ed them with the Fleece of his Sheep;
 who never took advantage of the Indigent
 in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own
 Power or Interest; Let this Character be com-
 pared with the former; nay, add to this lat-
 ter some considerable *Pains* of the *external*
Senses, with *Labour* and kind *Anxiety*:
 which of the two would a Spectator chuse?
 Which would he admire, or count the hap-
 pier, and most suitable to human Nature?
 Were he amusing himself with imaginary
 Scenes of Life, or were he advising a *Son*,
 or a *Friend*, which of these States would he
 chuse or recommend? Such a Trial would

* See the Character of *Job*, *ch. xxxi.* See also *Treat. II.*
sect. 6.

SECT. soon discover the Prevalence of the *moral*
 V. *Species* above all Enjoyments of Life.



*LittleHap-
 piness in
 malicious
 Pleasures.*

V. THERE are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, arising from the Gratification of *Anger* or *Hatred*. To compare these Pleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds universally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion, either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merely that it is *sensitive*, fills us with Joy and Delight: The apprehending the Torments of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know how to raise delight in us by such *pastoral Scenes*, they feel the Power of such *pleasing Images*: they know that the human Heart can dwell upon such Contemplations with *delight*; that we can continue long with Pleasure, in the View of *Happiness* of any Nature whatsoever. When indeed we have received unfavourable Apprehensions of any Nature, as *cruel* and *savage*, we begin from our very publick Affections, to desire their Misery as far as it may be necessary to the Protection of others.

BUT that the Misery of another, for its *own sake*, is never grateful, we may all find by making this Supposition: That we had the
 most

most savage Tyger, or Crocodile, or some greater Monster of our own Kind, a Nero, or Domitian, chained in some Dungeon; that we were perfectly assured they should never have power of doing farther *Injuries*; that no Mortal should ever know their Fate or Fortunes, nor be influenced by them; that the *Punishments* inflicted on them would never restrain others by Way of example, nor any *Indulgence* shown be discovered; that the first Heat of our *Resentment* were allayed by Time—No mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of *Good* arising from their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischiefs, began himself to feel *Remorse* and *Anguish* for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray *Remorse* nor *Approbation*, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who would delight to load him with *useless Misery*?

If the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises the Pleasure of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*? The Reason is plainly this: Upon apprehending *Injury* to ourselves or others, NATURE wisely determines

SECT. us to study *Defence*, not only for the present, but for the future. *Anger* arises with its most *uneasy Sensations*, as every one acknowledges. *The Misery* of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature scarce leads to any farther Resentment, when once the Injurious seems to us fully seized with *Remorse*, so that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their Revenge further, are prepossessed with some false *Opinion* of Mankind, as worse than they really are; and are not easily inclined to believe their hearty *Remorse* for Injuries, or to think themselves secure. Some *Point of Honour*, or *Fear* of Reproach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Revenge: But this farther confirms, that the *Misery of another* is only grateful as it allays, or secures us against a furious Pain; and cannot be the Occasion, by itself, of any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer Safety from Injury, to the having revenged an Injury? Who would not chuse an untainted *Reputation*, for *Courage* gained in a just War, in which, without *Hatred* or *Anger*, we acted from Love of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by asserting our questioned Courage with furious *Anger* in a *Duel*, and with continued *Hatred* toward the Person conquered? Who can dwell upon a *Scene of Tortures*, though practised upon the vilest Wretch; or can delight either

ther in the Sight or Description of *Vengeance*, prolonged beyond all necessity of *Self-Defense*, or *publick Interest*? “ The Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Pleasures of Humanity and Virtue, as the flaking the burning, and constantly recurring Thirst of a Fever, to the natural Enjoyments of grateful Food in Health.”

VI. WERE we to compare, in like manner, the *Pains* of the publick and moral Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with other *Pains of the external Senses*, or with the greatest external Losses, we should find the former by far superior. And yet nothing is more ordinary, than to find Men, who will allow “ the Pleasures of the former Classes superior to any other, and yet look upon *external Pain* as more intolerable than any.” There are two Reasons for this Mistake. 1. “ They compare the most *acute Pains* of the external Senses with some *smaller Pains* of the other Senses.” Whereas, would they compare the strongest of both Kinds, they would find the Ballance on the other side. How often have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Patriots, endured the greatest *bodily Pains*, to avoid the Pains of their *publick* and *moral Sense*, and *Sense of Honour*? How do they every Day suffer Hunger, Thirst, and Toil, to prevent like Evils to those they love? How

SECT. How often do Men endure, for their *Party*
 V. or *Faction*, the greatest external Evils, not
 only when they are unavoidable, but, when
 by counter-acting their *publick* or *moral Sense*,
 or *Sense of Honour*, they could extricate them-
 selves? Some Crimes appear so horrid, some
 Actions so cruel and detestable, that there is
 hardly any Man but would rather suffer
Death, than be conscious of having done them.

THE second Cause of Mistake in this
 Matter, is this, “ The avoiding moral E-
 “ vil by the Sufferance of *external Pain*,
 “ does not diminish the *Sense* of the Pain;
 “ but on the other hand, the *Motive* of
 “ avoiding grievous Pain, really diminishes
 “ the moral *Evil* in the Action done with
 “ that design.” So that in such Instances
 we compare *external Pain* in its full strength,
 with a *moral Pain* of the lighter sort, thus
 alleviated by the Greatness of the *Tempta-*
*tion**. To make a just Comparison, it
 should be thus: “ Whether would a Man
 “ chuse to be tortured to Death, or to have,
 “ without any *Temptation* or *Necessity*, tor-
 “ tured another, or a dear Friend, or Child
 “ to Death?” Not whether a Man will be-
 tray his Friend or Country, for fear of
 Tortures, but “ whether it be better vo-
 “ luntarily, and under no fear, to betray
 “ a Friend, or our Country, than to suffer

* *Treat. II. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.*

“ Tortures,

“ Tortures, or the Pain of the Gout or S E C T.
 “ Stone equal to Tortures?” Upon such V.
 Comparisons as these, we should find some
 other Pains and Misery superior to any *external Pain*. When we judge of the *State of others*, we would not be long in suspense which of these Evils to chuse as the lightest for those whom we † most regarded.

VII. WE have hitherto only compared on *Publick*
 the one side the *publick and moral Sense*, *Affections*
 and the *Sense of Honour* jointly, with the *compared*
external Senses, the *Pleasures of Imagination*, and *external Advantage or Disadvantage* jointly. The reason of joining them thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind not prepossessed with any *false Apprehensions* of things, the former three Senses and Desires really concur, in exciting to the same Course of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be opposite to *private Virtue*; nor can the *Desire of Virtue* ever lead to any thing pernicious to the Publick: Had Men also true Opinions, *Honour* could only be obtained by *Virtue*, or serving the Publick.

BUT since there may be some *corrupt partial Notions of Virtue*, as when Men have inadvertently engaged themselves into

* *Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 1.*

SECT. some Party or Faction pernicious to the

V. Publick, or when we mistake the *Tendencies* of Actions, or have some Notions of the DEITY, † as requiring some Actions apprehended pernicious to the publick, as *Duties* to himself; in such cases there is room to compare our *publick Sense* or *Desires* with our *moral*, to see which is prevalent. The Pleasures of these Senses, in such cases, need not be compared; the following either the one or the other will give little Pleasure: The Pain of the counteracted *Sense* will prevent all *Satisfaction*. This State is truly deplorable, when a Person is thus distracted between two noble Principles, his *publick Affections*, and *Sense of Virtue*. But it may be enquired, which of these Senses, when counteracted, would occasion the *greater Pain*? Perhaps no-

† Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some particular moral Species, have produced these monstrous Decisions or Apothegms; viz. “ *Some Actions are not lawful, though they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happiness, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World, or to avoid universal eternal Misery.*”

“ *Fiat Justitia & ruat Cælum.*”

Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked upon as universally and necessarily Evil, is only this, “ that in our present Constitution of Nature, they cannot possibly produce any *good*, prepollent to their *evil Consequences.*” Whatever Action would do so, in the *whole of its Effects* must necessarily be *good*. This Proposition is *Identick*.

thing

thing can be answered *universally* on either Side. With Men of *recluse contemplative Lives*, who have dwelt much upon some *moral Ideas*, but without large *extensive View* of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the *publick Affections*, and common *Affairs of Life*, the *Sense of Virtue*, in some partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; especially since these partial Species of Virtue have always some sort of *kind Affection* to assist them. With *active Men*, who have fully exercised their *publick Affections*, and have acquired as it were an *Habit* this way, it is probable the *publick Affections* would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any *publick Necessity*, always break through the *limited narrow Rules* of Virtue or Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any *Scheme of Principles* to justify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in such cases, their *moral Sense* is brought over to the Side of their *Affections*, though their *speculative Opinions* are opposite to both.

VIII. It is of more consequence to compare the *publick and moral Senses*, in opposition to the *Sense of Honour*. Here there may be direct Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions


The Moral Sense compared with the Sense of Honour.

SECT. of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the *Agent*, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.

To allow the Prevalence of *Honour*, cannot with any Person of just Reflection, weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour presupposes * a *moral Sense*, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it. But it is enough for some *Writers*, who affect to be wondrous shrewd in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making all the World, a *selfish Generation*, without any *natural Disposition* toward a *publick Interest*, or toward any moral *Species*; to get but a Set of different *Words* from those commonly used, yet including the same *natural Dispositions*, † or presupposing them, however an inadvertent Reader may not observe it; and they are sufficiently furnished to shew, that there is no real *Virtue*, that all is but *Hyppocrisy*, *Disguise*, *Art*, or *Interest*. “ To be *bo-*
“ *noured*, *highly esteemed*, *valued*, *praised*,
“ or on the contrary, to be *despised*, *un-*
“ *dervalued*, *censured* or *condemned*; to be
“ *proud* or *ashamed*, are Words without a-
“ ny Meaning, if we take away a *moral*

* See *Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 4.*

† *Ibid.*

“ *Sense*.” Let this Sense be as *capricious*, SECT.
inconstant, *different* in different Persons as V.
 they please to alledge, “ a *Sense of Morali-* 
 “ *ty* there must be, and *natural* it must
 “ be, if the *Desire of Esteem, Pride* or
 “ *Shame* be natural.”

To make this comparison between the *publick* and *moral* *Senses* on the one hand, and that of *Honour* on the other, it is to be observed, that all *Aversion to Evil* is stronger than *Desire of positive Good*. There are many sorts of positive Good, without which one may be easy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any *kind*, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The *avoiding of Evil* is always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a *Crime*, than the *Prospect of positive Good*: to make therefore just Comparisons of the Prevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several *Goods* should be opposed to each other, and their *Evils* to each other, and not the *Pleasures* of one compared with the *Pains* of another.

PUBLICK *Affections*, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleasures of *Honour*, but even the *Pains of Shame*. This is the most common Event in Life,

S E C T. that for some apprehended Interest of Offspring, Families, Friends, Men neglect Opportunities of gaining *Honour*, and even incur *Shame* and *Contempt*. In Actions done for the Service of a *Party*, there can be no comparison, for *Honour* is often a Motive on both sides.

IT is also certain, that the *Fear of Shame*, in some Instances, will overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even *natural Affection*, Love of *Pleasure*, *Virtue*, *Wealth*, and even of *Life* itself. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their Offspring; has persuaded Men to the most dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their *Fortunes*, to counteract their *Duty*, and even to throw away their *Lives*. The Distraction and Convulsion of Mind observable in these *Conflicts* of Honour, with Virtue and publick Affection, shows how *unnatural* that State is, wherein the strongest *Principles of Action*, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.

IT is perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of *Honour* on the one hand, or that of the Desire of *Virtue* and *publick Good* on the other. *Habits* or *Custom*

Custom may perhaps determine the Victory SECT. V.
on either side. Men in high Stations, who have long indulged the Desire of *Honour*, and have formed the most frightful Apprehensions of *Contempt* as the worst of Evils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value *Reputation* in any particular, and dread *Dis honour* in that point, may have *Fear of Shame* superior to all Aversions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged *good Nature*, or reflected much upon the Excellency of *Virtue* itself, abstracted from *Honour*, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.

To compare the *moral Sense* with the Sense of *Honour*, we must find cases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears *Infamy* by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain *Praise* by an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself as considerable a Virtue, as the World imagines the Action to be. The common Instances, in which some, who pretend deep Knowledge of *human Nature*, triumph much, have not these necessary Circumstances. When a Man condemns *Duelling* in his private Sentiments, and yet practises it, we have indeed a con-

Duels no proper Instances.

SECT. considerable Evidence of the Strength of this

V. *Desire of Honour, or Aversion to Shame,*
 since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But here on one hand, besides the *Fear of Shame*, there is the *Fear of constant Insults*, of losing all the *Advantages* depending upon the Character of Courage, and sometimes even some *Species of Virtue* and *publick Good*, in restraining an insolent Villain: On the other hand is the *Fear of Death*. The *moral Sense* is seldom much concerned: for however Men may condemn *voluntary Duelling*; however they may blame the *Age* for the Custom, or censure the *Laws* as defective, yet generally, in their present Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of *Self-Defence*, against opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of *Self-Defence* and *Prosecution of Injuries*. The Case seems to them the same with that of *Thieves* and *Night-Robbers*, who may be put to Death by private Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn *Duelling*, and yet practise it.

It is foreign to our present Purpose to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of our *Duels*, when Men from a sudden

sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary *Affronts* the despising of which would appear honourable in every wise Man's Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adversary; though the *Success* in such Attempts can have no tendency to justify them against the dishonourable *Charge*, or to procure any Honour from Men of worth.

SECT.
V.



THE magnified Instance of *Lucretia** is yet less to our Purpose. Some talk, as if "she indeed would rather have died" than consented to the Crime; but the Crime did not appear so great an Evil as the *Dis honour*; to the Guilt she submitted to avoid the Shame." Let us consider this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but *Fear of Shame*, and a *Sense of Duty*? If we look into the Story, we shall find, that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the *Fear of Shame*, and of *Death*, which she little regarded, the Hope of *noble Revenge*, or rather of *Justice* on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant's Family; nay, the Hopes of a

Nor the
Case of
Lucretia.

* Livy, Lib. I. c. 57.

nobler

SECT. *nobler Fame* by her future Conduct; the
 V. *Fear* of suffering that contumely by
 ~~~~~ *force*, which she was tempted to consent  
 to, and that in such a manner as she  
 could have had no Redress. All these  
 Considerations concurred to make her con-  
 sent. On the other side, there was only  
 the *moral Sense* of a Crime thus extenuated  
 by the most grievous *Necessity*, and by  
 hopes of *doing Justice* to her Husband's  
 Honour, and *rescuing her Country*: Nay,  
 could she not have at once saved her *Cha-*  
*rafter* and her *Life* by consenting; when  
 in that virtuous Age she might have expected  
*Secrecy* in the Prince, since boasting of such  
 Attempts would have been dangerous to the  
 greatest Man in *Rome*?

IT is not easy to find just Room for a  
 Comparison even in fictitious Cases, be-  
 tween these two *Principles*. Were there  
 a Person who had no Belief of any DEITY,  
 or of any reality in *Religion*, in a Country  
 where his *secular Interest* would not suffer  
 by a Character of *Atheism*; and yet he  
 knew that the Profession of zealous Devo-  
 tion would tend to his *Honour*: If such a  
 Person could have any Sense of *Morality*,  
 particularly an Aversion to *Disimulation*,  
 then his *Profession of Religion* would evi-  
 dence the Superiority of the *Sense of Ho-*  
*nour*;



nour; and his *Discovery* of his Sentiments, SECT.  
or *Neglect* of Religion, would evidence V.  
the Balance to be on the other side. I pre-  
sume in *England* and *Holland*, we have  
more Instances of the latter than the former.  
It is true, our Gentlemen who affect the  
Name of *Freedom*, may have now their  
Hopes of *Honour* from their own *Party*,  
as well as others.

THE Adherence to any particular *Reli-*  
gion by one in a strange Country, where it  
was dishonourable, would not be allowed a  
good Instance of the Prevalence of a *moral*  
*Species*; it is a very common thing indeed,  
but here are *Interests* of another Life, and  
Regard to a *future Return* to a Country  
where this Religion is in repute.

IX. THE Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, The Plea-  
or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, ures of  
who have any tolerable Taste of them, as Imagina-  
a much superior Happiness to those of the tion great-  
*external Senses*, though they were enjoyed er than  
to the full. those of  
external  
Senses.

OTHER Comparisons might be made  
but with less use, or certainty in any gene-  
ral Conclusions, which might be drawn  
from them.


THE

SECT. THE Pleasures of *Wealth* or *Power*,  
 V. are proportioned to the Gratifications of the  
 ~~~~~ *Desires* or *Senses*, which the Agent intends  
 to gratify by them: So that, for the Rea-
 sons above offered, *Wealth* and *Power* give
 greater Happiness to the *Virtuous*, than
 to those who consult only *Luxury* or *ex-*
ternal Splendor. If these *Desires* are grown
enthusiastick and *habitual*, without regard
 to any other end than *Possession*, they are
 an endless Source of Vexation, without any
 real *Enjoyment*; a perpetual *Craving*, with-
 out *Nourishment* or *Digestion*; and they
 may surmount all other Affections, by
 Aids borrowed from other Affections them-
 selves.

THE *fantastick Desires* are violent, in
 proportion to the *Senses* from which the
associated Ideas are borrowed. Only it is
 to be observed, that however the *Desires*
 may be violent, yet the obtaining the *Ob-*
ject desired gives little Satisfaction; the
Possession discovers the Vanity and Deceit,
 and the *Fancy* is turned toward different
 Objects, in a perpetual Succession of incon-
 stant Pursuits.

A Compa-
ri-son of the
several
Pleasures
as to Du-
ration.


X. THESE several kinds of Pleasure or
 Pain are next to be compared as to their
Duration. Here we are not only to con-
 sider

sider the *Certainty* of the Objects occasion- S E C T.
ing these Sensations, but the *Constancy* of V.
our Relish or Fancy. 

I. THE Objects necessary to remove the Pains of *Appetite*, and to give as grateful *external Sensations* as any others, to a Person of a *correct Imagination*, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry. But then the *Sensations* themselves are short and transitory; the *Pleasure* continues no longer than the *Appetite*, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the *Intervals* of Enjoyment. When the Sensation is past, we are no happier for it, there is little pleasure in *Reflection*; and that almost solely arises from the return of *Appetite*; and some Prospect of repeated Enjoyment, or some moral Notions of *Love* or *Friendship* or *Communication of Pleasure*: without these the Remembrance of past sensual Enjoyments is more generally nauseous. Nor are past Sensations any security against, or support under either *external Pain*, or any other sort of evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses pure, and unmixed with *foreign Ideas*, they cannot furnish Employment for Life: If *foreign Ideas* come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our *Relish* or *Fancy* full of Inconstancy and Caprice.

SECT. 2. IN like manner, the Pleasures of the
 V. *Imagination* may be enjoyed by all, and be
 a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from *Property*, and keep our *Imagination* pure. Such are the Pleasures in the Observation of *Nature*, and even the Works of *Art*; which are ordinarily exposed to view. But as these give less Pleasure the more *familiar* they grow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much less can they secure us against, or support us under the *Calamities of Life*, such as *Anger*, *Sorrow*, *Dishonour*, *Remorse*, or *external Pain*. If the *monstrous* or *trifling Taste* take place, or the Ideas of *Property*, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleasure, frequent *Disgusts*, *Anxieties*, and *Disappointments*, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.

3. THE *publick Happiness* is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Course of *Events*. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our *publick Desires* must therefore frequently subject us to *Sorrow*; and the Pleasures of the *publick Sense* must
 be

be very inconstant. 'Tis true indeed, that SECT.
a general *Good-will* to our kind, is the most V.
constant Inclination of the Mind, which 
grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we
ever dissatisfied with it: the *Incertainty*
therefore is wholly owing to the *Objects*.
If there can be any Considerations found
out to make it probable, that in the Whole
all Events tend to Happiness, this implicit
Hope indeed may make our *publick Affe-*
ctions the greatest and most constant Source
of Pleasure. Frequent *Reflection* on this, is
the best Support under the Sorrow arising
from particular evils, befalling our Fellow-
Creatures. In our *nearer Attachments*
brought upon ourselves, we may procure
to ourselves the greatest Enjoyments of this
kind, with considerable *Security* and *Con-*
stancy, by chusing for our *Friends*, or *dear-*
est Favourites, Persons of just Apprehen-
sions of Things, who are subjected only to
the *necessary Evils* of Life, and can enjoy all
the certain and constant Good. And in like
manner, our Attachment to a *Country* may
be fixed by something else than the *Chance*
of our Nativity. The Enjoyments of the
publick Sense cannot indeed secure us against
bodily *Pains* or *Loss*; but they are often a
considerable Support under them. Nothing
can more allay *Sorrow* and *Dejection* of
Mind for private Misfortunes, than good
Nature,

SECT. Nature, and Reflection upon the Happiness
V. of those we love.



4. The *moral Sense*, if we form *true Opinions* of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the *Affections* whence they spring, as it is the Fountain of the most *intense Pleasure*, so it is in itself *constant*, not subject to Caprice or Change. If we resolutely encourage this Sense, it grows more acute by frequent *Gratification*, never cloy, never is surfeited. We not only are sure never to want *Opportunities* of doing good, which are in almost every one's power in the highest Degree ; * but each good Action is Matter of pleasant *Reflection* as long as we live. These Pleasures cannot indeed wholly secure us against all kinds of *Uneasiness*, yet they never tend naturally to increase them. On the contrary, their general Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent into all Pleasures, in the highest Degree in which they are consistent with each other. Our *external Senses* are not weakened by Virtue, our *Imaginations* are not impaired ; the *temperate Enjoyment* of all external Pleasures is the highest. A virtuous Conduct is generally the most prudent, even as to outward *Prosperity*. Where Virtue costs us much, its own

* *Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.*

Pleasures are the more sublime. It direct- S E C T.
ly advances the Pleasures of the *publick* V.
Sense, by leading us to promote the pub-
lick Happiness as far as we can; and *Honour*
is its natural and ordinary Attendant.
If it cannot remove the *necessary Pains of*
Life, yet it is the best Support under them.
These moral Pleasures do some way more
nearly affect us than any other: They make
us delight in *ourselves*, and relish our very
Nature. By these we perceive an *internal*
Dignity and *Worth*; and seem to have a
Pleasure like to that ascribed often to the
DEITY, by which we enjoy our own *Per-*
fection, and that of every other Being.

It may perhaps seem too *metaphysical* to
alledge on this Subject, that other *Sensations*
are all dependent upon, or related by the
Constitution of our Nature, to something
different from *ourselves*; to a *Body* which
we do not call *Self*, but something belong-
ing to this *Self*. That other *Perceptions* of
Joy or *Pleasure* carry with them Relations
to *Objects*, and *Spaces* distinct from this
Self; whereas "the Pleasures of Virtue are
" the very *Perfection of this SELF*, and are
" immediately perceived as such, indepen-
" dent of external Objects."

OUR Sense of *Honour* may afford very
constant Pleasures by good Oeconomy: If

M

our

SECT. our *moral Sense* be not perverted; if we
 V. form just Apprehensions of the *Worth* of
 others, Honour shall be pleasant to us in a
 compound Proportion of the *Numbers* and
Worth of those who confer it. If therefore
 we cannot approve ourselves to all, so as to
 obtain *universal Honour* among all to whom
 we are known, yet there are still Men of
 just Thought and Reflection, whose *Esteem*
 a virtuous Man may procure. Their *Dig-*
nity will compensate the Want of *Numbers*,
 and support us against the Pains of *Censure*
 from the Injudicious.

THE Inconstancy of the Pleasures of
Wealth and *Power* is well known, and is
 occasioned, not perhaps by Change of Fan-
 cy, for these Desires are found to continue
 long enough, since they tend toward the
universal Means of gratifying all other De-
 sires; but by the Uncertainty of *Objects* or
Events necessary to gratify such continually
 increasing Desires as these are, where there
 is not some fixed View different from the
Wealth or *Power* itself. When indeed they
 are desired only as the Means of gratifying
 some other well-regulated *Desires*, we may
 soon obtain such a Portion as will satisfy us.
 But if once the *End* be forgotten, and
Wealth or *Power* become grateful for them-
selves, no farther Limits are to be expected:
 the Desires are insatiable, nor is there any
 consi-

considerable *Happiness* in any given *Degree* of either. S E C T.
V.



XI. WERE we to consider the *Duration* of the several Pains, we may find it generally as the *Duration* of their Pleasures. As to the external Senses, the old *Epicurean* Consolation is generally just: “Where the Pain is violent, it shortens our *Duration*;” “when it does not shorten our *Duration*,” “it is generally either *tolerable*, or admits of frequent *Intermissions*;” and then, when the external Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse for having endured it. There is nothing uneasy in the *Reflection*, when we have no present *Pain*, or fear no *Return* of it.

THE *internal Senses* are not properly *Avenues of Pain*. No *Form* is necessarily the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.

THE Pains of the *moral Sense* and Sense of *Honour*, are almost perpetual; *Time*, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us least *Relief* from them. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself an uneasy Burden. Our very *Self*, our Nature is disagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The *Deformity* of Vice often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of

SECT. II. Their Actions are under some Disguise
 V. of *Innocence*, or even of *Virtue* itself.

When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a *Fury*, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one *Vice*, which perhaps has had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any, *viz.* *Cowardice*, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed *Cowards*, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of *Courage*? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent soever they may be about other Points in Morality. Other *Vices* would appear equally odious and despicable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were they equally stript of the *Disguises of Virtue*. A vicious Man has no other Security against the Appearances of this terrifying *Form*, than *Ignorance* or *Inadvertence*. If *Truth* break in upon him, as it often must, when any *Adversity* stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use *Freedom* with his Conduct, he is rendered perpetually miserable, or must fly to the only Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible *Reparation* of Injuries, and a new Course of Life, the Necessity of which

is

is not superseded by any *Remedy* suggested by the *Christian Revelation*.

SECT.
V.


THE Pains of the *publick Sense* are very lasting. The *Misery* of others, either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy *Reflection*, and must continue so, if their State appears in the whole *absolutely Evil*. Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a “*good governing*” MIND, ordering all for good in the whole, “with the Belief of a *future State*, where “the particular seeming Disorders are rectified.” A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong *publick Affections* interesting us strongly in this *Whole*, and considering this *Whole* as one great *System*, in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these Pains, by removing the Opinion of any *absolute Evil*.

THE Pains arising from foolish *Associations of moral Ideas*, with the Gratifications of *external Senses*, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of *Beauty* or *Grandeur*, or from the Desires of *Property*, the Humour of *Distinction*, may be as constant as the Pains of the *Senses* from which these Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these Associations is very little. “The *Desires* of “Trifles are often made very strong and “uneasy; the *Pleasures of Possession* very
M 3 “small

SECT. "small and of short Continuance, only till

V. "the Object be familiar, or the *Fancy*

~~~~~ "change: But the *Pains of Disappointment*  
"are often very lasting and violent."

Would we guard against these Associations,  
every real *Pleasure* in Life remains, and we  
may be easy without these things, which to  
others occasion the greatest Pains.

*Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellas,  
Argentum, vestes Getulo Murice tinctas,  
Est qui non habeat, est qui nec curat habere. Hor.*

S E C T.


## S E C T. VI.

*Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness.*

**T**HUS, upon comparing the several S E C T. VI.  
 kinds of Pleasures and Pains, both as  
 to *Intention* and *Duration*, we see that “ the  
 “ whole Sum of Interest lies upon the Side  
 “ of *Virtue, Publick-spirit, and Honour* :  
 “ To *forfeit* these Pleasures in whole, or in  
 “ part, for any other *Enjoyment*, is the most  
 “ foolish Bargain ; and on the contrary, to  
 “ secure them with the *Sacrifice* of all  
 “ others, is the *truest Gain*.”

**T**HERE is one general *Observation* to be  
 premised, which appears of the greatest  
 Necessity for the just *Management* of all our  
 Desires ; viz. that we should, as much as  
 possible, in all Affairs of Importance to  
 ourselves or others, prevent the *Violence* of  
 their *confused Sensation*, and stop their *Pro-*  
*pensities* from breaking out into Action, till  
 we have fully examined the real *Moment* of  
 the Object, either of our Desires or Avers-

SECT. fions. The only way to effect this is, “ a  
 VI. “ constant *Attention* of Mind, an habitual  
 “ *Discipline* over ourselves, and a fixed *Re-*  
 “ *solution* to stop all Action, before a calm  
 “ *Examination* of every Circumstance at-  
 “ tending it; more particularly, the real  
 “ *Values* of external Objects, and the *moral*  
 “ *Qualities* or *Temper*s of rational Agents,  
 “ about whom our Affections may be em-  
 “ ployed.” This Power we may obtain  
 over ourselves, by a frequent Consideration  
 of the great *Calamities*, and pernicious  
 Actions, to which even the *best of our Pass-*  
*sions* may lead us, by the *confused Sensations*,  
 and *fantastick Associations* of Ideas which  
 attend them: Thus we may raise an *habi-*  
*tual Suspicion* and *Dread* of every *violent*  
*Passion*, which, recurring along with them  
 continually, may in some measure counter-  
 ballance their *Propensities* and *confused Sen-*  
*sations*. This *Discipline* of our Passions is  
 in general necessary: The *unkind* or *destru-*  
*ctive Affections*, our *Anger*, *Hatred*, or *A-*  
*version* to rational Agents, seem to need it  
 most; but there is also a great Necessity for  
 it, even about the *tender* and *benign Affe-*  
*ctions*, lest we should be hurried into *uni-*  
*versal* and *absolute Evil*, by the Appearance  
 of *particular Good*: And consequently it  
 must be of the highest Importance to all,  
 to strengthen as much as possible, by fre-  
 quent Meditation and Reflection, the calm  
 Desires

Desires either private or publick, rather SECT. than the particular Passions, and to make VI. the *calm universal Benevolence* superior to  them.

THAT the necessary *Resignation* of other Resignation of sensual Pleasures. Pleasures may be the more easy, we must frequently suggest to ourselves these Considerations above-mentioned. “ *External Pleasures* are short and transitory, leave no agreeable *Reflection*, and are no manner of *Advantage* to us when they are past; we are no better than if we had wanted them altogether.”

IN like manner, “ past Pains give us no unpleasant *Reflection*, nor are we the worse for having endured them. If they are violent, our Existence will probably be short; if not, they are tolerable, or allow long Intervals of Ease.” Let us join to these a *stoical Consideration*; “ that *external Pains* give us a noble Opportunity of *moral Pleasures* in Fortitude, and *Submission* to the Order of the whole, if we bear them resolutely; but if we fret under them, we do not alleviate the Suffering, but rather increase it by *Discontent* or *Sullenness*.” When *external Pains* must be endured voluntarily to avoid *moral Evil*, we must, as much as possible, present to ourselves the *moral Species* itself with

SECT. with the *publick Good* to ensue, the *Honour*  
 VI. and *Approbation* to be expected from all  
 ~~~~~ good Men, the DEITY, and our own  
 Hearts, if we continue firm; and on the
 contrary, the *Remorse*, *Shame* and Appre-
 hension of *future Punishments*, if we yield
 to this Temptation.

How necessary it is to break off the vain
 Associations of *moral Ideas*, from the Ob-
 jects of *external Senses*, will also easily ap-
 pear. This may be done, by considering
 how trifling the *Services* are which are done
 to our Friends or Acquaintances, by *splen-*
did Entertainments, at an Expence, which,
 otherwise employed, might have been to
 them of considerable Importance. Men
 who are at ease, and of as *irregular Im-*
aginations as ourselves, may admire and
 praise our *Magnificence*; but those who
 need more *durable Services*, will never think
 themselves much obliged. We cannot ex-
 pect any *Gratitude* for what was done only
 to please our own *Vanity*: The *Indigent*
 easily see this, and justly consider upon the
 whole how much they have profited.

If the Wealth of the *Luxurious* fails, he
 is the Object of *Contempt*: No body pities
 him nor honours him: his *personal Digni-*
ty was placed by himself in his *Table*, *E-*
quipage and *Furniture*; his Admirers placed
 it

it also in the same: When these are gone all
is lost.

SECT.
VI.



—*Non est melius quo insumere possis?
Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite? quare
Templaruunt antiqua Deum? cur improbecaræ
Non aliquid Patriæ ex tanto emetiris acervo?
Uni nimirum tibi recte semper erunt res:
O magnus posthac inimicis Risus.*—— Hor.

THERE is no Enjoyment of external Pleasure, which has more imposed upon Men of late, by some confused *Species of Morality*, than *Gallantry*. The sensible Pleasure alone must, by all Men who have the least Reflection, be esteemed at a very low rate: But the Desires of this kind, as they were by Nature intended to found the most constant uninterrupted *Friendship*, and to introduce the most venerable and lovely *Relations*, by *Marriages* and *Families*, arise in our Hearts, attended with some of the *sweetest Affections*, with a disinterested *Love* and *Tenderness*, with a most gentle and obliging *Deportment*, with something great and heroick in our Temper. The Wretch who rises no higher in this Passion than the mean *sensual Gratification*, is abhorred by every one: But these sublimer Sensations and Passions often so fill the Imaginations of the *Amorous*, that they are unawares led into the

SECT. the most contemptible and cruel Conduct
 VI. which can be imagined. When for some
 ~~~~~ trifling transitory *Sensations*, which they  
 might have innocently enjoyed along with  
 the highest *moral Pleasures* in Marriage,  
 they expose the very Person they love and  
 admire to the deepest *Infamy* and *Sorrow*, to  
 the *Contempt* of the World, to perpetual  
*Confusion*, *Remorse*, and *Anguish*; or, to  
 what is worse, an *Insensibility* of all Ho-  
 nour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or  
 Evil, to be the Scorn and Aversion of the  
 World; and all this coloured over with the  
 gay Notions of *Pleasantry*, *Genteelness*, *Politeness*, *Courage*, *high Enjoyment of Life*.

WOULD Men allow themselves a little  
 Time to reflect on the *whole Effect* of such  
 capricious Pursuits, the *Anguish* and *Distraction*  
 of Mind which these Sallies of Plea-  
 sure give to *Husbands*, *Fathers*, *Brothers*;  
 would they consider how they themselves  
 would resent such Treatment of a *Wife*,  
 a *Child*, a *Sister*; how much deeper such  
 Distresses are, than those trifling Losses or  
 Damages, for which we think it just to  
 bring the Authors to the Gallows; sure  
 none but a thorough Villain could either  
 practice or approve the one more than the  
 other.

A WISE

A WISE Man in his Oeconomy, must do much even in Complaisance to the *Follies* of others, as well as his own *Conveniency*, to support that general *good Opinion* which must be maintained by those who would be useful to the Publick. His *Expences* must be some way suited to his *Fortune*, to avoid the Imputation of *Avarice*. If indeed what is saved in *private Expences*, be employed in *generous Offices*, there is little danger of this Charge. Such a *Medium* may be kept as to be above *Censure*, and yet below any *Affectation of Honour* or *Distinction* in these matters. If one corrects his own *Imagination* in these things, he will be in no danger of doing any thing pernicious to please others. He is still in a State fit to judge of the real *Importance* of every thing which occurs to him, and will gratify the false *Relish* of others, no farther than it is consistent with, and subservient to *some nobler Views*.

II. To make the Pleasures of *Imagination* a constant Source of *Delight*, as they seem intended in the Frame of our Nature, with no hazard of *Pain*, it is necessary to keep the Sense free from foreign *Ideas of Property*, and the *Desire of Distinction*, as much as possible. If this can be done, we may receive Pleasure from every *Work of Nature*.

*Conduct necessary about the Pleasures of Imagination.*

SECT. *Nature or Art* around us. We enjoy not  
 VI. only the whole of *Nature*, but the united  
 ~~~~~ Labours of all about us. To prevent the  
 Idea of *Property*, let us consider "how lit-
 "tle the *Proprietor* enjoys more than the
 " *Spectator* : Wherein is he the better or
 " the happier ?" The *Poet*, or the *Connois-*
seur, who judges nicely of the Perfection
 of the Works of Art, or the Beauties of
 Nature, has generally a *higher Taste* than
 the Possessor. The *magnificent Palace*, the
grand Apartments, the *Vistas*, the *Fountains*,
 the *Urns*, the *Statues*, the *Grottoes* and *Ar-*
bours, are exposed either in their own *Na-*
ture, or by the Inclination of the *Proprie-*
tor, to the Enjoyment of others. The
Pleasure of the Proprietor depends upon the
Admiration of others ; he robs himself of
 his chief Enjoyment, if he excludes *Specta-*
tors : Nay, may not a *Taste* for Nature be
 acquired, giving greater Delight than the
 Observation of Art ?

Deterius Lybicus olet, aut nitet, Herba lapillis ?
Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum,
Quam quæ per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum ?
Nempe inter varias nutritur Sylva Columnas,
Laudaturque Domus, longos quæ prospicit Agros.
Naturam expellas furca licet, usque recurret. Hor.

Must an *artful Grove*, an *Imitation* of a
 Wilderness, or the more confined *Forms* or
 Ever-

Ever-greens, please more than the real *For- SECT.*
rest, with the *Trees of God*? Shall a *Statue VI.*
 give more Pleasure than the *human Face* ~~~~~
Divine?

WHERE the *Humour of Distinction* is not corrected, our Equals become our Adversaries: The Grandeur of another is our *Misery*, and makes our Enjoyments insipid. There is only one way of making this Humour tolerable, but this way is almost inconsistent with the *Inclination* itself, *viz.* “continually to haunt with our Inferiors, “and compare ourselves with them.” But if inconstant *Fortune*, or their own Merit raise any of them to equal us, our *Pleasure* is lost, or we must sink ourselves to those who are still *Inferior*, and abandon the Society of every Person whose *Art* or *Merit* raises him. How poor a Thought is this!

THE Pursuits of the *Learned* have often as much Folly in them as any others, when Studies are not valued according to their *Use in Life*, or the real Pleasures they contain, but for the *Difficulty* and *Obscurity*, and consequently the *Rarity* and *Distinction*. Nay, an abuse may be made of the most noble and manly Studies, even of *Morals*, *Politicks*, and *Religion* itself, if our Admiration and Desire terminate upon the *Knowledge* itself, and not upon the Possession of
 the

SECT. the *Dispositions* and *Affections* inculcated in VI. these Studies. If these Studies be only matter of *Amusement* and *Speculation*, instead of leading us into a constant *Discipline* over ourselves, to correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, we are not much better employed, than if we had been studying some useless Relations of *Numbers*, or Calculations of *Chances*.

THERE is not indeed any part of Knowledge which can be called entirely *useless*. The most *abstracted Parts* of *Mathematicks*, and the Knowledge of *mythological History*, or antient *Allegories*, have their own Pleasures not inferior to the more gay Entertainments of *Painting*, *Musick*, or *Architecture*; and it is for the Advantage of Mankind that some are found, who have a Taste for these Studies. The only Fault lies, in letting any of those *inferior Tastes* engross the whole Man to the Exclusion of the nobler Pursuits of *Virtue* and *Humanity*.

CONCERNING all these Pleasures of the Imagination, let us consider also “ how little support they can give Men under any “ of the Calamities of Life,” such as the Treachery or Baseness of a *Friend*, a *Wife*, a *Child*, or the perplexing Intricacies of our common Affairs, or the Apprehension of *Death*.

Re

Re veraque Metus hominum, Curæque sequaces SECT.
Nec metuunt sonitus Armorum, nec fera Tela; VI.
Audaçterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes
Versantur, nec fulgorem reverentur ab auro,
Nec clarum vestis splendorem purpureaï
Quid dubitas quin omne sit hoc rationis egestas?
Luc.

III. UNDER this Head of our Internal *Ideas of*
Sense, we must observe one natural Effect *Divinity*
of it, that it leads us into *Apprehensions of*
a DEITY. Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Har- *arise from*
mony, wherever they occur, raise an Opi- *the inter-*
nion of a MIND, of *Design*, and *Wisdom*. *nal Senses.*
Every thing great, regular, or proportioned,
excites *Veneration*, either toward itself, if
we imagine it animated, if not animated,
toward some apprehended Cause. No De-
termination of our Mind is more *natural*
than this, no Effect more *universal*. One
has better Reason to deny the Inclination
between the *Sexes* to be natural, than a
Disposition in Mankind to *Religion*.

WE cannot open our Eyes, without
discerning *Grandeur and Beauty* every
where. Whoever receives these *Ideas*, feels
an inward *Veneration* arise. We may fall
into a Thousand vain Reasonings: foolish
limited Notions of DIVINITY may be for-
med, as attached to the particular *Places* or
Objects, which strike us in the most lively
N manner.

SECT. manner. Custom, Prejudice of Sense or
 VI. Education, may confirm some foolish O-
 ~~~~~pinion about the *Nature* or *Cause* of these  
 Appearances: But wherever a superior  
 MIND, a governing INTENTION or DE-  
 SIGN is imagined, there *Religion* begins in  
 its most simple Form, and an inward *De-  
 votion* arises. Our Nature is as much de-  
 termined to this, as to any other Percep-  
 tion or Affection. How we manage these  
 Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the great-  
 est Importance to our Happiness or Misery.

WHEN we have the Apprehension of an  
 universal MIND with Power and Know-  
 ledge, we must also conceive something  
 correspondent to our *Affections* in the DI-  
 VINITY, with some *moral Apprehensions* of  
 the Actions and Tempers of his Creatures.  
 The *Order of Nature* will suggest many  
 Confirmations of this. We must conclude  
 some *Worship* acceptable, and some Ex-  
 pressions of *Gratitude* as our Duty. Con-  
 ceptions of the DEITY must be various,  
 according to the different Degrees of *Atten-  
 tion* and *Reasoning* in the Observers, and  
 their own Tempers and Affections. Imag-  
 ining the divine MIND, as *cruel, wrathful,  
 or capricious*, must be a perpetual Source  
 of Dread and Horror; and will be apt to  
 raise a *Resemblance* of Temper in the Wor-  
 shipper, with its attendant *Misery*. A con-  
 trary



trary Idea of the DIVINITY, as good, and kind, delighting in universal Happiness, and ordering all Events of the Universe to this End, as it is the most delightful Contemplation, so it fills the good Mind with a constant *Security* and *Hope*, amidst either publick Disorders, or private Calamities.

SECT.  
VI.  
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To find out which of these two Representations of the DEITY is the true one, we must consult the *Universe*, the Effect of his Power, and the Scene of his Actions. After what has been observed by so many ingenious Authors, both *Ancient* and *Modern*, one cannot be at a loss which Opinion to chuse. We may only on this occasion consider the Evidences of divine Goodness appearing in the *Structure of our own Nature*, and in the Order of our *Passions* and *Senses*.


It was observed above, how admirably our Affections are contrived for good in the *whole*. Many of them indeed do not pursue the *private Good* of the Agent; nay, many of them, in various Cases, seem to tend to his detriment, by concerning him violently in the Fortunes of *others*, in their *Adversity*, as well as their Prosperity. But they all aim at *good*, either private or publick: and by them each particular Agent is

*Evidences  
of the Good-  
ness of God  
in the  
Frame of  
our Senses  
and Affec-  
tions.*

SECT. made, in a great measure, subservient to the

VI. *good of the whole.* Mankind are thus insensibly linked together, and make one great *System*, by an invisible Union. He who *voluntarily* continues in this Union, and delights in employing his Power for his *Kind*, makes himself happy: He who does not continue this Union freely, but affects to break it, makes himself wretched; nor yet can he break the *Bonds of Nature*. His *publick Sense*, his *Love of Honour*, and the very *Necessities* of his Nature, will continue to make him depend upon his *System*, and engage him to serve it, whether he inclines to it or not. Thus we are formed with a View to a general good *End*; and may in our own nature discern a universal Mind watchful for the whole.

THE same is observable in the Order of our *external Senses*. The simple Productions of Nature, which are useful to any Species of Animals, are also *grateful* to them; and the pernicious or useless Objects are made disagreeable. Our external Sensations are no doubt often *painful*, when our Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they want supplies of Nourishment; when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it appears, “ that the *general Laws* “ are wisely constituted, and that it is necessary to the Good of a System of  
“ such

“ such Agents, to be under the Influence SECT.  
 “ of *general Laws*, upon which there is VI.  
 “ occasion for *Prudence* and *Activity* ;”   
 the particular *Pains* occasioned by a necessary *Law* of Sensation, can be no Objection against the Goodness of the Author. See Treat. I. Sect. ult.

Now that there is no room for complaint, that “ our external Sense of *Pain* “ is made too acute,” must appear from the Multitudes we daily see so careless of preserving the Blessing of *Health*, of which many are so prodigal as to lavish it away, and expose themselves to the most severe external *Pain* for very trifling Reasons. Can we then repine at the friendly *Admonitions* of Nature, joined with some *Austerity*, when we see that they are scarce sufficient to restrain us from Ruin. The same may be said of Pain of other kinds, *Shame* and *Remorse* are never to be called too severe, while so many are not sufficiently restrained by them. Our *Compassion* and friendly *Sense of Sorrow*, what are they else but the *Alarms* and *Exhortations* of a kind impartial *Father*, to engage his *Children* to relieve a distressed *Brother*? Our *Anger* itself is a necessary Piece of Management, by which every pernicious Attempt is made *dangerous* to its Author.

SECT. VI. Would we allow room to our Invention, to conceive what sort of *Mechanism*, what *Constitutions* of Senses or Affections a *malicious powerful Being* might have formed, we should soon see how few Evidences there are for any such Apprehension concerning the AUTHOR of this World. Our *Mechanism*, as far as we have ever yet discovered, is wholly contrived for good. No cruel *Device*, no *Art* or *Contrivance* to produce evil: No such *Mark* or *Scope* seems ever to be aimed at. How easy had it been to have contrived some necessary Engines of *Misery* without any use; some *Member* of no other service but to be matter of *Torment*; *Senses* incapable of bearing the surrounding Objects without Pain; Eyes pained with the *Light*; a Palate offended with the *Fruits* of the Earth; a Skin as tender as the Coats of the *Eye*, and yet some more furious Pain forcing us to bear these Torments? Human *Society* might have been made as uneasy as the Company of *Enemies*, and yet a perpetual more violent Motive of *Fear* might have forced us to bear it. *Malice*, *Rancour*, *Distrust*, might have been our natural Temper. Our *Honour* and *Self-Approbation* might have depended upon *Injuries*; and the *Torments* of others been made our *Delight*, which yet we could not have enjoyed thro' perpetual

perpetual *Fear*. Many such Contrivances we may easily conceive, whereby an evil *Mind* could have gratified his *Malice* by our *Misery*. But how unlike are they all to the Intention or Design of the Mechanism of this World?

SECT.  
VI.



OUR *Passions* no doubt are often Matter of Uneasiness to ourselves, and sometimes occasion Misery to *others*, when any one is indulged into a Degree of Strength beyond its *Proportion*. But which of them could we have wanted, without greater Misery in the whole? They are by Nature ballanced against each other, like the *Antagonist Muscles* of the Body; either of which separately would have occasioned *Distortion* and irregular *Motion*, yet jointly they form a Machine, most accurately subservient to the *Necessities, Convenience, and Happiness* of a *rational System*. We have a Power of *Reason* and *Reflection*, by which we may see what Course of Action will naturally tend to procure us the most valuable *Gratifications* of all our Desires, and prevent any intolerable or unnecessary *Pains*, or provide some support under them. We have Wisdom sufficient to form Ideas of *Rights, Laws, Constitutions*; so as to preserve large Societies in Peace and Prosperity, and promote a *general Good* amidst all the *private Interests*.

SECT. VI. IF from the present Order of Nature, in which *Good* appears far superior to *Evil*, we have just ground to conclude the DEITY to be benevolent, it is not conceivable "that any Being, who desires the Happiness of others, should not desire a *greater Degree* of Happiness to them rather than a less; and that consequently the whole *Series of Events* is the best possible, and contains in the whole the greatest possible *absolute Good*:" especially since we have no Presumption of any *private Interest*, which an *universal MIND* can have in view, in Opposition to the greatest Good of the whole. Nor are the particular Evils occurring to our Observation, any just Objection against the perfect Goodness of the universal PROVIDENCE to us, who cannot know how far these Evils may be necessarily connected with the *Means* of the greatest possible absolute Good.

*The Conduct of our publick Sense and Affections.* IV. IN managing our *publick Sense* of the State of others, we must beware of one common Mistake, *viz.* "apprehending every Person to be miserable in those Circumstances, which we imagine would make ourselves miserable." We may easily find, that the *lower Rank* of Mankind, whose only Revenue is their bodily Labour, enjoy as much *Chearfulness, Contentment,*

ment, *Health, Gaiety*, in their own way, as SECT. any in the highest Station of Life. Both VI. their Minds and Bodies are soon fitted to their State. The *Farmer* and *Labourer*, when they enjoy the bare Necessaries of Life, are easy. They have often more *correct Imaginations*, through *Necessity* and *Experience*, than others can acquire by *Philosophy*. This Thought is indeed a poor Excuse for a base selfish *Oppressor*, who imagining Poverty a great Misery, bears hard upon those in a low Station of Life, and deprives them of the common Necessaries, or even of the natural Conveniencies of Life, But this Consideration may support a compassionate Heart, too deeply touched with apprehended Miseries, of which the *Sufferers* are themselves insensible.

THE Pains of this *Sense* are not easily removed. They are not allayed by the Distinction of Pains into *real* and *imaginary*. Much less will it remove them, to consider how much of human Misery is owing to their own *Folly* and *Vice*. Folly and Vice are themselves the most pitable Evils. It is of more consequence to consider, what Evidences there are “ that the Vice and Misery in the World are smaller than we “ sometimes in our melancholy Hours imagine.” There are no doubt many furious


SECT.ous Starts of Passion, in which Malice  
 VI. may seem to have place in our Constitution; but how seldom, and how short, in comparison of Years spent in fixed kind Pursuits of the Good of a *Family*, a *Party*, a *Country*? How great a Part of human Actions flow directly from *Humanity* and *kind Affection*? How many censurable Actions are owing to the same Spring, only chargeable on *Inadvertence*, or an Attachment to too *narrow a System*? How few owing to any thing worse than *selfish Passions* above their Proportion?

HERE Men are apt to let their Imaginations run out upon all the *Robberies*, *Piracies*, *Murders*, *Perjuries*, *Frauds*, *Massacres*, *Assassinations*, they have ever either heard of, or read in History; thence concluding all Mankind to be very wicked: as if a *Court of Justice* were the proper Place of making an Estimate of the *Morals* of Mankind, or an *Hospital* of the *Healthfulness* of a Climate. Ought they not to consider, that the Number of honest *Citizens* and *Farmers* far surpasses that of all sorts of Criminals in any State; and that the innocent or kind Actions of even Criminals themselves, surpass their Crimes in Numbers? That it is the *Rarity* of Crimes, in comparison of innocent or good Actions,  
 which



which engages our Attention to them, and SECT. makes them be recorded in History; while VI. incomparably more honest, generous, domestic Actions are overlooked, only because they are so common; as one great *Danger*, or one *Month's Sicknefs*, shall become a frequently repeated Story, during a long Life of Health and Safety. ~~~~~

THE Pains of the *external Senses* are pretty frequent, but how short in comparison of the long Tracts of Health, Ease and Pleasure? How rare is the Instance of a Life, with one tenth spent in violent Pain? How few want absolute Necessaries; nay, have not something to spend on *Gaiety* and *Ornament*? The Pleasures of *Beauty* are exposed to all in some measure. These kinds of Beauty, which require *Property* to the full Enjoyment of them, are not ardently desired by many. The Good of every kind in the Universe, is plainly superior to the Evil. How few would accept of *Annihilation*, rather than Continuance in Life in the middle State of Age, Health and Fortune? Or what separated Spirit, who had considered human Life, would not, rather than perish, take the hazard of it again, by returning into a Body in the State of Infancy?

SECT. — *Who would lose,*  
 VI. *For fear of Pain, this intellectual Being,*  
 *These Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity,*  
*To perish rather, swallowed up and lost*  
*In the wide Womb of uncreated Night,*  
*Devoid of Sense and Motion——?*

Milton's Par. lost, Book II.

THESE Thoughts plainly shew a *Prevalence* of Good in the World. But still our publick Sense finds much matter of compassionate Sorrow among Men. The *Many* are in a tolerable good State; but who can be unconcerned for the distressed *Few*? They are few in comparison of the whole, and yet a great *Multitude*.

WHAT Parent would be much concerned at the Pains of breeding of *Teeth*, were they sure they would be short, and end well? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an Incision, which was necessary for the Cure, and would certainly accomplish it? Is there then no *Parent* in NATURE, no *Physician* who sees what is necessary for the *Whole*, and for the good of each Individual in the whole of his Existence, as far as is consistent with the general Good? Can we expect, in this our *Childhood* of Existence, to understand all the Contrivance and Art of this Parent and Physician of Nature? May not  
 some

some harsh Discipline be necessary to Good? SECT. VI.  
 May not many natural Evils be necessary to prevent future moral Evils, and to correct the Tempers of the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good? Is not *Suffering* and *Distress* requisite, before there can be room for generous Compassion, *Succour*, and *Liberality*? Can there be *Forgiveness*, *Returns of good for evil*, unless there be some *moral Evil*? Must the whole want the eternally delightful *Consciousness* of such *Actions* and *Dispositions*, to prevent a few transient Sensations of Pain, or natural Evil? May there not be some unseen Necessity for the greatest universal Good, that \* there should be an *Order of Beings* no more perfect than we are, subject to Error and wrong Affections sometimes? May not all the present Disorders which attend this State of *prevalent Order*, be rectified by the *directing Providence* in a future Part of our Existence? This belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE, and a *future State*, are the only sure Supports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire and strengthen our Love and Concern for this *Whole*, and acquiesce in what the governing MIND, who presides in it, is ordering in the wisest Manner, though not yet fully known to us, for its most universal Good.

\* See the Archbishop of Dublin, *de Origine Mali*.

SECT. A FUTURE State, firmly believed, makes

VI. the greatest Difficulties on this Subject to  
 ~~~~~ vanish. No particular *finite Evils* can be

The Necessity of believing a future State.

looked upon as intolerable, which lead to Good, infinite in *Duration*, Not can we complain of the Conditions of Birth, if the present Evils of Life have even a probable hazard of *everlasting Happiness* to compensate them; much more if it be placed in our Power certainly to obtain it. Never could the boldest Epicurean bring the lightest Appearance of Argument against the *Possibility* of such a State, nor was there ever any thing tolerable advanced against its *Probability*. We have no Records of any Nation which did not entertain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in all Ages, have found at least probable Arguments for it; and the Vulgar have been prone to believe it, without any other *Argument* than their natural Notions of *Justice* in the *Administration of the World*. Present *Hope* is present Good: and this very Hope has enlivened human Life, and given ease to generous Minds, under Anxieties about the publick Good.

THIS Opinion was interwoven with all Religions; and as it in many instances overballanced the Motives to Vice, so it removed Objections against *Providence*. The
 good

good Influence of this Opinion, however it might not justify any *Frauds* in other points, yet probably might overballance many Evils flowing from even very *corrupt Religions*. How agreeable then must it be to every good Man, that this Opinion, were there even no more to be done, should be confirmed beyond question or doubt, by a well attested *divine Revelation*, for the perpetual *Security* of the virtuous, and for the constant Support of the *kind and compassionate*? How gladly must every honest Heart receive it; and rejoice that even those who have neither *Leisure* nor *Capacity* for deep *Reflection*, should be thus convinced of it?

As to the Management of those Passions which seem *opposite* to the *Happiness* of others, such as *Anger, Jealousy, Envy, Hatred*; it is very necessary to represent to ourselves continually, the most *favourable Conceptions* of others, and to force our Minds to examine the *real Springs* of the resented Actions. We may almost universally find, that no Man acts from *pure Malice*; that the Injurious only intended some *Interest of his own*, without any *ultimate Desire* of our Misery; that he is more to be pitied for his own mean *selfish Temper*, for the want of true *Goodness*, and its attendant *Happiness*, than to be hated for his Conduct, which is really more pernicious to himself than

The Conduct of the unkind Affections.

SECT. than to others. * Our *Lenity, Forgiveness,*
 VI. and *Indulgence* to the Weakness of others,
 will be constant Matter of *delightful Consci-*
 ousness, and *Self-Approbation*; and will be
 as probably effectual in most cases, to ob-
 tain *Reparation* of Wrongs, from an hearty
Remorse, and thorow *Amendment of the*
Temper of the Injurious, as any Methods of
 Violence. Could we raise our Goodness e-
 ven to an higher Pitch, and consider “ the
 “ Injurious as our *Fellow-Members* in this
 “ great intellectual Body, whose Interest
 “ and Happiness it becomes us to promote,
 “ as much as we can consistently with that
 “ of others, and not to *despise, scorn,* or
 “ *cut them off,* because of every *Weakness,*
 “ *Deformity,* or *lighter Disorder;*” we
 might bring ourselves to that divine Con-
 duct, of even *returning good for evil.*

IN like manner, our *Emulation, Jealousy,*
or Envy, might be restrained in a great
 measure, by a constant *Resolution* of bear-
 ing always in our Minds the † *lovely Side* of
 every Character: ‡ “ The compleatly Evil
 “ are as rare as the perfectly Virtuous:
 “ There is something amiable almost in e-
 very one.” Could we enure ourselves con-

* See this Point handled with great Judgment, in *Plato's Gorgias.*

† Epictet. *Enchir. Cap. 65.*

‡ Plato *Phædon.*

constantly to dwell on these things, we might often bear patiently the *Success of a Rival*, nay, sometimes even rejoice in it, be more happy ourselves, and turn him into a real *Friend*. We should often find those *Phantoms* of Vice and Corruption which torment the *Jealous*, vanishing before the bright Warmth of a thorow *good Temper*, resolved to search for every thing *lovely and good*, and averse to think any *evil*.

V. IN governing our *moral Sense*, and *Condu& of*
fires of Virtue, nothing is more necessary *the moral*
 than to study the *Nature and Tendency of* *Sense, and*
 human Actions; and to extend our views to *Sense of*
the whole Species, or to all *sensitive Natures*,
 as far as they can be affected by our Con-
 duct. Our moral Sense thus regulated, and
 constantly followed in our Actions, may be
 the most constant Source of the most *stable*
Pleasure. The same Conduct is always the most
 probable Means of obtaining the *Pleasures*
of Honour. If there be a Distinction be-
 tween *Truth* and *Falshood*, Truth must be
 stronger than Falshood: It must be more
 probable that *Truth* will generally prevail;
 that the real *good Tendency* of our Actions,
 and the Wisdom of our *Intentions* will be
 known; and *Misrepresentations* or *partial*
Views will vanish. Our Desire of *Honour*
 is not confined to our present State. The
 Prospect of *future Glory* is a strong Motive
 O of

SECT. of Action. And thus the *Time*, in which

VI. our Character may have the hazard of obtaining Justice, has no other Limits than those of the *Existence of rational Natures*. Whereas, *partial Notions* of Virtue, and *partial Conduct*, have no other Foundation for *Self-Approbation*, than our *Ignorance*, *Error*, or *Inadvertence*; nor for *Honour*, than the like *Ignorance*, *Error*, or *Inadvertence* of others.

THAT we may not be engaged into any thing contrary to the publick Good, or to the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Desire of *false Honour*, or *Fear of false Shame*, it is of great use to examine the *real Dignity* of those we converse with, and to confine our *Intimacies* to the truly virtuous and wise. From such we can expect no Honour, but according to our sincere Pursuit of the *publick Good*; nor need we ever fear any *Shame* in such a Course. But above all, did we frequently, and in the most lively manner, present to ourselves that great, and wise, and good MIND, which presides over the Universe, sees every *Action*, and knows the true *Character* and *Disposition* of every Heart, approving nothing but sincere Goodness and Integrity; did we consider that the time will come, when we shall be as conscious of his *Presence*, as we are of our own *Existence*; as sensible of his *Approbation* or
Condem-

Condemnation, as we are of the Testimony SECT.
of our own Hearts; when we shall be en- VI.
gaged in a *Society of Spirits*, stripped of
these *Prejudices* and *false Notions* which so
often attend us in *Flesh and Blood*, how
should we despise that Honour which is
from Men, when opposite to the truest Ho-
nour from God himself?

VI. CONCERNING the Desires of *Wealth* The Desires
and *Power*, besides what was suggested above of Wealth
to allay their Violence, from considering and Pow-
the small Addition commonly made to the
Happiness of the Possessor, by the greatest
Degrees of them, and the *Uncertainty* of
their Continuance; if we have obtained any
share of them, let us examine their *true Use*,
and what is the best Enjoyment of them.

——— *Quid asper*

Utile Nummus habet? Patriæ carisq; propinquis
Quantum elargiri decet? ——— Persius.

WHAT *moral Pleasures*, what Delights
of *Humanity*, what *Gratitude* from Persons
obliged, what *Honour*, may a wise Man of
generous Temper purchase with them? How
foolish is the Conduct of heaping up Wealth
for *Posterity*, when smaller Degrees might
make them equally happy! when great *Pro-*
spects of this kind are the strongest *Tempta-*
tions to them, to indulge *Sloth*, *Luxury*,

SECT. *Debauchery, Insolence, Pride, and Contempt*
 VI. of their Fellow-Creatures; and to banish
 ~~~~~ some noble Dispositions, *Humility, Compassion, Industry, Hardiness of Temper and Courage*, the Offspring of the sober rigid Dame *Poverty*. How often does the *Example*, and almost direct *Instruction* of Parents, lead Posterity into the basest Views of Life!

————— *Qui nulla exempla beati*  
*Pauperis esse putat* —————  
*Cum dicis Juveni stultum qui donat amico,*  
*Qui paupertatem levat attollitque propinqui,*  
*Et spoliare doces & circumscribere* ———  
*Ergo Ignem, cujus scintillas ipse dedisti,*  
*Flagrantem late, & rapientem cuncta videbis.*  
 Juv. Sat. XIV.

How powerfully might the Example of a wisely generous Father, at once teach his Offspring the true *Value* of Wealth or Power, and prevent their *Neglect* of them, or foolish *throwing* them away, and yet inspire them with a *generous Temper*, capable of the just *Use* of them!

*Support  
 against  
 Death.*

DEATH is one Object of our *Aversion*, which yet we cannot avoid. It can scarcely be said, that “the *Desire of Life* is as strong “as the Sum of all *selfish Desires*.” It may be so with those who enure themselves to no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*.

ses. But how often do we see Death endu-  
red, not only from Love of *Virtue*, or *pub-*  
*lick Affections*, in Heroes and Martyrs, but  
even from Love of *Honour* in lower Char-  
acters! Many Aversions are stronger than  
that to Death. *Fear of bodily Pain*, *fear of*  
*Dis honour*, which are selfish Aversions, do  
often surpass our Aversion to Death, as well  
as *publick Affections* to Countries or Friends.  
It is of the greatest Consequence to the *En-*  
*joyment* of Life, to know its true *Value*; to  
strip Death of its borrowed Ideas of Ter-  
ror; to consider it barely as the *Cessation of*  
*both the Pains and Pleasures we now feel*,  
coming frequently upon us with no more  
Pain than that of *Swooning*, with a noble  
Hazard, or rather a certain *Prospect* of su-  
perior Happiness to every *good Mind*. Death  
in this view must appear an inconsiderable  
Evil, in comparison of *Vice*, *Self-Abhor-*  
*rence*, real *Dis honour*, the *Slavery of one's*  
*Country*, the *Misery of a Friend*.

THE tender Regards to a *Family* and *Off-*  
*spring*, are often the strongest Bands to re-  
strain a generous Mind from submitting to  
Death. What shall be the Fate of a *Wife*,  
a *Child*, a *Friend*, or a *Brother*, when we  
are gone, are the frequent Subjects of grie-  
vous Anxiety. The Fortunes of such Per-  
sons often depend much upon us; and when

SECT. they do not, yet we are more anxious about  
VI. their State when we shall be absent.



*Ut affidens implumibus pullis avis,  
Serpentium allapsus timet  
Magis relictis, non ut adsit auxili  
Latura plus præsentiis.*

Hor.

NEXT to the Belief of a good PROVIDENCE, nothing can support Men more under such *Anxieties*, than considering how often the *Orphan* acquires a *Vigor* of Mind, *Sagacity* and *Industry*, superior to those who are enfeebled by the constant *Care* and *Services* of others. A wise Man would desire to be provided with Friends against such an Exigency; Persons of such Goodness, as would joyfully accept the *Legacy* of a *Child*, or indigent *Friend* committed to their Protection.

IF Death were an *entire End* of the Person, so that no Thought or Sense should remain, all *Good* must cease at Death, but no *Evil* commence. The *Loss of Good* is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a Being which has lost all *Sense of Evil*. Were this the Case, the Consolation against Death would only be this, frequently to look upon *Life* and all its Enjoyments as granted to us only for a *short Term*; to employ this uncertain Time as much as we can in the Enjoyment

joyment of the *noblest Pleasures*; and to prevent Surprize at our Removal, by *laying our Account* for it. SECT. VI.



BUT if we exist, and think after Death, and retain our *Senses* of Good and Evil, no Consolation against Death can be suggested to a *wicked Man*; but for the *virtuous*, there are the best Grounds of *Hope* and *Joy*. If the *Administration* of the whole be good, we may be sure “ that *Order* and *Happiness* “ will in the whole prevail: Nor will *Misery* be inflicted any farther than is necessary for some prepollent Good. Now there is no Presumption, that the *absolute Misery* of any *virtuous* Person can be necessary to any good End; Such Persons therefore are the most likely to enjoy a State of perfect Happiness.

VII. To conclude: Let us consider that common Character, which when ascribed to any *State, Quality, Disposition, or Action*, engages our *Favour* and *Approbation* of it, viz. its being *natural*. We have many Suspicions about Tempers or Dispositions formed by *Art*, but are some way prepossessed in favour of what is *natural*: We imagine it must be advantageous and delightful to be in a natural State, and to live according to Nature. This very Presumption in favour of what is natural, is a plain Indication that

*What is the natural State of Men.*

SECT. the Order of Nature is good, and that Men  
 VI. are some way convinced of it. Let us en-  
 quire then what is meant by it.

IF by natural we mean “ that which we  
 “ enjoy or do when we first begin to exist,  
 “ or to think,” it is impossible to know  
 what *State*, *Temper*, or *Actions*, are *natural*. Our *natural State* in this Sense differs  
 little from that of a *Plant*, except in some  
 accidental *Sensations of Hunger*, or of *Ease*,  
 when we are well nourished.

SOME elaborate Treatises of great Philo-  
 sophers about *innate Ideas*, or Principles  
 practical or speculative, amount to no more  
 than this, “ That in the Beginning of our  
 “ Existence we have no *Ideas* or *Judg-*  
 “ *ments* ;” they might have added too, no  
*Sight*, *Taste*, *Smell*, *Hearing*, *Desire*, *Volition*. Such Dissertations are just as useful  
 for understanding *human Nature*, as it  
 would be in explaining the *animal Oeconomy*,  
 to prove that the *Fœtus* is animated before  
 it has *Teeth*, *Nails*, *Hair*, or before it can  
*eat*, *drink*, *digest*, or *breathe* : Or in a *natural History of Vegetables*, to prove that *Trees*  
 begin to grow before they have *Branches*,  
*Leaves*, *Flower*, *Fruit*, or *Seed* : And con-  
 sequently that all these things were adventi-  
 tious, or the Effect of *Art*.

BUT

BUT if we call “ that *State*, those *Dis-* S E C T.  
 “ *positions* and *Actions*, *natural*, to which VI.  
 “ we are inclined by some part of our Con-  
 “ stitution, antecedently to any *Volition* of  
 “ *our own*; or which flow from some *Prin-*  
 “ *ciples* in our Nature, not brought upon us  
 “ by our own *Art*, or that of others ;” then  
 it may appear, from what was said above,  
 that “ a *State of Good-will, Humanity, Com-*  
 “ *passion, mutual Aid, propagating and sup-*  
 “ *porting Offspring, Love of a Community*  
 “ *or Country, Devotion, or Love and Gra-*  
 “ *titude to some governing Mind*, is our na-  
 “ tural State,” to which we are naturally  
 inclined, and do actually arrive, as univer-  
 sally, and with as much uniformity, as we  
 do to a certain *Stature* and *Shape*.


IF by natural we understand “ the *high-*  
 “ *est Perfection of the Kind*, to which any  
 “ Species may be improved by cultivating  
 “ its natural *Dispositions* or *Powers* ;” as  
 few arrive at this in the Growth of their  
*Bodies*, so few obtain it in their *Minds*. But  
 we may see what this Perfection is, to which  
 our *natural Dispositions* tend, when we im-  
 prove them to the utmost, as far as they  
 are consistent with each other, making the  
*weaker* or *meaner* yield to the *more excellent*  
 and *stronger*. Our several *Senses* and *Affe-*  
*ctions, publick* and *private*, with our Powers  
 of

SECT. of *Reason and Reflection*, shew this to be the

VI. *Perfection of our Kind*, viz. “to know,  
 “ love, and reverence the great AUTHOR of  
 “ all things; to form the most *extensive I-*  
 “ *deas* of our own true Interests, and those  
 “ of all other *Natures*, *rational* or *sensitive*;  
 “ to abstain from all *Injury*; to pursue re-  
 “ gularly and impartially the *most universal*  
 “ *absolute Good*, as far as we can; to enjoy  
 “ constant *Self-Approbation*, and *Honour*  
 “ from wise Men; with *Trust in divine*  
 “ PROVIDENCE, *Hope of everlasting Happi-*  
 “ *ness*, and a *full Satisfaction and Assurance*  
 “ of Mind, that the whole Series of *Events*  
 “ is directed by an unerring *Wisdom*, for  
 “ the greatest universal *Happiness* of the  
 “ whole.”

To assert that “Men have generally arrived to the *Perfection of their Kind* in this Life,” is contrary to Experience. But on the other hand, to suppose “no Order at all in the *Constitution* of our Nature, or “no *prevalent Evidences* of good Order,” is yet more contrary to Experience, and would lead to a Denial of PROVIDENCE in the most important Affair which can occur to our Observation. We actually see such Degrees of *good Order*, of *social Affection*, of *Virtue* and *Honour*, as make the Generality of Mankind continue in a tolerable, nay, an *agreeable State*. However, in some  
 Tempers




Tempers we see the *selfish Passions* by Habits SECT. grown too strong; in others we may ob- VI. serve *Humanity, Compassion, and Good-nature* sometimes raised by Habits, as we say, to an Excess. 

WERE we to strike a *Medium* of the several Passions and Affections, as they appear in the whole Species of Mankind, to conclude thence what has been the natural Ballance previously to any Change made by Custom or Habit, which we see casts the Ballance to either side, we should perhaps find the *Medium* of the publick Affections not very far from a sufficient *Counterballance* to the *Medium* of the Selfish; and consequently the *Overballance* on either side in particular Characters, is not to be looked upon as the *original Constitution*, but as the *accidental Effect* of Custom, Habits, or Associations of Ideas, or other preternatural Causes: So that an universal *increasing* of the Strength of *either*, might in the whole be of little advantage. The raising universally the *publick Affections*, the Desires of *Virtue* and *Honour*, would make the *Hero of Cervantes*, pining with *Hunger* and *Poverty*, no rare Character. The universal increasing of *Selfishness*, unless we had more accurate Understandings to discern our *nicest Interests*, would fill the World with universal *Rapine* and *War*. The Consequences of  
either

SECT. either universally *abating*, or *increasing* the

VI. Desires between the *Sexes*, the *Love of Offspring*, or the several *Tastes* and *Fancies* in other Pleasures, would perhaps be found more pernicious to the whole, than the present Constitution. What seems most truly wanting in our Nature, is greater *Knowledge*, *Attention*, and *Consideration*: had we a greater Perfection this way, and were evil *Habits*, and foolish *Associations of Ideas* prevented, our *Passions* would appear in better order.

BUT while we feel in ourselves so much *publick Affection* in the various Relations of Life, and observe the like in others; while we find every one desiring indeed his *own Happiness*, but capable of discerning, by a little Attention, that not only his external *Conveniency*, or *worldly Interest*, but even the most immediate and lively *Sensations of Delight*, of which his Nature is susceptible, immediately flow from a *Publick Spirit*, a *generous, human, compassionate Temper*, and a suitable *Deportment*; while we observe so many Thousands enjoying a tolerable State of *Ease* and *Safety*, for each one whose Condition is made *intolerable*, even during our present *Corruption*: How can any one look upon this World as under the Direction of an *evil Nature*, or even question a perfectly *good PROVIDENCE*? How clearly does the  
Order

*Order of our Nature* point out to us our true SECT.  
*Happiness and Perfection*, and lead us to it VI.  
as naturally as the several *Powers* of the   
*Earth, the Sun, and Air*, bring *Plants* to  
their Growth, and the Perfection of their  
Kinds? We indeed are directed to it by our  
*Understanding and Affections*, as it becomes  
*rational and active Natures*; and *they* by *me-*  
*chanick Laws*. We may see, that “*Atten-*  
“*tion to the most universal Interest of all*  
“*sensitive Natures, is the Perfection of*  
“*each individual of Mankind:*” That they  
should thus be like well-tuned *Instruments*,  
affected with every *Stroke or Touch* upon  
any one. Nay, how much of this do we  
actually see in the World? What *generous*  
*Sympathy, Compassion, and Congratulation*  
with each other? Does not even the flour-  
ishing State of the *inanimate Parts of Na-*  
*ture*, fill us with joy? Is not thus *our Na-*  
*ture* admonished, exhorted and commanded  
to cultivate *universal Goodness and Love*, by  
a *Voice heard thro’ all the Earth, and Words*  
*sounding to the Ends of the World?*



## T R E A T I S E II.

## I L L U S T R A T I O N S

## U P O N T H E

## M O R A L S E N S E.

**T**HE Differences of Actions from which some are constituted *morally Good*, and others *morally Evil*, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Dispute, the *Confusion of ambiguous Words*, must be excusable.

IN the following Discourse, *Happiness* <sup>*Definitions.*</sup> denotes pleasant *Sensation* of any kind, or a continued State of such *Sensations*; and *Misery* denotes the contrary *Sensations*.

SUCH Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called for shortness,  
*privately*

*privately useful*: and such Actions as procure Misery to the Agent, *privately hurtful*.

ACTIONS procuring Happiness to others may be called *publicly useful*, and the contrary Actions *publicly hurtful*. Some Actions may be both *publicly and privately useful*, and others both *publicly and privately hurtful*.

THESE different *natural Tendencies* of Actions are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our *Reflection* upon human Affairs, we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.

*Two Questions about Morality.*

WHEN these *natural Differences* are known, it remains to be inquired into; 1st, "What *Quality* in any Action determines "our *Election* of it rather than the contrary?" Or, if the Mind determines itself, "What *Motives* or *Desires* excite to an "Action, rather than the contrary, or rather than to the *Omission*?" 2dly, "What " *Quality* determines our *Approbation* of "one Action, rather than of the contrary "Action?"

THE Words *Election* and *Approbation* seem to denote simple Ideas known by *Consciousness*; which can only be explained by *synonymous Words*, or by concomitant or consequent

sequent Circumstances. *Election* is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. *Approbation* of our own Action denotes, or is attended with, a Pleasure in the *Contemplation* of it, and in *Reflection* upon the *Affections* which inclined us to it. *Approbation* of the Action of another has some little Pleasure attending it in the Observer, and raises Love toward the *Agent*, in whom the Quality approved is deemed to reside, and not in the *Observer*, who has a Satisfaction in the Act of approving.\*

THE *Qualities* moving to *Election*, or *exciting to Action*, are different from those moving to *Approbation*: We often do Actions which we do not *approve*, and *approve* Actions which we *omit*: We often *desire* that an Agent had omitted an Action which we *approve*; and *wish* he would do an Action which we *condemn*. *Approbation* is employed about the Actions of *others*, where there is no room for our *Election*.

Now in our Search into the *Qualities* exciting either our *Election* or *Approbation*, let us consider the several *Notions* advanced of moral Good and Evil in both these Respects; and what *Senses*, *Instincts*, or *Affe-*

\* See *Treat. II. Sect. 2. Parag. ult.*

*tions*, must be necessarily supposed to account for our *Approbation* or *Election*.

*The Epicurean Opinion.*

THERE are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that of the old *Epicureans*, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of *Cicero*, *De finibus*; which is revived by *Hobbes*, *Rocheſcault*, and others of the last Century, and followed by many better Writers: “ That all the  
 “ Desires of the *human Mind*, nay of all  
 “ *thinking Natures*, are reducible to *Self-*  
 “ *Love*, or *Desire of private Happiness*:  
 “ That from this Desire all Actions of any  
 “ Agent do flow.” Our *Christian Moralists* of this Scheme introduce other sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still it is the  
 “ *Prospect of private Happiness*, which,  
 “ with some of them, is the sole *Motive of*  
 “ *Election*. And that, in like manner, what  
 “ determines any Agent to *approve* his own  
 “ Action, is its *Tendency to his private Happiness* in the whole, tho’ it may bring  
 “ *present Pain* along with it: That the *Approbation* of the Action of another, is  
 “ from an Opinion of its Tendency to the  
 “ Happiness of the *Approver*, either *immediately* or more *remotely*: That each Agent may discover it to be the surest way  
 “ to promote his private Happiness, to do  
 “ *publickly useful Actions*, and to abstain  
 “ from those which are *publickly hurtful*:  
 “ That



" That the neglecting to observe this, and  
 " doing *publickly hurtful Actions*, does mis-  
 " chief to the whole of Mankind, by hurt-  
 " ing any one part; that every one has  
 " some little *damage* by this Action: Such  
 " an *inadvertent Person* might possibly be  
 " *pernicious* to any one, were he in his  
 " Neighbourhood; and the very *Example*  
 " of such Actions may extend over the  
 " whole World, and produce some perni-  
 " cious Effects upon any Observer. That  
 " therefore every one may look upon such  
 " Actions as *hurtful to himself*, and in this  
 " view does disapprove them, and hates the  
 " Agent. In the like manner, a *publickly*  
 " *useful Action* may diffuse some small *Ad-*  
 " *vantage* to every Observer, whence he  
 " may *approve* it, and *love* the Agent."

THIS Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Life: \* Such as the *Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion*. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or *acute Reflections* about these Actions. Ingenious speculative Men, in their straining to support an *Hypothesis*, may contrive a thousand *subtle selfish Motives*, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for

*Does not  
 answer the  
 Appearances.*

▪ See *Treat. III. Sect. 1.*

the sudden *Approbation*, and violent *Sense* of something amiable in Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of these distant *Tendencies* to his Happiness. Nor will it better account for our *want of Approbation* toward *publicly useful Actions* done *casually*, or only with Intention of *private Happiness* to the Agent. And then, in these Actions reputed *generous*, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his *own Pleasure*, how come we to approve them more than his *enriching himself*, or his *gratifying his own Taste* with good Food? The whole *Species* may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Observer an equal Share.

WERE our *Approbation* of Actions done in *distant Ages* and *Nations*, occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward ourselves would be useful to us, why do not we approve and love in like manner, any Man who *finds a Treasure*, or *indulges himself* in any exquisite *Sensation*, since these Advantages or Pleasures might have been conferred on *ourselves*; and tend more to *our Happiness* than any Actions in distant Ages?

THE *Sanctions of Laws* may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of *useful* to himself, and lead him

him into an Opinion of *private Advantage* in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions ; but what should determine any Person to approve the *Actions of others*, because of a Conformity to a Law, if Approbation in any Person were only an Opinion of *private Advantage* ?

THE other Opinion is this, “ That we  
 “ have not only *Self-Love*, but *benevolent* The opposite Opinion does plainly.  
 “ *Affections* also toward others, in various  
 “ Degrees, making us desire their Happi-  
 “ ness as an *ultimate End*, without any view  
 “ to private Happiness: That we have a  
 “ *moral Sense* or Determination of our Mind,  
 “ to *approve* every *kind Affection* either in  
 “ ourselves or others, and all publicly use-  
 “ ful Actions which we imagine flow from  
 “ such Affection, without our having a  
 “ view to our *private Happiness*, in our Ap-  
 “ probation of these Actions.”

THESE two Opinions seem both intelli-  
 gible, each consistent with itself. The for-  
 mer seems not to represent human Nature  
 as it is ; the other seems to do it.


THERE have been many *ways of speaking* Schemes  
 introduced, which seem to signify something seemingly different  
 different from both the former Opinions. from both.  
 Such as these, that “ Morality of Actions  
 “ consists in *Conformity to Reason*, or Dis-

“ *formity from it :*” That “ *Virtue* is acting according to the *absolute Fitness and Unfitness of Things*, or agreeably to the “ *Natures or Relations of Things*,” and many others in different Authors. To examine these is the Design of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how the *Moral Sense* alledged to be in Mankind, must be pre-supposed even in these Schemes.

## S E C T.

## S E C T. I.

*Concerning the Character of Virtue,  
agreeable to Truth or Reason.*

SINCE Reason is understood to denote S E C T.  
I.  
our *Power of finding out true Proposi-*  
*tions*, Reasonableness must denote the same  
thing, with *Conformity to true Propositions,*  
*or to Truth.* 

REASONABLENESS in an Action is a very  
common Expression, but yet upon inquiry,  
it will appear very confused, whether we  
suppose it the Motive to *Election*, or the  
Quality determining *Approbation*.

THERE is one sort of *Conformity to Truth* *Conformity  
to Truth  
examined.*  
which neither determines to the one or the  
other; viz. that *Conformity which is be-*  
*tween every true Proposition and its Object.*  
This sort of Conformity can never make us  
*chuse* or *approve* one Action more than its  
contrary, for it is found in all Actions alike:  
Whatever *Attribute* can be ascribed to a ge-  
nerous kind Action, the contrary *Attribute*  
may as truly be ascribed to a selfish cruel  
Action: Both Propositions are equally true,

SECT. and the two contrary Actions, the Objects  
 I. of the two *Truths* are equally conformable to  
 ~~~~~ their several Truths, with that sort of *Con-*  
formity which is between a Truth and its
 Object. This *Conformity* then cannot make
 a Difference among Actions, or recommend
 one more than another either to *Election* or
Approbation, since any Man may make as
 many Truths about Villany, as about He-
 roism, by ascribing to it contrary *Attributes*.

For Instance, these are *Truths* concern-
 ing the *Preservation* of *Property*. “ It
 “ tends to the Happiness of human Society :
 “ It encourages Industry: It shall be reward-
 “ ed by God.” These are also *Truths* concern-
 ing *Robbery*. “ It disturbs Society : It
 “ discourages Industry : It shall be punished
 “ by God.” The former *three Truths* have
 the *Preservation of Property* for their Ob-
 ject: the latter *three* have *Robbery*. And
 each Class of Truths hath that sort of *Con-*
formity to its Objects, which is common to
 all Truths with their Objects. The *moral*
Difference cannot therefore depend upon this
Conformity, which is common to both.

THE *Number* of Truths in both cases
 may be plainly the same ; so that a good
 Action cannot be supposed to agree to *more*
Truths than an evil one, nor can an evil
 Action be disagreeable to any *Truth* or Com-
 pages

pages of *Truths* made about it; for what-
 ever Propositions do not agree with their
 Objects are not Truths.



IF *Reasonableness*, the Character of Virtue, denote some other sort of *Conformity* to Truth, it were to be wished that these Gentlemen, who make it the original Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any *Sense* or *Affections*, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to a Sense, either to *Election* or *Approbation*.

THEY tell us, " we must have some *Standard* antecedently to all *Sense* or *Affections*, since we judge even of our Senses and Affections themselves, and approve or disapprove them: This Standard must be our *Reason*, Conformity to which must be the original Idea of moral Good."

BUT what is this *Conformity of Actions to Reason*? When we ask the Reason of an Action, we sometimes mean, " *What Truth* either justifying or exciting. *shows a Quality in the Action, exciting the Agent to do it?*" Thus, why does a Luxurious Man pursue *Wealth*? The Reason is given by this Truth, " *Wealth is useful to purchase Pleasures.*" Sometimes for a Reason of Actions we shew the *Truth expressing a Quality, engaging our Approbation*. Thus the Reason of hazarding Life in just War, is, that " it tends to preserve our
 " honest

SECT. " honest Countrymen, or evidences publick

I. " Spirit:" The *Reason* for *Temperance*, and
 against *Luxury* is given thus, " *Luxury* evi-
 dences a selfish base Temper." The for-
 mer sort of Reasons we will call *exciting*,
 and the latter *justifying*. * Now we shall
 find that all *exciting Reasons* pre-suppose
Instincts and *Affections*; and the *justifying*
 pre-suppose a *Moral Sense*.


*Exciting
 Reasons
 suppose Af-
 fections.*

As to *exciting Reasons*, in every calm ra-
 tional Action some *end* is desired or intend-
 ed; no end can be intended or desired pre-
 viously to some one of these Classes of Affe-
 ctions, *Self-Love*, *Self-Hatred*, or desire of
 private Misery, (if this be possible) *Benevo-
 lence* toward others, or *Malice*: All Affe-
 ctions are included under these: no *end* can
 be previous to them all; there can there-
 fore be no *exciting Reason* previous to *Af-
 fection*.

WE have indeed many confused Ha-
 rangues on this Subject, telling us, " We
 " have two Principles of Action, *Reason*,
 " and *Affection* or *Passion*: the former in
 " common with Angels, the latter with
 " Brutes: No Action is wise, or good, or
 " reasonable, to which we are not excited

* Thus *Grotius* distinguishes the Reasons of War, into the
Justificæ, and *Suasoriæ*, or these, *sub ratione utilis*.

" by

“ by *Reason*, as distinct from all *Affections*; S E C T.
 “ or, if any such Actions as flow from I.
 “ *Affections* be good, it is only by *chance*, 
 “ or *materially* and not *formally*.” As if indeed *Reason*, or the Knowledge of the Relations of things, could excite to Action when we proposed no *End*, or as if *Ends* could be intended without *Desire* or *Affection*.

WRITERS on these Subjects should remember the common Divisions of the Faculties of the Soul. That there is 1. *Reason* presenting the natures and relations of things, antecedently to any Act of *Will* or *Desire*: 2. The *Will*, or *Appetitus Rationalis*, or the disposition of Soul to pursue what is presented as good, and to shun Evil. Were there no other Power in the Soul, than that of mere contemplation, there would be no *Affection*, *Volition*, *Desire*, *Action*. Nay without some motion of *Will* no Man would voluntarily persevere in Contemplation. There must be a *Desire* of Knowledge, and of the Pleasure which attends it: this too is an Act of *Willing*. Both these Powers are by the Antients included under the Λόγος or λογικὸν μέρος. Below these they place two other powers dependent on the Body, the *Sensus*, and the *Appetitus Sensitivus*, in which they place the particular Passions: the former answers to the *Understanding*,
 and

S E C T. and the latter to the *Will*. But the *Will* is

I. forgot of late, and some ascribe to the *Intellect*, not only *Contemplation* or *Knowledge*, but *Choice*, *Desire*, *Prosecuting*, *Loving*. Nay some are grown so ingenious in uniting the Powers of the Soul, that *contemplating with Pleasure*, *Symmetry* and *Proportion*, an Act of the *Intellect* as they plead, is the same thing with *Goodwill* or the virtuous *Desire* of publick Happiness.

No exciting
Reasons for
ultimate
Ends.

BUT are there not also exciting Reasons, even previous to any end, moving us to propose one end rather than another? To this *Aristotle* long ago answered, " that " there are *ultimate Ends* desired without " a view to any thing else, and *subordinate* " *Ends* or *Objects* desired with a view to " something else." To *subordinate Ends* those *Reasons* or *Truths* excite, which shew them to be conducive to the *ultimate End*, and shew *one Object* to be more effectual than another: thus *subordinate Ends* may be called *reasonable*. But as to the *ultimate Ends*, to suppose *exciting Reasons* for them, would infer, that there is no *ultimate End*, but that we desire one thing for another in an infinite Series.

THUS ask a Being who desires *private Happiness*, or has *Self-Love*? " what Reason
" son

“son excites him to desire Wealth?” He will S E C T.
 give this Reason, that “Wealth tends to I.
 “procure Pleasure and Ease.” Ask his ~
 Reason for desiring Pleasure or Happiness:
 One cannot imagine what Proposition he
 could assign as his *exciting Reason*. This
 Proposition is indeed true, “There is
 “an *Instinct* or *Desire* fixed in his Nature,
 “determining him to pursue his Happi-
 “ness;” but it is not this *Reflection* on his
 own Nature, or this *Proposition* which ex-
 cites or determines him, but the *Instinct it-*
self. This is a Truth, “*Rhubarb* strength-
 “ens the Stomach:” But it is not a *Propo-*
sition which strengthens the Stomach, but
 the *Quality* in that Medicine. The Effect
 is not produced by *Propositions* shewing the
Cause, but by the *Cause* itself.

IN like manner, what *Reason* can a be-
 nevolent Being give, as exciting him to haz-
 ard his Life in just War? This perhaps,
 “such Conduct tends to the Happiness of
 “his Country.” Ask him, “why he serves
 “his Country?” he will say, “His Coun-
 “try is a very valuable Part of Mankind.”
 Why does he study the Happiness of Man-
 kind? If his Affections be really *disinterest-*
ed, he can give no *exciting Reasons* for it:
 The Happiness of Mankind in general, or
 of any valuable Part of it, is an *ultimate*
End to that Series of Desires.

WE

SECT. WE may transiently observe a Mistake

I. some fall into; They suppose, because they
 ~~~~~ have formed some Conception of an *infinite*  
 Men have many ultimate Ends. *Good, or greatest possible Aggregate, or Sum*  
*of Happiness*, under which all *particular*  
*Pleasures* may be included; that there is  
 also some *one great ultimate End*, with a  
 view to which every *particular Object* is de-  
 sired; whereas, in truth, each *particular*  
*Pleasure* is desired without farther view, as  
 an ultimate End in the *selfish Desires*. It is  
 true, the *Prospect* of a greater inconsistent  
 Pleasure may surmount or stop this Desire;  
 so may the *Fear* of a prepollent Evil. But  
 this does not prove “ that all Men have for-  
 “ med Ideas of *infinite Good, or greatest pos-*  
 “ *sible Aggregate*, or that they have any *In-*  
 “ *stinct* or *Desire*, actually operating with-  
 “ out an Idea of its Object. Just so in the  
*benevolent Affections*, the Happiness of any  
 one Person is an *ultimate End*, desired with  
 no farther view: and yet the observing its  
*Inconsistency* with the Happiness of another  
 more beloved, or with the Happiness of *ma-*  
*ny*, though each one of them were but e-  
 qually beloved, may overcome the former  
 Desire. Yet this will not prove, that in  
 each *kind Action* Men form the abstract  
 Conception of *all Mankind*, or the *System*  
*of Rationals*. Such Conceptions are indeed  
 useful, that so we may gratify either our  
 Self-Love

*Self-Love* or *kind Affections* in the fullest S E C T. manner, as far as our Power extends; and I. may not content ourselves with smaller Degrees either of *private* or *publick Good*, while greater are in our power: But when we have formed these *Conceptions*, we do not serve the *Individual* only from Love to the *Species*, no more than we desire *Grapes* with an Intention of the *greatest Aggregate* of Happiness, or from an Apprehension that they make a Part of the *General Sum* of our Happiness. These Conceptions only serve to suggest *greater Ends* than would occur to us without Reflection; and by the *Prepollency* of one Desire toward the *greater Good*, to either private or publick, to stop the Desire toward the *smaller Good*, when it appears inconsistent with the greater.

LET us examine the Truths assigned as *The common Reason examined.* exciting to the Pursuit of publick Good, even by those, who, though they allow *disinterested Affections*, and a *moral Sense*, yet suppose something *reasonable* in it antecedently. They assign such as these, “ publick Good is the End proposed by the “ DEITY.” Then what *Reason* excites Men to concur with the DEITY? It is this, “ Concurring with the DEITY will make “ the Agent *happy*?” This is an *exciting Reason* indeed, but plainly supposes *Self-Love*:

SECT. *Love*: And let any one assign the *exciting*  
 I. *Reason* to the Desire of Happiness. Is the  
 ~~~~~ Reason exciting to concur with the DEITY  
 this, "The DEITY is our *Benefactor*?"
 Then what *Reason* excites to concur with
 Benefactors? Here we must recur to an *In-*
stinct. Is it this Truth, "The divine Ends
 "are *reasonable* Ends?" Then what means
 the Word [*reasonable*?] Does it mean, that
 "the Deity has *Reasons* exciting him to
 "promote the publick Good?" What are
 these *Reasons*? Why, perhaps "we do not
 "know them particularly, but in general
 "are sure that the DEITY has *Reasons* for
 "them." Then the Question recurs, What
 Reason excites us to *implicit Concurrence*
 with the Ends of the DEITY? The *Reasons*
 which excite *one Nature* may not excite a-
 nother: The Tendency of an Action to the
Happiness of one Agent may excite him, but
 will not excite another *Agent* to concur, un-
 less there appears a like Tendency to the
 Happiness of that *other*. They may say,
 "they are sure the *divine Ends* are good."
 What means *Goodness*? Is it *moral* or *natu-*
ral? If the divine Ends be *natural Good*,
 i. e. *pleasant*, or the *Cause of Pleasure*, to
 whom is this *Pleasure*? If to the DEITY,
 then why do we study the Happiness or the
 pleasing of the DEITY? What *Reason* ex-
 cites us? All the possible *Reasons* must ei-
 ther presuppose some *Affection*, if they are
 exci-

exciting; or some *moral Sense*, if they are ju-
 stifying.—Is the divine End naturally good
 to us? This is an exciting Reason, but supposes
Self-Love. If we say the divine Ends are mo-
rally good, we are just where we began. What
 is *moral Goodness*? *Conformity to Reason*.
 What are the *Reasons exciting or justifying*.

S E C T.

I.



If any alledge as the Reason *exciting* us
 to pursue publick Good, this Truth, that
 “ the Happiness of a *System*, a *Thousand*,
 “ or a *Million*, is a greater Quantity of
 “ Happiness than that of one *Person*: and
 “ consequently, if Men desire Happiness,
 “ they must have stronger Desires toward
 “ the *greater Sum*, than toward the *less*.”
 This Reason still supposes an *Instinct toward*
Happiness as previous to it: And again, To
 whom is the Happiness of a System a great-
 er Happiness? To one *Individual*, or to
 the *System*? If to the Individual, then his
 Reason exciting his Desire of a *happy Syst-*
em supposes *Self-Love*: If to the *System*,
 then what Reason can excite to desire the
 greater *Happiness of a System*, or any *Hap-*
piness to be in the Possession of *others*? None
 surely which does not presuppose *publick*
Affections. Without such *Affections* this
 Truth, “ that an hundred Felicities is a
 “ greater Sum than one Felicity,” will no
 more excite to study the Happiness of the
Hundred, than this Truth, “ an hundred
 Q “ Stones

SECT. "Stones are greater than one," will excite
 I. a Man, who has no *desire of Heaps*, to cast
 ~~~~~ them together.

THE same may be observed concerning that *Proposition*, assigned by some as the *ultimate Reason* both *exciting* to, and *justifying* the Pursuit of publick Good, *viz.* "It is best that all should be happy." Best is most good: Good to whom? To the *Whole*, or to each *Individual*? If to the *former*, when this Truth excites to Action, it must presuppose *kind Affections*; if it is good to each *Individual*, it must suppose *Self-Love*.

The true  
 Meaning of  
 Reason ex-  
 citing to A-  
 ctions, and  
 reasonable  
 Actions.

LET us once suppose *Affections, Instincts* or *Desires* previously implanted in our Nature: and we shall easily understand the *exciting Reasons* for Actions, *viz.* "These Truths which shew them to be conducive toward some *ultimate End*, or toward the *greatest End* of that kind in our Power." He acts *reasonably*, who considers the various Actions in his Power, and forms *true Opinions* of their *Tendencies*; and then chuses to do that which will obtain the highest Degree of *that*, to which the *Instincts* of his Nature incline him, with the smallest Degree of those things from which the *Affections* in his Nature make him averse.

MORE




MORE particularly, the *exciting Reasons* S E C T. I.  
 to a Nature which had only *selfish Affections*, are those Truths which shewed  
 “ what Object or Event would occasion to  
 “ it the greatest Quantity of *Pleasure* :”  
 these would excite to the Prosecution of it.  
 The *exciting Truths* about *Means*, would  
 be only those which pointed out some Means  
 as more certainly effectual than any other,  
 or with less *Pain* or *Trouble* to the *Agent*.  
*Publick Usefulness* of *Ends* or *Means*, or  
*publick Hurtfulness* would neither excite nor  
 dissuade, farther than the *publick State*  
 might affect *that* of the *Agent*.

IF there is any Nature with *publick Affections*: the Truths exciting to any *End*  
 in this Order, are such as shew, “ that any  
 “ Event would promote the Happiness of  
 “ others.” That *End* is called most *reasonable*, which our Reason discovers to con-  
 tain a greater Quantity of *publick Good*, than  
 any other in our power.

WHEN any Event may affect both the  
*Agent* and *others*, if the *Agent* have both  
*Self-Love* and *publick Affections*, he acts ac-  
 cording to that Affection which is *strongest*,  
 when there is any *Opposition* of Interests; if  
 there be no *Opposition*, he follows both.  
 If he discovers this Truth, that “ his con-

SECT. "stant pursuit of *publick Good* is the most  
 I. "probable way of promoting his *own Hap-*  
 ~~~~~ "*piness,*" then his Pursuit is truly reasona-  
 ble and constant; thus both Affections are
 at once gratified, and he is consistent with
 himself. Without knowledge of that Truth
 he does not act *reasonably* for his own Hap-
 piness, but follows it by *Means* not tending
 effectually to this *End*: and must frequent-
 ly from the Power of *Self-Love*, neglect or
 counteract his other *End*, the *publick Good*.
 If there be also a *moral Sense* in such an A-
 gent, while yet he is inadvertent to the *Con-*
nexion of *private Happiness* with the *Study*
of the publick; he must be perpetually yet
 more uneasy, either through the apprehended
Neglect of private Interest when he serves in
 Publick; or when he pursues only *private In-*
terest, he will have perpetual *Remorse* and *Dis-*
satisfaction with his own Temper, through his
moral Sense. So that the Knowledge of this
Connexion of private Interest, with the Study
 of publick Good, seems absolutely necessary
 to preserve a constant *Satisfaction* of Mind,
 and to prevent an *alternate Prevalence* of
 seemingly contrary Desires.

SHOULD any one ask even concerning
 these two *ultimate Ends*, *private Good* and
publick, is not the latter more *reasonable*
 than the former?——What means the
 Word *reasonable* in this Question? If we
 are

are allowed to presuppose *Instincts* and *Aff-* S E C T.
ections, then the Truth just now supposed I.
 to be discoverable concerning our State, is 
 an *exciting Reason* to serve the publick In-
terest, since this Conduct is the most *effect-*
ual Means to obtain both ends. But I
 doubt if any Truth can be assigned which
excites in us either the Desire of *private*
Happiness or *publick*. For the former none
 ever alledged any *exciting Reason*: and a *be-*
nevolent Temper finds as little *Reason exci-*
ting him to the latter; which he desires
 without any view to *private Good*. If the
 meaning of the Question be this, “ does
 “ not every *Spectator* approve the Pursuit
 “ of publick Good more than private?”
 The Answer is obvious, that he does: but
 not for any *Reason* or *Truth*, but from
 a *moral Sense* in the Constitution of the
 Soul.

THIS leads to consider *Approbation* of
 Actions, whether it be for *Conformity to a-*
ny Truth, or *Reasonableness*, that Actions are
 ultimately approved, independently of any
moral Sense? Or if all *justifying Reasons*
 do not presuppose it?

IF *Conformity to Truth*, or *Reasonable*, de- *Justifying*
 note nothing else but that “ an Action is *Reasons*
 “ the *Object of a true Proposition*,” it is *suppose a*
 plain, that all Actions should be approved *moral*
Sense.
 Q₃ equally,

SECT. equally, since as many Truths may be made
 I. about the worst, as can be made about the
 best. See what was said above about exciting Reasons.

BUT let the *Truths* commonly assigned as *justifying* be examined. Here it is plain, “*A Truth shewing an Action to be fit to attain an End,*” does not justify it; nor do we approve a *subordinate End* for any Truth, which only shews it to be fit to promote the *ultimate End*; for the worst Actions may be conducive to their *Ends*, and *reasonable* in that Sense. The *justifying Reasons* then must be about the *Ends* themselves, especially the *ultimate Ends*. The Question then is, “Does a *Conformity to any Truth* make us approve an *ultimate End*, previously to any *moral Sense*?” For example, we approve *pursuing the publick Good*. For what *Reason*? Or what is the *Truth* for *Conformity* to which we call it a *reasonable End*? I fancy we can find none in these Cases, more than we could give for our liking any *pleasant Fruit*. *

THE Reasons assigned are such as these; “*It is the End proposed by the DEITY.*” But why do we approve concurring with

* This is what *Aristotle* so often asserts that the Προαίτιον or βελιυτὸν is not the End, but the Means.

the divine Ends? This Reason is given, S E C T. I.
"He is our Benefactor:" But then, for what Reason do we approve *Concurrence with a Benefactor?* Here we must recur to a *Sense*. Is this the Reason moving to *Approbation*, *"Study of publick Good tends to the Advantage of the Approver?"* Then the Quality moving us to approve an Action, is its being *advantageous to us*, and not *Conformity to a Truth*. This Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fact. Men approve without Perception of *private Advantage*; and often do not condemn or disapprove what is plainly pernicious; as in the Execution of a *just Sentence*, which even the Sufferer may approve.

IF any alledge, that this is the *justifying Reason* of the *Pursuit of publick Good*, *"that it is best all be happy,"* then we approve Actions for their *Tendency to that State which is best*, and not for *Conformity to Reason*. But here again, what means *best*? *morally best*, or *naturally best*? If the *former*, they explain the same Word by itself in a Circle: If they mean the *latter*, that "it is the most happy State where all are happy;" then, *most happy*, for whom? the *System*, or the *Individual*? If for the *former*, what Reason makes us approve the *Happiness of a System*? Here we must recur to a *Sense* or kind *Affections*. Is

SECT. it most happy for the *Individual*? Then the

I. Quality moving *Approbation* is again *Tendency to private Happiness*, not *Reasonableness*.

*Obligation
supposes
either Affections or
a moral
Sense.*

THERE are some other *Reasons* assigned in Words differing from the former, but more confused, such as these: “ *It is our Duty to study publick Good. We are obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to the Deity. The whole is to be preferred to a Part.*” But let these Words, *Duty, Obligation, Owing*, and the meaning of that Gerund or Participle, *is to be preferred*, be explained; and we shall find ourselves still at a Loss for *exciting Reasons* previously to *Affections*, or *justifying Reasons* without recourse to a *moral Sense*.

The meaning of Obligation.

WHEN we say one is obliged to an Action, we either mean, 1. *That the Action is necessary to obtain Happiness to the Agent, or to avoid Misery*: Or, 2. *That every Spectator, or he himself upon Reflection, must approve his Action, and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its Circumstances.* The former Meaning of the Word *Obligation* presupposes *selfish Affections*, and the *Senses of private Happiness*: The latter Meaning includes the *moral Sense*. Mr. Barbeyrac, in his Annotations upon *Grotius*,

tius,* makes *Obligation* denote an *indispensable Necessity to act in a certain manner*. I. S E C T.

Whoever observes his Explication of this *Necessity*, (which is not *natural*, otherwise no Man could act against his *Obligation*) will find that it denotes only “ such a Con-
“ stitution of a powerful Superior, as will
“ make it impossible for any Being to ob-
“ tain *Happiness*, or avoid *Misery*, but by
“ such a Course of Action.” This agrees with the former Meaning, though sometimes he also includes the latter.

MANY other confused Definitions have been given of *Obligation*, by no obscure Names in the learned World. But let any one give a distinct Meaning, different from the two above-mentioned. To pursue them all would be endless; only let the *Definitions* be substituted in place of the Word *OBLIGATION*, in other parts of each Writer, and let it be observed whether it makes good Sense or not. †

BEFORE we quit this Character *Reasonableness*, let us consider the Arguments brought to prove that there must be some Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Sense. Say

Arguments for some Standard of Morals prior to a Sense considered.

* *Lib. I. Chap. 1. Sect. 10.*

† The common Definition *Vinculum Juris quæ necessitate astringimur alicujus rei præstandæ*, is wholly metaphorical, and can settle no Debate precisely.

they,

SECT. they, “ *Perceptions of Sense* are deceitful,

I. “ we must have some Perception or Idea
 ~~~~~ “ of *Virtue* more stable and certain; this  
 “ must be *Conformity to Reason*: *Truth*  
 “ discovered by our *Reason* is certain and  
 “ invariable: *That* then alone is the Original Idea of *Virtue*, *Agreement with Reason*.” But in like manner our *Sight* and *Sense of Beauty* is deceitful, and does not always represent the true *Forms* of Objects. We must not call that *beautiful* or *regular*, which pleases the *Sight*, or an *internal Sense*; but *Beauty* in external *Forms* too, consists in *Conformity to Reason*. So our *Taste* may be vitiated: we must not say that *Savour* is perceived by *Taste*, but must place the original Idea of *grateful Savours* in *Conformity to Reason*, and of *ungrateful* in *Contrariety to Reason*. We may mistake the real *Extent* of Bodies, or their *Proportions*, by making a Conclusion upon the first sensible Appearance: Therefore *Ideas of Extension* are not originally acquired by a *Sense*, but consist in *Conformity to Reason*.

IF what is intended in this *Conformity to Reason* be this, “ That we should call no  
 “ Action *virtuous*, unless we have some  
 “ Reason to conclude it to be virtuous, or  
 “ some *Truth* shewing it to be so.” This is very true; but then in like manner we should count no Action *vicious*, unless we  
 have



have some *Reason* for counting it so, or SECT.  
 when it is *Truth* “that it is vicious.” If I.  
 this be intended by *Conformity to Truth*,  
 then at the same rate we may make *Conformity to Truth* the original Idea of *Vice* as well as *Virtue*; nay, of every Attribute whatsoever. That *Taste* alone is *sweet*, which there is *Reason* to count *sweet*; that *Taste* alone is *bitter*, concerning which it is *true* that it is *bitter*; that *Form* alone is *beautiful*, concerning which it is *true* that it is *beautiful*; and that alone *deformed*, which is truly *deformed*. Thus *Virtue*, *Vice*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, *Beautiful*, or *Deformed*, originally denote *Conformity to Reason*, antecedently to Perceptions of any *Sense*. The *Idea of Virtue* is particularly that concerning which it is *Truth*, that it is *Virtue*; or *Virtue* is *Virtue*; a wonderful Discovery!

So when some tell us, “that *Truth* is naturally pleasant, and more so than any *sensible Perception*; this must therefore engage Men more than any other Motive, if they attend to it.” Let them observe, that as much *Truth* is known about *Vice* as *Virtue*. We may demonstrate the publick *Miseries* which would ensue upon *Perjury*, *Murder*, and *Robbery*. These Demonstrations would be attended with that *Pleasure* which is peculiar to *Truth*; as well as the Demonstrations of the publick *Happiness* to ensue

SECT. ensue from *Faith, Humanity and Justice.*

I. There is equal Truth on both sides.



*Hence it  
is: 'at Vir-  
tue, scaled  
reasonable  
and not  
Vice.*

WE may transiently observe what has occasioned the Use of the Word *reasonable*, as an Epithet of only *virtuous Actions*. Tho' we have *Instincts* determining us to desire *Ends*, without supposing any previous *Reasoning*; yet it is by use of our *Reason* that we find out the Means of obtaining our *Ends*. When we do not use our Reason, we often are disappointed of our End. We therefore call those Actions which are *effectual* to their Ends, *reasonable* in one Sense of that Word.

AGAIN, in all Men there is probably a *moral Sense*, making publicly useful Actions and kind Affections *grateful* to the Agent, and to every Observer: Most Men who have thought of human Actions, agree, that the *publicly useful* are in the whole also *privately useful* to the Agent, either in this Life or the next: We conclude, that all Men have the *same Affections and Senses*: We are convinced by our Reason, that it is by publicly useful Actions alone that we can promote *all our Ends*. Whoever then acts in a contrary manner, we presume is *mistaken, ignorant of, or inadvertent* to, these Truths which he might know; and say he acts *unreasonably*. Hence some have been

been led to imagine, some *Reasons* either S E C T.  
 exciting or justifying previously to all *Affe-* I.  
*tions* or a *moral Sense*. ~

Two Arguments are brought in defence *Objections*  
 of this Epithet, as antecedent to any Sense, *from our*  
*viz.* “ That we judge even of our *Affe-* *judging*  
*tions* and *Senses* themselves, whether they *even of our*  
 “ are *morally Good or Evil.*” *Affections*  
*and Senses*  
*themselves.*

THE second Argument is, that “ if all  
 “ *moral Ideas* depend upon the *Constitution*  
 “ of our *Sense*, then all *Constitutions* would  
 “ have been alike reasonable and good to  
 “ the DEITY, which is absurd.”

As to the first Argument, it is plain we *That we*  
 judge of our own *Affections*, or those of *judge our*  
 others by our *moral Sense*, by which we ap- *Senses*  
 prove kind *Affections*, and disapprove the *themselves.*  
 contrary. But none can apply *moral Attri-*  
*butes* to the very *Faculty* of perceiving *moral*  
*Qualities*; or call his *moral Sense* *morally*  
*Good or Evil*, any more than he calls the  
*Power of Tasting*, *sweet or bitter*; or of  
*Seeing*, *strait or crooked*, *white or black*.

EVERY one judges the *Affections* of others *Answered.*  
 by his own *Sense*; so that it seems not im-  
 possible that in these *Senses* Men might dif-  
 fer as they do in *Taste*. A *Sense* approving  
*Benevolence* would disapprove *that Temper*,  
 which

SECT. which a *Sense approving Malice* would delight in. The *former* would judge of the *latter* by his own *Sense*, so would the *latter* of the *former*. Each one would at first view think the *Sense* of the other perverted. But then, is there no difference? Are both *Senses* equally good? No certainly, any *Man* who observed them would think the *Sense* of the *former* more desirable than of the *latter*; but this is, because the *moral Sense* of every *Man* is constituted in the former manner. But were there any Nature with no *moral Sense* at all observing these two Persons, would he not think the State of the *former* preferable to that of the *latter*? Yes, he might: but not from any Perception of *moral Goodness* in the one *Sense* more than in the other. Any rational Nature observing two Men thus constituted, with *opposite Senses*, might by reasoning see, not *moral Goodness* in one *Sense* more than in the contrary, but a *Tendency to the Happiness of the Person himself*, who had the former *Sense* in the one Constitution, and a *contrary Tendency* in the opposite Constitution: nay, the Persons themselves might observe this; since the *former Sense* would make these Actions grateful to the Agent which were useful to others; who, if they had a like *Sense*, would love him, and return *good Offices*; whereas the *latter Sense* would make all such Actions as are *useful to others*, and  
apt

apt to engage their *good Offices*, ungrateful S E C T. to the Agent; and would lead him into I. *publickly hurtful Actions*, which would not only procure the Hatred of others, if they had a *contrary Sense*, but engage them out of their *Self-Love* to study his *Destruction*, tho' their *Senses* agreed. Thus any *Observer*, or the *Agent* himself with this *latter Sense*, might perceive that the *Pains* to be feared, as the Consequence of *malicious Actions*, did over-balance the *Pleasures* of this *Sense*; so that it would be to the Agent's *Interest* to counteract it. Thus one Constitution of the *moral Sense* might appear to be more *advantageous* to those who had it, than the contrary; as we may call that *Sense* of Tasting *healthful*, which made wholesome Meat pleasant; and we would call a contrary *Taste* *pernicious*. And yet we should no more call the moral *Sense* *morally good* or *evil*, than we call the *Sense* of Tasting *savoury* or *unsavoury*, *sweet* or *bitter*.

BUT must we not own, that we judge of all our *Senses* by our *Reason*, and often correct their *Reports* of the *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste* of Objects, and pronounce them *right* or *wrong*, as they agree or disagree with *Reason*? This is true. But does it then follow, that *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste*, are not *sensible Ideas*, but only denote *Reasonableness*, or *Agreement with Reason*?

SECT. Reason? Or that these Qualities are perceiv-

I. able antecedently to any *Sense*, by our *Power of finding out Truth*? Just so a *compassionate Temper* may rashly imagine the *Correction of a Child*, or the *Execution of a Criminal*, to be cruel and inhuman: but by *reasoning* may discover the *superior Good* arising from them in the whole; and then the same *moral Sense* may determine the Observer to approve them. But we must not hence conclude, that it is any *reasoning* antecedent to a *moral Sense*, which determines us to *approve* the Study of publick Good, any more than we can in the former Case conclude, that we perceive *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste*, antecedently to a *Sense*. All these Sensations are often corrected by *Reasoning*, as well as our *Approbations* of Actions as *Good* or *Evil*:\* and yet no body ever placed the *Original Idea* of *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, or *Taste*, in *Conformity to Reason*.

'Tis manifest we have in our *Understanding moral Ideas*, or they are Perceptions of the Soul: we reason about them, we compare, we judge; but then we do all the same Acts about *Extension*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Taste*, *Sound*, which Perceptions all Men call *Sensations*. All our Ideas, or the ma-


\* See Sect. 4. of this Treatise.

materials of our reasoning or judging, are received by some immediate Powers of Perception internal or external, which we may call *Senses*; by these too we have Pleasure and Pain. All Perception is by the Soul, not by the Body, tho' some Impressions on the bodily Organs are the Occasions of some of them; and in others the Soul is determined to other sorts of *Feelings* or *Sensations*, where no bodily Impression is the immediate Occasion. A certain *incorporeal Form*, if one may use that Name, a *Temper* observed, a *Character*, an *Affection*, a *State* of a sensitive Being, known or understood, may raise *Liking*, *Approbation*, *Sympathy*, as naturally from the very Constitution of the Soul, as any bodily Impression raises external Sensations. Reasoning or *Intellect* seems to raise no new Species of Ideas, but to discover or discern the *Relations* of those received. Reason shews what Acts are conformable to a *Law*, a *Will* of a Superior; or what Acts tend to Private Good, or to Publick Good: In like manner, Reason discovers contrary Tendencies of contrary Actions. Both Contraries are alike the Object of the Understanding, and may give that sort of Pleasure which arises upon Discovery of Truth. A Demonstration that certain Actions are detrimental to Society is attended with the peculiar *Pleasure of new Knowledge*, as much as a like Demonstration of

SECT. the Benefit of Virtue. But when we *approve* a kind beneficent Action, let us consider whether this *Feeling*, or *Action*, or *Modification* of the Soul more resembles an Act of *Contemplation*, such as this [when straight Lines intersect each other, the vertical Angles are equal;] or that *Liking* we have to a beautiful Form, an harmonious Composition, a grateful Sound.

THUS tho' no Man can immediately either *approve* or *disapprove* as *morally good or evil* his own *moral Sense*, by which he approves only *Affections* and *Actions* consequent upon them; yet he may see whether it be *advantageous* to him in other respects, to have it constituted *one way* rather than another. *One Constitution* may make these Actions grateful to this Sense which tend to procure *other Pleasures* also. A *contrary Constitution* may be known to the very Person himself to be *disadvantageous*, as making these Actions *immediately grateful*, which shall occasion all *other sorts* of Misery. His *Self-Love* may excite him, tho' with *Dissatisfaction*, to counteract this Sense, in order to avoid a greater *Evil*. Mr. *Hobbes* seems to have had no better Notions of the *natural State* of Mankind. An Observer, who was *benevolent*, would desire that all had the former sort of *Sense*; a *malicious Observer*, if he feared no *Evil to himself*,  
from



from the Actions of the Persons observed S E C T.  
 would desire the *latter Constitution*. If this I.  
 Observer had a *moral Sense*, he would think   
 that *Constitution* which was contrary to *his*  
*own, strange and surprizing, or unnatural*.  
 If the Observer had no *Affections* toward  
 others, and were disjoined from Mankind,  
 so as to have neither *Hopes* nor *Fears* from  
 their Actions, he would be indifferent about  
 their *Constitutions*, and have no *Desire* or  
*Preference* of one above another; tho' he  
 might see which were *advantageous* to them,  
 and which *pernicious*.

As to the second Argument, What means *The 2d Ob-*  
 [alike reasonable or good to the DEITY?] Does *jection,*  
 it mean, " that the DEITY could have had *that all*  
 " no *Reasons* exciting him to make one *Constitu-*  
 " Constitution rather than another?" 'Tis *have been*  
 plain, if the DEITY had nothing *essential* *alike reason-*  
*to his Nature*, resembling or analogous to *favoured.*  
 our *sweetest* and *most kind Affections*, we can  
 scarce suppose he could have any *Reason* ex-  
 citing him to any thing he has done: but  
 grant such a *Disposition* in the DEITY, and  
 then the manifest *Tendency of the present*  
*Constitution to the Happiness of his Creatures*  
 was an exciting Reason for chusing it before  
 the contrary.\* Each sort of Constitution  
 might

\* A late Author on *the Foundation of Moral Goodness*, &c.  
 p. 9. thus argues: " If such a Disposition is in the Deity, is

SECT. might have given Men an equal *immediate*

I. *Pleasure* in present *Self-Approbation* for any  
 ~~~~~ sort of Action; but the Actions approved  
 by the *present Sense*, procure all *Pleasures* of
 the *other Senses*; and the Actions which
 would have been approved by a *contrary*
moral

“ it a Perfection, or is it not? is it better than the contrary,
 “ more worthy of his Nature, more agreeable to his other
 “ Perfections? If not, let us not ascribe it to him: If it be,
 “ then for what Reason, Account, or Ground is it better?
 “ That Reason, Account, or Ground, must be the Founda-
 “ tion of moral Goodness. If there be no Reason why it is
 “ better, then God is acted by a blind unaccountable Im-
 “ pulse.” In Answer, one may first ask the precise Meaning
 of these vague Words, *Perfection*, *Betterness*, *Worthiness*, *A-*
greement. If these Terms denote “ whatever makes the Be-
 “ ing possessed of them happier, than he would be without
 “ them;” then, 1. It is plain, kind Dispositions are Perfe-
 ctions to Men in our present Frame; are better for us than the
 contrary, and agree better with our other Powers; *i. e.* they
 tend to preserve them, and procure us many Enjoyments.
 2. Our apprehending such Dispositions in God, according to
 our Frame makes us esteem and love him. 3. Our Knowledge
 of God is so imperfect, that it is not easy to prove that such
 Dispositions tend to make or preserve him happy, or to pro-
 cure him other Enjoyments. And yet, 4. We may have
 good Reason, Ground, or Evidence, from his Works and Ad-
 ministration to believe him Benevolent. 5. If he has real
 Good-will to his Creatures, their Perfection or Happiness is
 to him an ultimate End, intended without farther View or
 Reason: And yet, 6. He is not *acted by a blind Impulse*: the
 ultimate End is known to him, and the best Means chosen;
 which never happen in what we call blind Impulses; unless
 one calls *willing any ultimate End* a blind Impulse. For thus
 each Man should desire his own Happiness by a blind Impulse:
 And God’s willing to regard the *Fitness of Things*, must be a
 blind Impulse, unless he have a *prior Reason* why he wills
 what his Understanding represents as *fit*, rather than what
 is *unfit*; for his Understanding represents both. And there
 must be a *prior Fitness* or *Reasonableness* that he should will
 what

moral Sense, would have been productive of S E C T.
all *Torments of the other Senses*.
I.



IF it be meant, that “ *upon this Supposition, that all our Approbation pre-supposes in us a moral Sense, the DEITY could not have approved one Constitution more than another :*” where is the Consequence? Why may not the Deity have something of a superior Kind, analogous to our *moral Sense*, essential to him? How does any Constitution of the *Senses of Men* hinder the DEITY to reflect and judge of his own Actions? How does it affect the divine Apprehension, which way soever *moral Ideas* arise with Men?

IF it means “ *that we cannot approve one Constitution more than another, or approve the DEITY for making the present Constitution :*” This Consequence is also false. The *present Constitution* of our *moral Sense* determines us to approve all *kind Affections*:


what is *fit*, and a yet prior *Fitness* that he should regard the *Fitness* of willing what is fit, and so on.

If in these Questions is meant, not by what Argument do we prove that the Deity is benevolent? but, “ what is the “ efficient Cause of that Disposition in God?” Those Gentlemen must answer for us, who tell us also of the *Reason or Ground of the Divine Existence*; and that not as a Proof that he does exist, or the *Causa Cognoscendi*, as the Schoolmen speak; but the *Causa Effendi* of that Being which they acknowledge uncaused and independent. See Dr. Sam. Clarke's *Boyle's Lectures*.

SECT. This Constitution the DEITY must have
 I. foreseen as *tending* to the *Happiness* of his
 ~~~~~ Creatures; it does therefore evidence *kind*  
*Affection* or *Benevolence* in the DEITY, this  
 therefore we must *approve*.

The mean-  
 ing of an-  
 tecedent  
 Reasona-  
 bleness.

WE have got some strange Phrases, "*that*  
 " *some things are antecedently reasonable in*  
 " *the Nature of the thing,*" which some in-  
 sist upon: "That otherwise, say they, if  
 " before Man was created, any Nature  
 " *without a moral Sense* had existed, this  
 " Nature would not have approved as mo-  
 " rally good in the Deity, his constituting  
 " our Sense as it is at present." Very true;  
 and what next? If there had been no *moral*  
*Sense* in that Nature, there would have been  
 no *Perception of Morality*. But "could not  
 " such Natures have seen something *reaso-*  
 " *nable* in one Constitution more than in  
 " another?" They might no doubt have  
*reasoned* about the various *Constitutions*, and  
 foreseen that the *present* one would tend to  
 the *Happiness* of Mankind, and would evi-  
 dence *Benevolence* in the DEITY; So also  
 they might have *reasoned* about the *contrary*  
*Constitution*, that it would make Men mise-  
 rable, and evidence *Malice* in the Deity.  
 They would have *reasoned* about *both*, and  
 found out *Truths*: are both Constitutions  
 alike *reasonable* to these Observers? No, say  
 they, "the *benevolent* one is *reasonable*, and  
 " the

“ the *malicious unreasonable* :” And yet these SECT.  
 Observers *reasoned* and *discovered Truths* I.  
 about both: An ACTION then is called by us   
*reasonable* when it is *benevolent*, and *unrea-*  
*sonable* when *malicious*. This is plainly mak-  
 ing the Word *reasonable* denote whatever  
 is *approved* by our moral Sense, without Re-  
 lation to true *Propositions*. We often use  
 that Word in such a confused Manner; But  
 these *antecedent Natures*, supposed without  
 a *moral Sense*, would not have *approved* one  
 Constitution of the DEITY as *morally* better  
 than another.

HAD it been left to the Choice of these  
*antecedent Minds*, what *manner of Sense* they  
 would have desired for Mankind, would  
 they have seen no *difference*? Yes they  
 would, according to their *Affections* which  
 are pre-supposed in all *Election*. If they  
 were *benevolent*, as we suppose the DEITY,  
 the *Tendency of the present Sense to the Hap-*  
*pinefs of Men* would have excited their  
 Choice. Had they been *malicious*, as we  
 suppose the Devil, the *contrary Tendency* of  
 the *contrary Sense* would have excited their  
*Election* of it. But is there nothing *prefera-*  
*ble*, or *eligible* antecedently to all *Affections*  
 too? No certainly, unless there can be *De-*  
*sire* without *Affections*, or *superior Desire*,  
*i. e.* Election antecedently to all *Desire*.

SECT. SOME farther perplex this Subject, by as-

I.serting, that " the same *Reasons* determining  
 ~~~~~ " *Approbation*, ought also to excite to *Ele-*  
Reasons for " *ction.*" Here, 1. We often see *justifying*
Ele.Tion *Reasons* where we can have no *Election* ;
different *viz.* when we observe the *Actions of others*,
from those which were even prior to our *Existence*.
for Appro- 2. The *Quality* moving us to *Election* very
bation. often cannot excite *Approbation* ; *viz. pri-*
uate usefulness, not publickly pernicious.
 This both does and *ought* to move *Election*,
 and yet I believe few will say, " they ap-
 " *prove* as virtuous the *eating a Bunch of*
 " *Grapes*, taking a *Glass of Wine*, or *sitting*
 " *down* when one is tired. *Approbation* is
 not what we can *voluntarily* bring upon our-
 selves. When we are contemplating *Actions*,
 we do not *chuse* to approve, because *Appro-*
bation is pleasant ; otherwise we would al-
 ways approve, and never condemn any *Ac-*
tion ; because this is some way uneasy. *Ap-*
probation is plainly a *Perception* arising with-
 out previous *Volition*, or *Choice* of it, be-
 cause of any *concomitant Pleasure*. The
 Occasion of it is the *Perception of benevolent*
Affections in ourselves, or the discovering
 the like in others, even when we are inca-
 pable of any *Action* or *Election*. The *Rea-*
sons determining *Approbation* are such as
 shew that an *Action* evidenced *kind Affe-*
ctions, and that in *others*, as often as in *our-*
selves.

selves. Whereas, the Reasons moving to S E C T.
Election are such as shew the *Tendency of* I.
an Action to gratify some Affection in the ~~~
Agent.

THE *Prospect* of the Pleasure of *Self-Approbation*, is indeed often a Motive to *chuse* one Action rather than another; but this supposes the *moral Sense*, or Determination to *approve*, prior to the *Election*. Were Approbation *voluntarily* chosen, from the Prospect of its concomitant Pleasure, then there could be no *Condemnation* of our own Actions, for that is unpleasant.

As to that confused Word [ought] it is needless to apply to it again all that was said about *Obligation*.

S E C T. II.


*Concerning that Character of Virtue
and Vice, The Fitness or Unfitness
of Actions.*

S E C T. II. **W**E come next to examine some other
 Explications of Morality, which
 have been much insisted on of late. * We
 are told, “ that there are *eternal and immu-*
table Differences of Things, absolutely
 “ and antecedently: that there are also *eter-*
nal and unalterable Relations in the Na-
 “ tures of the Things themselves, from
 “ which arise *Agreements and Disagree-*
ments, Congruities and Incongruities, Fit-
ness and Unfitness of the *Application of*
 “ *Circumstances*, to the *Qualifications of*
 “ *Persons*; that Actions *agreeable to these*
 “ *Relations* are *morally Good*, and that the
 “ *contrary Actions* are *morally Evil*.” These
 Expressions are sometimes made of the same
 Import with those more common ones:
 “ *acting agreeably to the eternal Reason and*
 “ *Truth of Things*.” It is asserted, that

*The Fitness
and Unfit-
ness in Mo-
rals.*

* See Dr. *Samuel Clarke's Boyle's Lectures*; and many late
 Authors.

“ God

“ God who knows all these *Relations*, &c. S E C T.
 “ does guide his Actions by them, since he II.
 “ has no wrong Affection” the (Word 
 [wrong] should have been first explained):
 “ and that in like manner these *Relations*,
 “ &c. *ought*” (another unlucky Word in
 Morals) “ to determine the *Choice* of all
 “ Rationals, abstractly from any *Views* of
 “ *Interest*. If they do not, these Creatures
 “ are insolently *counteracting their Creator*,
 “ and as far as they can, *making things to*
 “ *be what they are not*, which is the great-
 “ est Impiety.”

THAT Things are now *different* is certain. That *Ideas*, to which there is no *Object* yet existing conformable, are also *different*, is certain. That upon comparing two *Ideas* there arises a *relative Idea*, generally when the two Ideas compared have in them any *Modes of the same simple Idea*, is also obvious. Thus every *extended Being* may be compared to any other of the same *Kinds of Dimensions*; and *relative Ideas* be formed of *greater, less, equal, double, triple, subduple*, &c. with infinite variety. This may let us see that Relations are not *real Qualities* inherent in external Natures, but only *Ideas* necessarily accompanying our *Perception* of two Objects at once, and comparing them. *Relative Ideas* continue, when the external Objects do not exist, provided
 we

SECT. we retain the *two Ideas*. But what the *eternal Relations*, in the Natures of Things do mean, is not so easy perhaps to be conceived.

Three sorts
of Relations
considered.

To shew particularly how far *Morality* can be concerned in *Relations*, we may consider them under these Three Classes. 1. The *Relations of inanimate Objects*, as to their *Quantity*, or *active* and *passive Powers*, as explained by Mr. *Locke*. 2. The *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*, as to their *active* or *passive Powers*. 3. The *Relations of rational Agents among themselves* founded on their *Powers* or *Actions* past or continued. Now let us examine what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from any of these *Sorts of Relations*, in which the *Morality* of *Actions* may consist; and whether we can place *Morality* in them, without presupposing a *moral Sense*. It is plain, that ingenious Author says nothing against the Supposition of a *moral Sense*: But many imagine, that his Account of moral Ideas is independent upon a *moral Sense*, and therefore are less willing to allow that we have such an immediate Perception, or *Sense* of *Virtue* and *Vice*. What follows is not intended to oppose his Scheme, but rather to suggest what seems a necessary Explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise intelligible

gible, but upon Supposition of a *moral* S E C T.
Sense. II.



I. RELATIONS of *inanimate Objects* being known, puts it in the Power of a rational Agent often to *diversify* them, to *change* their *Forms*, *Motions* or *Qualities* of any kind, at his pleasure: but no body apprehends any *Virtue* or *Vice* in such Actions, where no *Relation* is apprehended to a *rational* or *sensitive Being's Happiness* or *Misery*; otherwise we should have got into the Class of *Virtues* all the practical *Mathematicks* and the *Operations of Chymistry*.

None of
 them ex-
 plain Mo-
 rality
 without a
 Sense.


2. As to the *Relations of inanimate Objects to rational Agents*; the Knowledge of them equally puts it in one's Power to *destroy Mankind*, as to preserve them. Without presupposing *Affections*, this Knowledge will not excite to one Action rather than another; nor without a *moral Sense* will it make us approve any Action more than its contrary. The Relation of *Corn* to human Bodies being known to a Person of *kind Affections*, was perhaps the *exciting Reason* of teaching Mankind *Husbandry*: But the Knowledge of the *Relations of Arsenick* would excite a *malicious Nature*, just in the same manner, to the greatest *Mischief*. A *Sword*, an *Halter*, a *Musket*, bear the *same Relation* to the Body of an *Hero*, which they
 do

SECT. do to a *Robber*. The killing of either is e-

II. qually agreeable to *these Relations*, but not equally good. The Knowledge of *these Relations* neither excites to Actions, nor justifies them, without presupposing either *Affections* or a *moral Sense*. Kind *Affections* with such Knowledge makes *Heroes*; malicious *Affections*, *Villains*.

3. THE last sort of *Relations* is that among *rational Agents*, founded on their *Actions* or *Affections*; whence one is called *Creator*, another *Creature*; one *Benefactor*, the other *Beneficiary* (if that Word may be used in this general Sense;) the one *Parent*, the other *Child*; the one *Governour*, the other *Subject*, &c. Now let us see what *Fitnesses* or *Unfitnesses* arise from these *Relations*.

THERE is certainly, independently of *Fancy* or *Custom*, a *natural Tendency* in some Actions to give *Pleasure*, either to the Agent or others; and a *contrary Tendency* in other Actions to give *Pain*, either to the Agent or others. This sort of *Relation* of Actions to the *Agents* or *Objects* is indisputable. If we call these *Relations Fitnesses*, then the most contrary Actions have *equal Fitnesses* for contrary Ends; and each one is *unfit* for the End of the *other*. Thus *Compassion* is *fit* to make *others happy*, and *unfit* to make others *miserable*. *Violation of Property*

Property is *fit* to make Men *miserable*, and *SECT.*
unfit to make them happy. Each of these II.
 is both *fit* and *unfit*. with respect to dif- 
 ferent Ends. The bare *Fitness* then to an
End, is not the Idea of moral Goodness.

PERHAPS the *virtuous Fitness* is that
 of *Ends*. The *Fitness* of a *subordinate End*
 to the ultimate, cannot constitute the *Action*
good, unless the *ultimate End* be good. To
keep a Conspiracy secret is not a good *End*,
 though it be fit for obtaining a farther *End*,
 the *Success of the Conspiracy*. The *moral*
Fitness must be that of the *ultimate End* it-
 self: The *publick Good* alone is a *fit End*,
 therefore the *Means* fit for this *End* alone
 are good.

WHAT means the *Fitness of an ultimate*
End? For what is it fit? Why, it is an
ultimate End, not fit for any thing farther,
 but *absolutely fit*. What means that Word
fit? If it notes a *simple Idea* it must be the
Perception of some Sense: thus we must re-
 cur, upon this Scheme too, to a *moral Sense*.*

* A late Author who pleads that *Wisdom* is chiefly em-
 ployed in choosing the ultimate Ends themselves, and that
Fitness is a proper Attribute of *ultimate Ends*, in answer to
 this short Question, "What are they fit for?" "answers,
 "they are fit to be approved by all rational Agents." Now
 his meaning of the word [*Approved*] is this, *discerned to be*
fit. His Answer then is "they are fit to be perceived fit."
 When Words are used at this rate one must lose his Labour in
 Replies to such Remarkers. See a Paper called *Wisdom* the
 sole Spring of Action in the Deity.

IF

SECT. IF Fitness be not a *simple Idea*, let it be

II. defined. Some tell us, that it is “ an *Agreement* of an *Affection*, *Desire*, *Action*, “ or *End*, to the *Relations of Agents*.” But what means *Agreement*? Which of these four Meanings has it? 1. We say one *Quantity* agrees with another of equal *Dimensions* every way. 2. A *Corollary* agrees with a *Theorem*; when our knowing the latter to be Truth, leads us to know that the former is also a *true Proposition*. 3. *Meat* agrees with that *Body* which it tends to *preserve*. 4. *Meat* agrees with the *Taste* of that Being in whom it raises a *pleasant Perception*. If any one of these are the Meanings of *Agreement* in the Definition, then one of these is the Idea of *Fitness*. 1. That an *Action* or *Affection* is of the same *Bulk* and *Figure* with the *Relation*. Or, 2. When the *Relation* is a *true Proposition*, so is the *Action* or *Affection*. Or, 3. The *Action* or *Affection* tends to *preserve* the *Relation*; and *contrary Actions* would destroy it: So that, for Instance, God would be no longer related to us as *Creator* and *Benefactor*, when we disobeyed him. Or, 4. The *Action* raises *pleasant Perceptions* in the *Relation*. All these Expressions seem absurd. †

THESE

† Several Gentlemen who have published Remarks or Answers to this Scheme, continue to use these words *Agreement*, *Conformity*,


THESE Gentlemen probably have some S E C T. other Meanings to these Words *Fitness* or II. *Agreement*. I hope what is said will shew the need for *Explication* of them, though they be so common. There is one Meaning perhaps intended, however it be obscurely expressed, "That certain *Affections* or " *Actions* of an Agent, standing in a certain *Relation* to other Agents, is approved " by every *Observer*, or raises in him a *grateful Perception*, or moves the Observer to " love the Agent." This Meaning is the same with the Notion of pleasing a *moral Sense*.

WHOEVER explains *Virtue* or *Vice* by *Justice* or *Injustice*, *Right* or *Wrong*, uses only more ambiguous Words, which will equally lead to acknowledge a *moral Sense*.

Conformity, *Congruity*, without complying with this just Request of explaining or fixing precisely the meaning of these words, which are manifestly ambiguous.

S E C T III.

Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue considered.

S E C T. III.  **M**R. WOOLASTON * has introduced a new Explication of *moral Virtue*, viz. *Significancy of Truth in Actions*, supposing that in every ACTION there is some *Significancy*, like that which *Moralists* and *Civilians* speak of in their *Tacit Conventions*, and *Quasi Contractus*!

Significa-
tion,
wherein it
consists.

THE Word *Signification* is very common, but a little Reflection will shew it to be very ambiguous. In *Signification of Words* these things are included: 1. An *Association of an Idea with a Sound*, so that when any *Idea* is formed by the Speaker, the *Idea of a Sound* accompanies it. 2. The *Sound perceived* by the Hearer excites the *Idea* to which it is connected. 3. In like manner a *Judgment* in the Speaker's Mind is accompanied with the *Idea of a Combination of Sounds*. 4. This *Combination of Sounds* heard raises the *Apprehension* of that *Judg-*

* In his *Religion of Nature delineated*.

ment in the Mind of the Hearer. Nothing farther than these Circumstances seems to be denoted by *Signification*. S E C T. III.



HEARING a Proposition does not of itself produce either *Assent* or *Dissent*, or *Opinion* in the Hearer, but only presents to his Apprehension the *Judgment*, or *Thema Complexum*. But the Hearer himself often forms *Judgments* or *Opinions* upon this occasion, either *immediately* without Reasoning, or by some short *Argument*. These *Opinions* are some one or more of the following *Propositions*. 1. *That a Sound is perceived, and a Judgment apprehended.* 2. *Such a Person caused the Sound heard.* 3. *The Speaker intended to excite in the Hearer the Idea of the Sound, and the Apprehension of the Judgment, or Thema Complexum.* This Judgment is not always formed by the Hearer, nor is it always true, when Men are heard speaking. 4. *The Speaker intended to produce Assent in the Hearer:* This Judgment is not always true. 5. *The Speaker assents to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment in the Hearer is often false, and is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's *Veracity*, or speaking what expresses his *Opinion* usually. 6. *The Speaker does not assent to the Proposition spoken:* This Judgment of the Hearer is often false, when what is spoken is every way true.

- S E C T. true. 7. *The Speaker intended that the Hear-
 III. er should believe or judge, "that the Proposi-
 ~~~~~ "tion spoken was assented to by the Speaker."*  
 8. *The Speaker had the contrary Intention, to  
 that supposed in the last Judgment: Both  
 these latter Judgments may be false, when  
 the Proposition spoken is every way true.*  
 9. *The Proposition spoken represents the Object  
 as it is, or is logically true.* 10. *The Proposi-  
 tion spoken does not represent the Object as it  
 is, or it is logically false.*

Morality  
 does not  
 consist in  
 Signifi-  
 cancy.

As to the first four *Circumstances* which make up the proper *Significancy* of Speech, 'tis scarce possible that any one should place *moral Good or Evil* in them. Whether the Proposition were *logically true or false*, the having a bare *Apprehension* of it as a *Thema Complexum*, or raising this in another, without intending to produce *Assent or Dissent*, can have no more *moral Good or Evil* in it, than the *Reception* of any other *Idea*, or raising it in another. This *Significancy of Falshood* is found in the very *Propositions* given in *Schools*, as *Instances of Falshood, Absurdity, Contradiction to Truth, or Blasphemy*. The pronouncing of which, are *Actions* signifying more properly than most of our other *Actions*; and yet no body condemns them as immoral.

Not in  
 Conclufi-  
 ons form-  
 ed by Hear-  
 ers.

As to the *Opinions* formed by the Hear-  
 er, they are all his own *Action* as much as  
 any

any other *Conclusion* or *Judgment* formed from *Appearances* of any sort whatsoever. S E C T. III.

They are *true* or *false*, according to the Sagacity of the *Observer*, or his *Caution*. The Hearer may form perfectly true *Opinions* or *Judgments*, when the *Speaker* is guilty of the basest *Fraud*; and may form *false Judgments*, when the *Speaker* is perfectly *innocent*, and spoke nothing *false* in any Sense.

THE Evils which may follow from the false *Judgments* of the Hearer, are no otherwise chargeable on the *Speaker*, than as the evil *Consequences* of another's *Action* of any kind may be chargeable upon any Person who *co-operated*; or, by his *Action*, or *Omission*, the *Consequence* of which he might have *foreseen*, did either actually *intend* this Evil, or *wanted that Degree of kind Affection*, which would have inclined him to have prevented it.

THE *Intention* of the *Speaker* is what all *Moralists* have hitherto imagined, the *Virtue* or *Vice* of Words did depend upon, and not the bare *Significancy* of Truth or Falshood. This *Intention* is either, 1. To lead the Hearer into a true or false *Opinion* about the *Sentiments* of the *Speaker*. 2. To make the Hearer assent to the *Proposition* spoken. Or, 3. Both to make the Hearer assent to the *Proposition*, and judge that the

The Moral-  
rality of  
Speech in  
the Inten-  
tion.

S 3                      Speaker

SECT. *Speaker also assents to it.* Or, 4. *To accomplish some End, by means of the Hearer's assent to the Proposition spoken.* This End may be known by the Speaker to be either *publickly useful* or *publickly hurtful*.

SOME Moralists \* of late have placed all *Virtue in Speech* in the *Intention* of the last kind, *viz.* accomplishing some publickly useful End, by speaking either *logical Truth* or *Falshood*: and that all *Vice* in speaking, consists in intending to effect something *publickly hurtful* by Speech, whether *logically true* or *false*, and known to be such; or by using Speech in a manner which we may foresee would be *publickly hurtful*, whether we actually *intend* this evil Consequence or not. Some stricter *Moralists* assert that the *publick Evils* which would ensue from destroying mutual Confidence, by allowing to speak *Propositions known to be false* on any occasion, are so great, that no particular *Advantage* to be expected from speaking *known logical Falshoods*, can ever over-balance them; that all use of Speech supposes a *tacit Convention of Sincerity*, the *Violation* of which is always evil. Both sides in this Argument agree, that the *moral Evil* in Speech consists either in some *direct malicious Intention*, or a *Tendency to the publick Detriment* of

\* Barberac's *Notes on Puffendorf*, Lib. iv. c. 1, 7.

Society; which Tendency the Agent might have *foreseen*, as connected with his Action, had he not *wanted* that Degree of good *Affections* which makes Men *attentive* to the Effects of their Actions. Never was bare *Significancy of Falshood* made the Idea of *moral Evil*. Speaking *logical Falshood* was still looked upon as innocent in many cases. Speaking *contrary to Sentiment*, or *moral Falshood*, was always proved Evil, from some *publicly hurtful Tendency*, and not supposed as evil *immediately*, or the same Idea with *Vice*. The *Intention to deceive* was the Foundation of the Guilt. This Intention the Speaker studies to *conceal*, and does not *signify* it: It is an *Act of the Will*, neither *signified* by his Words, nor itself *signifying* any thing else.

THIS Point deserved Consideration, because if any Action be *significant*, it is certainly the *Act of Speaking*: And yet even in this the *Virtue* is not the *signifying of Truth*, nor the *Vice* the *signifying Falshood*.

THE Signification of some Actions depends upon a like Association of Ideas with them, made either by Nature, or arbitrarily, and by Custom, as with Sounds. Letters are by Custom the Signs of Sounds. A Scream or Groan is a natural Sign of Fear or Pain: A Motion of the Hand or Head may signify

SECT. *Assent, Dissent, or Desire. The cutting down tall Poppies was an answer: The sending Spurs, advice to Flight: Kindling many Fires raises the Opinion of an Encampment: Raising a Smoke will raise Opinion of Fire.*

Three Sorts  
of Signify-  
ing.

THE most important Distinction of Signs is this, that \* 1. "Some *Appearances* are the "Occasion upon which an Observer, by his "own Reasoning, forms a Judgment, without supposing, or having reason to believe, that the *Agent*, who caused these "Appearances, did it with *design to communicate his Sentiments* to others; or when "the Actions are such as are usually done "by the Agents, without *professing a Design to raise Opinions* in Observers. 2. Some "Actions are never used but with *professed Design* to convey the *Opinions of the Agent* to the *Observer*; or such as the *Observer* infers nothing from, but upon having *reason* to believe that the *Causar* of "the Appearance *intended to convey some Sentiment to the Observer.*" 3. Other Signs are used, when "the *Signifier* gives "no Reason to conclude any other *Intention*, but only to raise an *Apprehension of the Judgment, or the Thema Complexum*, "without *professing any Design to communi-*

\* See Grotius de Jure Bell. Lib. 3. c. 1.

“ *cate his Sentiments*, or to produce any *Af-* S E C T.  
 “ *sent* in the Observer. III.




To do Actions from which the Observer will form *false Opinions*, while yet the Agent is not understood to *profess any Intention of communicating to him his Opinions or Designs*, is never of itself imagined *evil*, let the Signs be *natural* or *instituted*; provided there be no *malicious Intention*, or *neglect of publick Good*. It is never called a Crime in a *Teacher*, to pronounce an *absurd Sentence* for an instance; in a *Nobleman*, to travel without *Coronets*; or a *Clergyman* in *Lay-habit*, for private Conveniency, or to avoid troublesome Ceremony; to *leave Lights in a Lodge*, to make People conclude there is a *Watch kept*. This *Significancy* may be in any Action which is observed; but as *true Conclusions* argue no *Virtue* in the Agent, so *false ones* argue no *Vice*.

RAISING *false Opinions* designedly by the *second Sort* of Signs, which reasonably lead the Observer to conclude a *Profession of communicating Sentiments*, whether the Signs be *customary*, *instituted*, or *natural*, is generally *evil*, when the Agent knows the *Falshood*; since it tends to diminish *mutual Confidence*. To *send Spurs* to a Friend, whom the *Sender* imagines to be in no danger, to deceive by *Hieroglyphicks* or *Painting*, is as criminal

SECT. III. nal as a *false Letter*. This *Significancy* occurs in very few human *Actions*: Some of the most important *Virtues* profess no *design* of communicating *Sentiments*, or raising *Opinions* either true or false: Nor is there any more *Intention* in some of the most *vicious Actions*. Again, who can imagine *Virtue*, in all *Actions*, where there is this *Significancy of Truth* with *Intention*? Is it *Virtue* to say at *Christmas*, that “the Mornings are sharp?” to *beckon with the hand*, in sign of *Assent* to such an *Assertion*? And in *false Propositions* thus signified by *Actions* or *Words*, there is no *Evil* apprehended where the *Falseness* is only *logical*. When the *Falseness* is known by the *Agent*, the *Evil* is not imagined in the *Significancy*, but in doing what one may foresee tends to breed *Distrust in Society*. And did all *moral Evil* consist in *moral Falseness*, there could be no *Sins of Ignorance*. If Mr. *Woolaston* alledges, that “*Ignorance of some things signifies this Falseness, viz. ‘We are not obliged to know the Truth:’*” This *Falseness* is not signified with *Intention*; nor is it *moral Falseness*, but only *logical*: since no *Man* in an *Error* knows that “*he is obliged to know the contrary Truth,*” Mr. *Woolaston*’s use of the *Words* [ought] or [obliged] without a distinct *Meaning*, is not peculiar to this *Place*.



THE third sort of *Significancy of fals-* SECT.  
*hood* is never apprehended as *morally Evil*: III.  
 if it were, then every *Dramatick Writer*   
 drawing *evil Characters*, every *History*  
*Painter*, every *Writer of Allegories*, or *E-*  
*picks*, every *Philosopher* teaching the Nature  
 of *contradictory Propositions*, would be  
 thought criminal.

BUT since only the *first sort of Signifi-* Signifi-  
*cancy* can be in all Actions, and that too *cancy dif-*  
 supposing that every Action whatsoever is *ferent from*  
*observed* by some Being or other: Let us *the Mora-*  
 see if this will account for *Morality*. Per-  
 haps either, 1st, "Every Action is good  
 " which leads the Observer into *true Opini-*  
 " *ons* concerning the *Sentiments of the A-*  
 " *gent*, whether the *Agent's Opinions* be  
 " *true or false.*" Or, 2dly. "That Action  
 " is good which leads the Observer into *true*  
 " *Opinions concerning the Object, the Ten-*  
 " *dency of the Action, and the Relation be-*  
 " *tween the Agent and the Object.*"

DID *Virtue* consist in this *first sort of Sig-*  
*nificancy* of Truth, it would depend not up-  
 on the *Agent* but the *Sagacity of the Obser-*  
*ver*: The acute Penetration of one would  
 constitute an *Action virtuous*, and the Rash-  
 ness or Stupidity of another would make it  
*vicious*: and the most *barbarous Actions*  
 would

SECT. would raise no *false Opinion of the Sentiments of the Agent*, in a judicious Observer.

THE second sort of Significancy would also make *Virtue* consist in the *Power of Observers*. An exact Reasoner would receive no *false Opinion* from the worst Action concerning the *Object* or *Relation* of the Agent to it: And a *false Opinion* might be formed by a weak Observer of a *perfectly good Action*.—An Observer who knew an Agent to have the *basest Temper*, would not from his worst Action conclude any thing *false* concerning the *Object*: And all such *false Opinions* would arise only upon Supposition that *the Agent was virtuous*.

BUT may it not be said, that “ whether  
 “ Men reason well about Actions or not,  
 “ there are some *Conclusions really deducible from every Action*? It is a *Datum*  
 “ from which something may be inferred  
 “ by *just Consequence*, whether any one actually infers it or not. Then may not  
 “ this *Quality* in Actions, whether we call  
 “ it *Significancy* or not, *that only true Propositions can be inferred from them*  
 “ by *just Reasoning*, be *moral Goodness*?  
 “ And may it not be the *very Idea* of *moral Evil* in Actions, that *some false Con-*  
 “ *clusions*

“ *clussions can by just Consequence, be de-* S E C T.  
 “ *duced from them?*” Or if we will not al- III.  
 low these to be the *very Ideas* of moral Good  
 and Evil, “ are they not *universal just*  
 “ *Characters* to distinguish the one from the  
 “ other?”

ONE may here observe in general, that since the Existence of the Action is supposed to be a true *Premise* or *Datum*, no false Conclusion can possibly be inferred from it by *just Reasoning*. We could perhaps often justly infer, that the Agent had *false Opinions*; but then this Conclusion of the Observer, *viz.* “ that the Agent has false Opinions” is really true.

BUT again, it will not make an *univer-* True Con-  
*sal Character* of good Actions, that a just clussions  
 Reasoner would infer from them, that *deducible*  
 “ *the Opinions of the Agent are true.*” *from Ac-*  
 For it is thus Men must reason from Ac- *tions, no*  
 tions; *viz. When the Constitution of Na-* just Cha-  
*ture, the Affections of Agents, and the Ac-* racter of  
*tion, are given, to conclude concerning the O-* Virtue.  
*pinions:* Or more generally given any three  
*of these to conclude the forth.* Thus sup-  
 pose the “ *Constitution of Nature such,*  
 “ *that the private Interest of each Indi-*  
 “ *vidual is connected with the publick*  
 “ *Good:*” Suppose an Agent’s Affections  
*selfish only, then from a publickly useful*  
*Action*

SECT. *Action* we infer, that “ *the Agent’s Opinions are true:*” And from a *publicly hurtful Action* conclude his *Opinions* to be false.

THE same *Constitution* supposed with *publick Affections* as well as *selfish*. The observing a *kind or publickly useful Action*, will not immediately infer, that the *Agent’s Opinions* are either *true* or *false*: With false *Opinions* he might do *publickly useful Actions* out of his *publick Affections*, in those cases wherein they are not apparently opposite to his *Interest*. A *publick Action* opposite to some present *private Interest*, would generally evidence *true Opinions*; or if the *Opinions were false*, that his *publick Affections* were in this Case much stronger than his *Self-Love*. A cruel *Action* would indeed evidence *false Opinions*, or a very violent unkind *Passion*.

SUPPOSE the same *Constitution* in all other respects, with *malicious Affections* in an Agent. A *cruel or ungrateful Action* would not always prove the *Opinions of the Agent to be false*; but only that his *Malice* in this instance, was more violent than regard to his *Interest*. A *beneficent Action* would prove only one of these two, either that his *Opinions of the Constitution* were true; or, that if  
he

he was mistaken about the *Constitution*, he S E C T.  
 had also a *false Opinion* of the natural Ten- III.  
 dency of the Action. Thus *false Opinions* ~~~~~  
 may be evidenced by contrary Actions.

SUPPOSE “ a *Constitution* wherein a *private Interest* could be advanced in *Opposition* to the *publick*” (this we may call an *evil Constitution*;) Suppose only *Self-Love* in the Agent, then a *publickly useful Action*, any way *toilsome* or *expensive* to the Agent, would evidence *false Opinions*: And the most *cruel selfish Actions* would evidence *true Opinions*.

IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *kind Affections* in the Agent; a *publickly useful Action* would not certainly argue either *true* or *false Opinions*. If his *Opinions* were true, but *kind Affections* stronger than *Self-Love*, he might act in the same manner, as if his *Opinions* were false, and *Self-Love* the *reigning Affection*.


IN an *evil Constitution*, suppose *malicious Affections* in an Agent, all *publickly useful Actions* would argue *false Opinions*; and *publickly hurtful Actions* would argue *true ones*.

THIS

SECT. THIS may shew us that Men's Actions  
 III. are generally *publickly useful*, when they  
 ~~~~~ have *true Opinions*, only on this account ;  
 that we neither have *malicious Affections* nat-
 urally, nor is there any probability, in our
 present *Constitution*, of promoting a *private*
Interest separately from, or in Opposition to
 the *Publick*. Were there contrary *Affe-*
ctions and a contrary *Constitution*, the most
 cruel Actions might flow from *true Opini-*
ons ; and consequently *publickly useful Ac-*
tions might flow from false ones.

How far it
 is a Cha-
 racter of
 Virtue,
 that it
 flows from
 true Opi-
 nions.

IN our *present Constitution*, it is probable
 no Person would ever do any thing publick-
 ly hurtful, but upon some false Opinion.
 The *flowing from true Opinions* is indeed a to-
 lerable Character or Property of *Virtue*, and
flowing from some false Opinion a tolerable
 Character of *Vice* ; tho' neither be strictly
 universal. But, 1. This is not *proper Sig-*
nification. A judicious Observer never ima-
 gines any *Intention to communicate Opinions*
 in some of the most important Actions, ei-
 ther good or evil. 2. Did an Action *signify*
Falshood, it is generally only *logical*. 3. The
false Opinion in the Agent is not the *Quality*
 for which the evil Action is *condemned* ; nor
 is the *true Opinion* that for which the good
 Action is *approved*. True Opinions in A-
 gents

gents often *aggravate* Crimes, as they shew S E C T.
 higher Degrees of *evil Affection*, or total III.
Absence of good. And *false Opinions* gene- 
 rally *extenuate* Crimes, unless when the ve-
 ry Ignorance or Error has flowed from *evil*
Affection, or total *Absence of good*.

IT is surprizing, for instance, how any should place the *Evil* of *Ingratitude* in *denying* the Person injured, to have been a *Benefactor*. The Observer of such an Action, if he supposed the Agent had really that *false Opinion*, would think the Crime the less for it: But if he were convinced that the Agent had a *true Opinion*, he would think his *Ingratitude* the more *odious*. Where we most abhor Actions, we suppose often *true Opinions*: And sometimes admire Actions flowing even from *false Opinions*, when they have evidenced no *want* of good Affection.

TO write a Censure upon a Book so well designed as Mr. *Woolaston's*, and so full of very good Reasoning upon the most useful Subjects, would not evidence much *good Nature*. But allowing him his *just Praise*, to remark any *Ambiguities* or *Inadvertencies* which may lead Men into Confusion in their Reasoning, I am confident would have been acceptable to a Man of so much Goodness, when he was living.

T

ONE

S E C T. ONE may see that he has had some other
 III. Idea of *moral Good*, previous to this *Signi-*
 ~~~~~ *ficancy of Truth*, by his introducing, in the  
 very Explication of it, Words pre-supposing  
 the *Ideas of Morality* previously known:  
 Such as [*Right*,] [*Obligation*,] [*Lye*,] [*his*]  
 denoting [*Property*.]

Signifying  
 of Truth  
 equal in  
 unequal  
 Virtue.


MR. *Woolaston* acknowledges that there  
 may be very little *evil* in some Actions signi-  
 fying *Falshood*; such as *throwing away*  
*that which is of but little Use or Value*. It  
 is objected to him, that there is equal *Con-*  
*trariety to Truth* in such Actions, as in the  
 greatest *Villany*: He, in answer to it, really  
 unawares gives up his whole Cause. He  
 must own, that there may be the *strictest*  
*Truth* and *Certainty* about Trifles; so there  
 may be the most *obvious Falshood* signified  
 by *trifling Actions*. If then *Significancy of*  
*Falshood* be the very same with *moral Evil*,  
 all Crimes must be equal. He answers, that  
*Crimes* increase according to the *Importance*  
 of the Truth denied; and so the *Virtue* in-  
 creases, as the *Importance* of the Truths af-  
 firmed. Then

*Virtue* and *Vice* increase, as the *Importance*  
 of Propositions affirmed or denied;

But



But *Signification of Truth and Falshood* does SECT.  
not so increafe: III.


Therefore *Signification of Truth or Falshood*,   
are not the same with *Virtue and Vice*.

BUT what is this *Importance of Truth*?  
Nothing else but the *Moment* or *Quantity* of  
good or evil, either *private* or *publick*, which  
should be produced by *Actions*, concerning  
which these *true Judgments* are made. But  
it is plain, the *Signification* of *Truth* or  
*Falshood* is not varied by this *Importance*;  
therefore *Virtue* or *Vice* denote something  
different from this *Signification*.

BUT farther, The *Importance* of *Actions*  
toward publick Good or Evil, is not the  
*Idea of Virtue* or *Vice*: Nor does the one  
prove *Virtue* in an *Action*, any farther than  
it evidences *kind Affections*; or the other  
*Vice*, farther than it evidences either *Malice*  
or *Want* of *kind Affections*: Otherwise a  
*casual Invention*, an *Action* wholly from  
*views of private Interest*, might be as vir-  
tuous as the most *kind* and *generous Offices*:  
And *Chance-Medley*, or *kindly-intended*, but  
*unsuccessful Attempts* would be as *vicious* as  
*Murder* or *Treason*.

ONE of Mr. *Woolaston's Illustrations* that Some Am-  
*Significancy of Falshood* is the *Idea* of moral biguities in  
Mr. Woo-  
Evil, llaston.

SECT. Evil, ends in this, “ ’Tis *acting a Lye.*”


III. What then? Should he not first have shewn  
 what was *moral Evil*, and that every Lye  
 was such?

ANOTHER Illustration or Proof is, that  
 “ *it is acting contrary to that Reason which*  
 “ *God has given us as the Guide of our Ac-*  
 “ *tions.*” Does not this place the original  
 Idea of *moral Evil* in *counteracting the DE-*  
*ITY*, and not in *signifying Falshood*? But,  
 he may say, “ *Counteracting the DEITY*  
 “ *denies him to be our Benefactor, and sig-*  
 “ *nifies Falshood.*” Then why is *signifying*  
*Falshood* evil? Why, it is *counteracting the*  
*DEITY*, who gave us Reason for our Guide.  
 Why is this evil again? It denies the Truth,  
 that “ *he is our Benefactor.*”

ANOTHER Illustration is this, “ That *sig-*  
 “ *nifying Falshood is altering the Natures of*  
 “ *Things, and making them be what they are*  
 “ *not, or desiring at least to make them be*  
 “ *what they are not.*” If by altering the  
*Natures* be meant *destroying Beings*, then  
*moral Evil* consists in *desiring the Destruction*  
*of other Natures*, or in *Evil Affections*. If  
 what is meant be *altering the Laws of Na-*  
*ture*, or *desiring that they were stopped*;  
 this is seldom desired by any but *Madmen*,  
 nor is this *Desire* evidenced by some of the  
 worst

worst Actions, nor is *such Desire* always criminal; otherwise it were as great a Crime as any, to wish, when a *Dam* was broken down, that the Water would not overflow the Country. S E C T. III.

IF *making Things be what they are not*, means “ attempting or desiring that any Subject should have two *opposite Qualities* “ *at once*, or a *Quality* and its *Privation* ;” it is certain then, that according to the *Stoicks*, all *vicious Men are thoroughly mad*. But it is to be doubted, that such Madness never happened to even the *worst of Mankind*. When a Man *murders*, he does not desire his *Fellow-Creature* to be both *dead* and *living*. When he *robs*, he does not desire that both *he* and the *Proprietor* should at the *same time* possess. If any says, that he desires to have a *Right* to that, to which another has a *Right* ; it is probably false, Robbers neither think of *Rights* at all, nor are solicitous about acquiring them: Or, if they retain some *wild Notions of Rights*, they think their *Indigence*, *Conquest* or *Courage* gives them a *Right*, and makes the other's *Right* to *cease*. If *attempting to make old Qualities or Rights give place to new*, be the *Idea of moral Evil*, then every *Artificer*, *Purchaser*, or *Magistrate invested with an Office* is criminal.

SECT. MANY of Mr. *Woolaston's* Propositions  
 III. contradicted by Actions, are about *Rights,*  
 *Duties, Obligation, Justice, Reasonableness.*  
 These are long Words, principal Names, or  
*Attributes* in Sentences. The little Word  
 [his,] or the Particles [*as, according*] are  
 much better: they may escape Observation,  
 and yet may include all the Ambiguities of  
*Right, Property, Agreement, Reasonableness:*  
 “*Treating Things as they are, and not as*  
 “*they are not:*” Or, “*According to what*  
 “*they are, or are not,*” are Expressions he  
 probably had learned from another truly  
 great Name, who has not explained them  
 sufficiently.

*In Quasi*  
*Contracts,*  
*or Tacit,*  
*no Signifi-*  
*cation of*  
*Truth.*

IT may perhaps not seem improper on  
 this occasion to observe, that in the *Quasi*  
*Contractus*, the *Civilians* do not imagine any  
 Act of the Mind of the *Person obliged* to be  
 really signified, but by a sort of *Fictio juris*  
 supposing it, order him to act as if he had  
 contracted, even when they know that he  
 had *contrary Intentions.*

IN the *Tacit Conventions*, it is not a *Judg-*  
*ment* which is signified, but an *Act of the*  
*Will transferring Right*, in which there is  
 no Relation to *Truth or Falshood* of itself.  
 The *Non-performance of Covenants* is made  
*penal,*

*penal*, not because of their *signifying Fal-* S E C T.  
*shoods*, as if this were the Crime in them: III.

But it is necessary, in order to preserve *Com-*  
*merce* in any Society, to *make effectual* all  
*Declarations of Consent to transfer Rights* by  
any usual *Signs*, otherwise there could be no  
*Certainty* in Men's Transactions.

## S E C T. IV.

*Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense.*

S E C T. IV. **H**AD those who insist so much upon the *antecedent Reasonableness of Virtue*, told us distinctly what is *reasonable* or *provable* concerning it, many of our Debates had been prevented. Let us consider what *Truths* concerning Actions Men could desire to know, or prove by *Reason*. I fancy they may be reduced to these Heads. 1. "To know whether there are not *some Actions* or *Affections* which obtain the *Approbation* of any Spectator or Observer, and others move his *Dislike* and *Condemnation*?" This Question, as every Man can answer for himself, so *universal Experience* and *History* shew, that in all Nations it is so; and consequently the *moral Sense* is *universal*. 2. "Whether there be any particular *Quality*, which, wherever it is apprehended, gains *Approbation*, and the contrary raises *Disapprobation*?" We shall find this *Quality* to be *kind Affection*,  
or

*Truths  
about Mo-  
rals, four  
sorts.*

or Study of the Good of others; and thus S E C T. IV.  
 the *moral Senses* of Men are generally *uniform*. About these two Questions there is little reasoning; we know how to answer them from reflecting on our own *Sentiments*, or by consulting others. 3. "What Actions do really evidence kind Affections, or do really tend to the greatest publick Good?" About this Question is all the special Reasoning of those who treat of the particular *Laws of Nature*, or even of *Civil Laws*: This is the largest Field, and the most useful Subject of Reasoning, which remains upon every Scheme of *Morals*, and here we may discover as certain, invariable, or eternal Truths, as any in Geometry. 4. "What are the Motives which, even from Self-Love, would excite each Individual to do those Actions which are publicly useful?" It is probable indeed, no Man would approve as virtuous an Action publicly useful, to which the Agent was excited only by *Self-Love*, without any kind Affection: It is also probable that no view of Interest can raise that kind Affection, which we approve as virtuous; nor can any Reasoning do it, except that which shews some moral Goodness, or kind Affections in the Object; for this never fails, where it is observed or supposed in any Person to raise the Love of the Observer.

SECT. YET since all Men have naturally *Self-*  
 IV. *Love* as well as *kind Affections*, the former  
 ~~~~~ may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former; in each case the Agent is *uneasy*, and in some degree *unhappy*. The first *rash Views* of human Affairs often represent *private Interest* as opposite to the *Publick*: When this is apprehended, *Self-Love* may often engage Men in *publickly hurtful Actions*, which their *moral Sense* will condemn; and this is the ordinary Cause of Vice. To represent these Motives of *Self-Interest*, to engage Men to publickly useful Actions, is certainly the most necessary Point in Morals. This has been so well done by the *ancient Moralists*, by Dr. *Cumberland*, *Puffendorf*, *Grotius*, *Shaftesbury*; it is made so certain from the *divine Government* of the World, the *State of Mankind*, who cannot subsist without Society, from universal *Experience* and *Consent*, from *inward Consciousness* of the Pleasure of kind Affections, and *Self-Approbation*, and of the *Torments of Malice*, or *Hatred*, or *Envy*, or *Anger*; that no Man who considers these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible *Interest* in opposing the publick Good; or in checking or restraining his kind Affections; nay, if he had no *kind Affections*, his very *Self-Love* and Regard to his private Good might excite him to publickly


lickly useful Actions, and dissuade from the contrary.

S E C T.
IV.


WHAT farther should be provable concerning Virtue, whence it should be called *reasonable antecedently to all Affection*, or *Interest*, or *Sense*, or what it should be *fit* for, one cannot easily imagine.

PERHAPS what has brought the Epithet *Reasonable*, or *flowing from Reason*, in opposition to what flows from *Instinct*, *Affection*, or *Passion*, so much into use, is this, " That it is often observed, that the very
" best of our particular *Affections* or *Desires*, when they are grown violent and
" *passionate*, through the *confused Sensations*
" and *Propensities* which attend them, make
" us incapable of considering calmly the
" whole *Tendency* of our Actions, and lead
" us often into what is *absolutely pernicious*,
" under some Appearance of *relative* or
" *particular Good*." This indeed may give some ground for distinguishing between *passionate Actions*, and *those from calm Desire* or *Affection* which employs our *Reason* freely: But can never set *rational Actions* in Opposition to those from *Instinct*, *Desire* or *Affection*. And it must be owned, that the most perfect Virtue consists in the *calm*, *unpassionate Benevolence*, rather than in particular Affections.

IF

SECT. If one asks "how do we know that *our*

IV. "*Affections are right when they are kind?*"

~~~~~ What does the Word [right] mean? Does  
*How we* it mean *what we approve?* This we know  
*judge of our* by *Consciousness* of our *Sense*. Again, how  
*Moral* do we know that our *Sense* is right, or that  
*Sense.* we *approve our Approbation?* This can only be answered by another Question, *viz.*  
 "How do we know we are pleased when  
 "we are pleased?"—Or does it mean,  
 "how do we know that we shall *always* ap-  
 "prove what we *now* approve?" To answer  
 this, we must first know that the *same Con-*  
*stitution* of our *Sense* shall always remain :  
 And again, that we have applied ourselves  
 carefully to consider the *natural Tendency* of  
 our Actions. Of the *Continuance* of the  
 same Constitution of our *Sense*, we are as  
 sure as of the Continuance of *Gravitation*,  
 or any other *Law of Nature* : The *Tenden-*  
*cy* of our own Actions we cannot always  
 know ; but we may know certainly that we  
*heartily* and *sincerely* study to act according  
 to what, by all the Evidence now in our  
 Power to obtain, appears as most *probably*  
*tending to publick Good*. When we are con-  
 scious of this *sincere Endeavour*, the *evil*  
*Consequences* which we could not have fore-  
 seen, never will make us *condemn* our Con-  
 duct. But without this *sincere Endeavour*,

we

we may often approve at *present* what we shall *afterwards* condemn.

S E C T.  
IV.



IF the Question means, “ How are we  
“ sure that what *we* approve, *all others* shall  
“ also approve?” Of this we can be sure  
upon *no Scheme*; but it is highly probable  
that the *Senses* of all Men are pretty *uni-*  
*form*: That the DEITY also approves *kind*  
*Affections*, otherwise he would not have im-  
planted them in us, nor determined us by a  
*moral Sense* to approve them. Now since  
the *Probability* that Men shall judge *truly*,  
abstracting from any presupposed *Prejudice*,  
is greater than that *they* shall judge *falsly*;  
it is more probable, when our Actions are  
really *kind* and *publickly useful*, that *all Ob-*  
*servers* shall judge *truly* of our *Intentions*,  
and of the *Tendency* of our Actions, and  
consequently approve what *we* approve our-  
selves, than that they shall judge *falsly* and  
condemn them.

IF the Meaning of the Question be,  
“ Will the doing what our *moral Sense* ap-  
“ proves tend to *our Happiness*, and to the  
“ avoiding Misery?” It is thus we call a  
*Taste wrong*, when it makes that *Food* at  
present *grateful*, which shall occasion *fu-*  
*ture Pains*, or *Death*. This Question con-  
cerning our *Self-Interest* must be answered  
by such *Reasoning* as was mentioned above,

SECT. to be well managed by our *Moralists* both  
IV. ancient and modern.



THUS there seems no part of that *Reasoning* which was ever used by *Moralists*, to be superseded by supposing a *moral Sense*. And yet without a *moral Sense* there is no Explication can be given of our *Ideas of Morality*; nor of that *Reasonableness* supposed antecedent to all *Instincts*, *Affections*, or *Sense*.

“ But may there not be a *right* or *wrong*  
“ *State* of our *moral Sense*, as there is in  
“ our other *Senses*, according as they represent their Objects to be *as they really are*,  
“ or represent them otherwise?” So may not our *moral Sense* approve that which is *vicious*, and disapprove *Virtue*, as a *sickly Palate* may dislike *grateful Food*, or a *viti-ated Sight* misrepresent *Colours* or *Dimensions*? Must we not know therefore antecedently what is *morally Good* or *Evil* by our *Reason*, before we can know that our *moral Sense* is *right*?

To answer this, we must remember that of the *sensible Ideas*, some are allowed to be only *Perceptions* in our Minds, and not Images of any like *external Quality*, as *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, *Smells*, *Pleasure*, *Pain*. Other Ideas are Images of something *external*,

as *Duration, Number, Extension, Motion*, S E C T. *Rest*: These latter, for distinction, we may IV. call *concomitant Ideas of Sensation*, and the former *purely sensible*. As to the *purely sensible Ideas*, we know they are *altered* by any Disorder in our *Organs*, and made *different* from what arise in us from the same Objects at other times. We do not denominate Objects from our *Perceptions during the Disorder*, but according to our *ordinary Perceptions*, or those of others in *good Health*: Yet no body imagines that therefore *Colours, Sounds, Tastes*, are not *sensible Ideas*. In like manner many *Circumstances* diversify the *concomitant Ideas*: But we denominate Objects from the *Appearances* they make to us in an *uniform Medium*, when our *Organs* are in no disorder, and the Object not very distant from them. But none therefore imagines that it is *Reason* and not *Sense* which discovers these *concomitant Ideas*, or *primary Qualities*.

JUST so in our *Ideas of Actions*. These three Things are to be distinguished, 1. The Idea of the *external Motion*, known first by *Sense*, and its *Tendency to the Happiness or Misery* of some *sensitive Nature*, often inferred by *Argument* or *Reason*, which on these Subjects, suggests as invariable eternal or necessary Truths as any whatsoever. 2. *Apprehension* or *Opinion of the Affections* in the

SECT. the Agent, inferred by our *Reason*: So far  
 IV. the Idea of an *Action* represents something  
 ~~~~~ external to the Observer, really existing  
 whether he had perceived it or not, and ha-
 ving a real Tendency to certain Ends. 3.
 The *Perception of Approbation or Disappro-
 bation* arising in the Observer, according as
 the *Affections of the Agent* are apprehended
kind in their *just Degree*, or *deficient*, or *ma-
 licious*. This *Approbation* cannot be suppo-
 sed an *Image of any thing external*, more
 than the *Pleasures of Harmony, of Taste, of
 Smell*. But let none imagine, that calling
 the *Ideas of Virtue and Vice* Perceptions of
 a *Sense*, upon apprehending the *Actions* and
Affections of another does diminish their *Re-
 ality*, more than the like *Affertions* concern-
 ing all *Pleasure and Pain, Happiness or Mi-
 sery*. Our *Reason* often corrects the *Report
 of our Senses*, about the *natural Tendency* of
 the external *Action*, and corrects *rash Con-
 clusions* about the *Affections* of the Agent.
 But whether our *moral Sense* be subject to
 such a Disorder, as to have *different Percep-
 tions*, from the same apprehended *Affections*
 in an Agent, at *different times*, as the *Eye*
 may have of the Colours of an unaltered
 Object, it is not easy to determine: Perhaps
 it will be hard to find any Instances of such
 a *Change*. What *Reason* could correct, if
 it fell into such a *Disorder*, I know not;
 except suggesting to its *Remembrance* its *for-
 mer*

mer Approbations, and representing the *ge-* S E C T.
neral Sense of Mankind. But this does not IV.
 prove Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice* to be previ-
 ous to a *Sense*, more than a like *Correction*
 of the Ideas of *Colour* in a Person under the
Jaundice, proves that *Colours* are perceived
 by *Reason*, previously to *Sense*.

If any say, “ this *moral Sense* is not a
 “ *Rule* :” What means that Word? It is
 not a *strait rigid Body* : It is not a *general*
Proposition, shewing what *Means* are fit to
 obtain an end : It is not a *Proposition*, assert-
 ing, that a *Superior* will make those happy
 who act one way, and miserable who act the
 contrary way. If these be the Meanings of
Rule, it is no *Rule* ; yet by reflecting upon
 it our Understanding may find out a *Rule*.
 But what *Rule* of Actions can be formed,
 without Relation to some *End* proposed?
 Or what *End* can be proposed, without pre-
 supposing *Instincts*, *Desires*, *Affections*, or a
moral Sense, it will not be easy to explain.

S E C T. V.

Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit ; and be rewardable upon the Supposition, that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct.

S E C T. V. **S**OME will not allow any *Merit* in *Actions* flowing from kind *Instincts*:
 “ *Merit*, say they, attends *Actions* to which
 “ we are excited by *Reason* alone, or to
 “ which we *freely* determine ourselves.
 “ The Operation of *Instincts* or *Affections*
 “ is *necessary*, and not *voluntary*; nor is
 “ there more *Merit* in them than in the
 “ *Shining of the Sun*, the *Fruitfulness of a*
 “ *Tree*, or the *Overflowing of a Stream*,
 “ which are all *publickly useful*.”

Merit,
what.

BUT what does *Merit* mean? or *Praiseworthiness*? Do these Words denote the
 “ *Quality* in *Actions*, which gains *Appro-*
 “ *bation* from the Observer, according to
 “ the present Constitution of the human
 “ *Mind*?” Or, 2^{dly}, Are these *Actions* called

led meritorious, “ which, when any Ob-
 “ server does *approve*, all other *Observers*
 “ approve him for his *Approbation* of
 “ it; and would condemn any *Observer*
 “ who did not *approve* these *Actions*?”
 These are the only Meanings of *meritorious*,
 which I can conceive as distinct from *re-*
wardable, which is considered hereafter se-
 parately. Let those who are not satisfied
 with either of these Explications of *Merit*,
 endeavour to give a Definition of it redu-
 cing it to its simple Ideas: and not, as a
 late Author has done, quarrelling these De-
 scriptions, tell us only that it is *Deserving*
or being worthy of Approbation, which is
 defining by giving a synonymous Term.


Now we endeavoured already to shew,
 that “ no *Reason* can excite to Action pre-
 “ viously to some *End*, and that no *End* can
 “ be proposed without some *Instinct* or Af-
 “ fection.” What then can be meant by
 being *excited by Reason*, as distinct from all
 Motion of *Instincts* or *Affections*? Some per-
 haps take the Word [Instinct] solely for
 such Motions of *Will*, or bodily Powers, as
 determine us without Knowledge or Inten-
 tion of any End. Such Instincts cannot be
 the Spring of Virtue. But the Soul may be
 as naturally determined to Approbation of
 certain Tempers and Affections, and to the
 Desire of certain Events when it has an Idea

SECT. of them, as Brutes are, by their lower Instincts, to their Actions. If any quarrel the
 V. Application of the Word *Instinct* to any thing higher than what we find in Brutes, let them use another Word. Though there is no Harm in the Sound of this Word, more than in a *Determination to pursue Fitness*, which they must allow in the Divine Will, if they ascribe any Will to him at all.

THEN *determining ourselves freely*, does it mean *acting without any Motive or exciting Reason*? If it did not mean this, it cannot be opposed to *acting from Instinct or Affections*, since all *Motives or Reasons* presuppose them. If it means this, that “*Meditation* is found only in Actions done without
 “ *Motive or Affection*, by mere *Election*,
 “ without prepotent *Desire* of one *Action*
 “ or *End* rather than its opposite, or without
 “ *Desire of that Pleasure* which * some
 “ suppose follows upon any *Election*, by a
 “ *natural Connexion* :” Then let any Man

* This is the Notion of *Liberty* given by the Archbishop of *Dublin*, in his most ingenious Book, *De Origine Mali*. This Opinion does not represent *Freedom of Election*, as opposite to all *Instinct or Desire*; but rather as arising from the *Desire of that Pleasure supposed to be connected with every Election*. Upon his Scheme there is a *Motive and End* proposed in every *Election*, and a natural *Instinct* toward *Happiness* presupposed: Though it is such a *Motive and End* as leaves us in perfect *Liberty*. Since it is a *Pleasure or Happiness*, not connected with one thing more than another, but following upon the *Determination* itself.

consider

consider whether he ever acts in this manner S E C T. V.
 by mere *Election*, without any previous *De-*
sire? And again, let him consult his own 
 Breast, whether such kind of Action gains
 his *Approbation*? Upon seeing a Person not
 more disposed by *Affection*, *Compassion*, or
Love or Desire, to make his Country happy
 than miserable, yet chusing the one rather
 than the other, from no *Desire of publick*
Happiness, nor *Aversion to the Torments of*
others, but by such an *unaffectionate Deter-*
mination, as that by which one moves his
first Finger rather than the *second*, in giving
 an Instance of a *trifling Action*; let any one
 ask if this Action should be *meritorious*:
 and yet that there should be no *Merit* in a
tender compassionate Heart, which shrinks at
 every *Pain* of its *Fellow-Creatures*, and tri-
 umphs in their *Happiness*; with *kind Affe-*
ctions and *strong Desire* labouring for the
 publick Good. If this be the Nature of *me-*
ritorious Actions; every honest Heart would
 disclaim all *Merit in Morals*, as violently as
 the old *Protestants* rejected it in *Justification*.

BUT let us see which of the two Senses of
Merit or *Praise-worthiness* is founded on this
 (I will not call it *unreasonable* or *casual*, but)
unaffectionate Cboice. If *Merit* denotes the
Quality moving the Spectator to approve,
 then there may be *unaffectionate Election* of
 the greatest Villany, as well as of the most

SECT. useful Actions; but who will say that they
 V. are *equally approved*?—But perhaps it is
 not the *mere Freedom of Choice* which is ap-
 proved, but the *free Choice of publick Good*,
 without any *Affection*. Then Actions are
 approved for *publick Usefulness*, and not for
Freedom. Upon this Supposition, the *Heat*
of the Sun, the *Fruitfulness of a Tree*, would
 be *meritorious*: or if one says, “these are
 “not *Actions*,” they are at least *meritorious*
Qualities, Motions, Attractions, &c. And a
casual Invention may be *meritorious*.—
 Perhaps *Free Election* is a *Conditio sine qua*
non, and *publick Usefulness* the immediate
Cause of Approbation; neither separately,
 but both jointly are *meritorious*: *Free Ele-*
ction alone is not *Merit*; *Publick Usefulness*
alone is not *Merit*; but both concurring.
 Then should any Person by *mere Election*,
 without any *Desire* to serve the publick, set
 about *Mines*, or any *useful Manufacture*; or
 should a Person by *mere Election* stab a Man
 without knowing him to be a *publick Rob-*
ber; here both *free Election* and *publick Use-*
fulness may concur: Yet will any one say
 there is *Merit* or *Virtue* in such Actions?
 Where then shall we find *Merit*, unless in
kind Affections, or *Desire* and *Intention* of
 the publick Good? This moves our *Appre-*
bation wherever we observe it: and the want
 of this is the true *Reason* why a *Searcher*
for Mines, a *free Killer* of an unknown
 Robber,

Robber, the *warming Sun*, or the *fruitful Tree*, are not counted *meritorious*.

S E C T.
V.


BUT it may be said, that to make an Action *meritorious*, it is necessary not only that the Action be *publickly useful*, but that it be *known* or *imagined* to be *such*, before the Agent freely chuses it. But what does this add to the former Scheme? Only a *Judgment* or *Opinion* in the *Understanding*, concerning the *natural Tendency* of an Action to the publick Good: Few, it may be presumed, will place *Virtue* in *Affent* or *Disfent*, or *Perceptions*. And yet this is all that is superadded to the former Case. The Agent must not *desire* the *publick Good*, or have any *kind Affections*. This would spoil the *Freedom of Choice*, according to their Scheme, who insist on a *Freedom opposite to Affections or Instincts*: But he must *barely know* the *Tendency* to publick Good, and without any *Propensity* to, or *Desire* of the *Happiness* of others, by an *arbitrary Election*, acquire his Merit. Let every Man judge for himself, whether these are the Qualities which he *approves*.

WHAT has probably engaged many into this way of speaking, "that Virtue is " the Effect of *rational Choice*, and not " of *Instincts or Affections*," is this; they

SECT. find, that “ some Actions flowing from
 V. “ particular kind Affections, are sometimes
 ~~~~~ “ condemned as *evil*,” because of their *bad*  
*Influence* upon the State of larger Soci-  
 eties; and that the *Hurry* and *confused Sen-*  
*sation* of any of our Passions, may di-  
 vert the Mind from considering the *whole*  
*Effect* of its Actions: They require there-  
 fore to *Virtue* a *calm and undisturbed Tem-*  
*per*.

THERE is indeed some ground to re-  
 commend this Temper as very necessary  
 in many Cases; and yet some of the most  
*passionate Actions* may be perfectly *good*.  
 But in the *calmest Temper* there must re-  
 main *Affection* or *Desire*, some implanted  
*Instinct* for which we can give no *reason*;  
 otherwise there could be no Action of any  
 kind. As it was shewn above in the first  
 Section.

IF *meritorious Actions* are these which  
 whosoever does not *approve*, is himself  
*condemned* by others: the Quality by which  
 they are constituted *meritorious* in this  
 Sense, is the same which moves our *Ap-*  
*probation*. We *condemn* any Person who  
 does not *approve* that which we ourselves  
*approve*: We presume the *Sense* of others  
 to be constituted like our own; and that  
 any other Person, would he attend to the  
 Actions

ACTIONS which we *approve*, would also SECT.  
*approve* them, and love the Agent; when V.  
 we find that another does not *approve* what   
 we approve, we are apt to conclude, that  
 he has not had *kind Affections* toward the  
 Agent, or that some *evil Affection* makes  
 him overlook his Virtues, and on this ac-  
 count condemn him.

PERHAPS by meritorious is meant the  
 same thing with another Word used in like  
 manner, *viz. rewardable*. Then indced  
 the *Quality* in which *Merit* or Rewarda-  
 bleness is founded, is different from that  
 which is denoted by *Merit* in the former  
 Meanings.

REWARDABLE, or *deserving Reward*, What Ac-  
 denotes either that *Quality which would in-* tions re-  
*cline a superior Nature to make an Agent* wardable.  
*happy*: Or, 2dly, That *Quality of Actions*  
*which would make a Spectator approve a*  
*superior Nature, when he conferred Happi-*  
*ness on the Agent, and disapprove that Su-*  
*perior, who inflicted Misery on the Agent,*  
*or punished him.* Let any one try to give  
 a meaning to the Word *rewardable* distinct  
 from these, and not satisfy himself with  
 the Words *worthy of*, or *deserving*, which  
 are of very complex and ambiguous Signi-  
 fication.

Now

SECT. Now the *Qualities* of an Action determining a powerful Nature to reward it, must be various according to the *Constitution* and *Affections* of that Superior. If he has a *moral Sense*, or *something analogous* of a more excellent sort, by which he is determined to love those who evidence *kind Affections*, and to desire their Happiness, then *kind Affection* is a Quality moving to Reward.

BUT farther, if this Superior be *benevolent*, and observes that inferior Natures can by their mutual Actions promote their mutual Happiness; then he must incline to excite them to *publicly useful Actions*, by Prospects of *private Interest*, if it be needful: Therefore he will engage them to such Actions by *Prospects of Rewards*, whatever be the internal Principle of their Actions, or whatever their *Affections* be. These *two Qualities* in Actions, *viz. flowing from kind Affections*, and *publick Usefulness* concurring, undoubtedly incline the *benevolent Superior* to confer Happiness: The *former alone*, where, through want of *Power*, the Agent is disappointed of his kind Intentions, will incline a benevolent Superior to reward; and the *want of Power* in the Agent will never incline him to punish. But the *want of kind Affections*, although there



there be *publickly useful Actions*, may be so S E C T. V.  
 offensive to the *moral Sense* of the *superior*  
*Nature*, as to prevent *Reward*, or excite to  
*punish*; unless this Conduct would occasion  
*greater publick Evil*, by withdrawing from  
 many Agents a *necessary Motive* to publick  
 Usefulness, viz. the *Hope of Reward*.

BUT if the Superior were *malicious* with  
 a *moral Sense* contrary to ours, the contrary  
*Affections* and *Tendency of Actions* would  
 excite to reward, if any such thing could be  
 expected from such a *Temper*.

IF Actions be called *rewardable*, when  
 “ a *Spectator* would approve the *superior*  
 “ *Mind* for conferring Rewards on such  
 “ Actions:” Then various Actions must be  
 rewardable, according to the *moral Sense* of  
 the Spectator. Men approve rewarding all  
*kind Affections*: And if it will promote pub-  
 lick Good to promise Rewards to *publickly*  
*useful Actions* from whatsoever *Affections*  
 they proceed, it will evidence Benevolence  
 in the Superior to do so. And this is the  
 Case with *human Governors*, who cannot  
 dive into the Affections of Men.

SOME strongly assert (which is often the  
 only Proof) that “ to make an Action re-  
 “ wardable, the Agent should have had In-  
 “ clinations to evil as well as to good.”  
 What

Whether  
 Motives or  
 Inclina-  
 tions to E-  
 vil be ne-  
 cessary to  
 make an  
 Agent re-  
 wardable?

SECT. V. What means this? That a good governing MIND is only inclined to make an Agent happy, or to confer a *Reward* on him when he has some *evil Affections*, which yet are surmounted by the *benevolent Affections*? But would not a *benevolent Superior* incline to make any *benevolent Agent* happy, whether he had any weaker evil Inclinations or not? Evil Inclinations in an Agent would certainly rather have some Tendency to *diminish* the Love of the superior Mind. Cannot a good Mind *love* an Agent, and *desire* his Happiness, unless he observes some Qualities, which, were they alone, would excite *Hatred* or *Aversion*? Must there be a Mixture of *Hatred* to make *Love* strong and effectual, as there must be a Mixture of Shade to set off the Lights in a Picture? Is there any Love, where there is no *Inclination to make happy*? Or is strong Love made up of *Love* and *Hatred*?

IT is true indeed, that *Men* judge of the *Strength* of kind Affections generally by the contrary Motives of *Self-Love*, which they surmount: But must the DEITY do so too? Is any Nature the less lovely, for its having no Motive to make itself *odious*? If a Being which has no Motive to evil can be *beloved* by a Superior, shall he not *desire the Happiness* of that Agent whom he loves? It is true, such a Nature will do good Actions without

without Prospect of any *Self-Interest*; but S E C T. V.  
would any benevolent Superior study the  
less to make it happy on that account?—

But if they apply the Word *rewardable* to those Actions alone, *which an Agent would not do without Prospect of Reward*: then indeed to make an Action in this Sense *rewardable*, it is necessary that the Agent should either have *no kind Affections*, or that he should live in such Circumstances, wherein Self-Love should lead to Actions *contrary* to the publick Good, and overpower any kind Affections; or that he should have *evil Affections*, which even in a good Constitution of the World, his *Self-Love* could not over-balance without *Reward*.

THIS poor Idea of *Rewardableness* is taken from the *Poverty* and *Impotence* of *human Governors*: Their Funds are soon exhausted; they cannot make happy all those whose Happiness they desire: Their *little Stores* must be frugally managed; none must be rewarded for what good they will do without Reward, or for abstaining from Evils to which they are not inclined. Rewards must be kept for the *insolent Minister*, who without reward would fly in the Face of his Prince; for the *turbulent Demagogue*, who will raise Factions if he is not bribed; for the *covetous, mean-spirited, but artful Citizen*, who will serve his Country no farther

SECT. ther than it is for his private Interest. But  
 V. let any kind honest Heart declare what *sort*  
 of Characters it loves? *Whose* Happiness it  
 most desires? *Whom* it would reward if  
 it could? Or what these *Dispositions* are,  
 which if it saw rewarded by a superior Na-  
 ture, it would be most pleased, and most  
*approve* the Conduct of the Superior? When  
 these Questions are answered, we shall know  
 what makes Actions *rewardable*.

IF we call all Actions *rewardable*, the re-  
 warding of which we *approve*; then indeed  
 we shall approve the rewarding of all *Ac-*  
*tions which we approve*, whether the Agent  
 has had any *Inclinations* or *Motives* to Evil  
 or not: We shall also approve the *promising*  
*of Rewards* to all *publicly useful Actions*,  
 whatever were the Affections of the Agents.  
 If by this *Prospect of Reward* either *malicious*  
*Natures* are restrained from Mischief,  
 or *selfish* Natures induced to serve the Pub-  
 lick, or *benevolent* Natures not able without  
 reward to surmount real or apparent *selfish*  
*Motives*: In all these Cases, the *proposing*  
*Rewards* does really advance the Happiness  
 of the *Whole*, or diminish its *Misery*; and  
 evidences *Benevolence* in the superior Mind,  
 and is consequently *approved* by our *moral*  
*Sense*.

IN this last Meaning of the Word *re-SECT.*  
*wardable*, these Dispositions are rewardable. V.

1. *Pure unmixed Benevolence.* 2. *Prepollent*  
*good Affections.* 3. *Such weak Benevolence,*  
*as will not without Reward overcome appa-*  
*rently contrary Motives of Self-Love.* 4. *Un-*  
*mixed Self-Love, which by Prospect of Re-*  
*ward may serve the publick.* 5. *Self-Love,*  
*which by Assistance of Rewards, may over-*  
*ballance some malicious Affections.* If in  
 these Cases *proposing Rewards* will increase  
 the Happiness of the System, or diminish its  
 Misery, it evidences *Goodness* in the Gover-  
 nor, when he cannot so well otherwise ac-  
 complish so much good for the whole.

IF we suppose a Necessity of making all  
 virtuous Agents *equally happy*, then indeed a  
*Mixture of evil Dispositions*, tho' surmount-  
 ed by the good, or of *strong contrary Mo-*  
*tives* overballanced by *Motives to Good*,  
 would be a Circumstance of some Import-  
 ance in the Distribution of Rewards: Since  
 such a Nature, during the *Struggle of con-*  
*trary Affections* or Motives, must have had  
 less *Pleasure* than that virtuous Nature  
 which met with no Opposition: But as this  
 very Opposition gave this Nature *full Evi-*  
*dence* of the Strength of its Virtue, this  
*Consciousness* may be a peculiar *Recompence*  
 to which the unmixed Tempers are Stran-  
 gers:

SECT. gers: And there seems no such necessity of

V. an *equal Happiness of all Natures*. It is no way inconsistent with perfect Goodness, to make different *Orders of Beings*; and, provided all the Virtuous be at last *fully content*, and as happy as they desire, there is nothing absurd in supposing *different Capacities* and *different Degrees*; and during the Time of *Probation*, there is no necessity, not the least shew of it, that all be equal.

THOSE who think “*no Person punishable for any Quality or Action, if he had it not in his Power to have had the opposite Quality, or to have abstained from the Action if he had willed it;*” perhaps are not mistaken: but then let them not assert on the other Hand, that it is unjust to reward or make happy those, who neither had any *Dispositions to Evil*, nor could possibly *desire* any such Dispositions. Now if Men’s Affections are naturally good, and if there be in their Fellows no *Quality* which would necessarily raise *Malice* in the Observer; but, on the contrary, *all Qualities* requisite to excite at least *Benevolence* or *Compassion*: It may be justly said to be in the *Power* of every one, by due Attention, to prevent any *malicious Affections*, and to excite in himself *kind Affections* toward all. So that the intricate Debates about human *Liberty* do not affect what is here alledged, concerning our  
moral

*moral Sense* of Affections and Actions, any more than any other Schemes. S E C T.  
V.



SOME alledge, that MERIT supposes, beside *kind Affection*, that the Agent has a *moral Sense*, *reflects* upon his own Virtue, *delights* in it, and *chooses* to adhere to it for the *Pleasure* which attends it.\* We need not debate the Use of this Word *Merit*: it is plain, we *approve* a generous kind Action, tho' the Agent had not made this *Reflection*. This *Reflection* shews to him a Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to which does not increase our *Approbation*: But then it must again be owned, that we cannot form a just Conclusion of a *Character* from one or two kind, generous Actions, especially where there has been no very strong *Motives to the contrary*. Some apparent Motives of *Interest* may afterwards overballance the *kind Affections*, and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. But the *Reflection* on Virtue, the being once *charmed* with the lovely Form, will discover an *Interest* on its side, which, if well attended to, no other Motive will overballance. This *Reflection* is a great *Security* to the *Character*; and must be supposed in such Creatures as *Men* are, before we can well depend upon a *Constancy in Virtue*. The same may be said of many other Mo-

\* See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. Part 1.

S E C T. tives to Virtue from *Interest*; which, tho'

V. they do not *immediately* influence the *kind*  
Affections of the Agent, yet remove these  
Obstacles to them, from *false Appearances*  
of *Interest*. Such are these from the San-  
ctions of *divine Laws* by future Rewards and  
Punishments, and even the manifest *Advan-*  
*tages of Virtue in this Life*: without *Refle-*  
*ction* on which, a *steady Course of Virtue* is  
scarce to be expected amidst the present  
Confusion of human Affairs.



## S E C T. VI.

*How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action virtuous.*

I. S O M E imagine, that “ to make an S E C T. VI.  
 “ Action virtuous, it is necessary that  
 “ the Agent should have previously known  
 “ his Action to be *acceptable to the DEITY*,  
 “ and have undertaken it chiefly with de-  
 “ sign to please or obey him. We have  
 “ not, say they, reason to imagine a *malicious*  
 “ *Intention* in many of the worst Ac-  
 “ tions: the very *want of good Affections in*  
 “ *their just Degree*, must constitute *moral*  
 “ *Evil*. If so, then the *moral Evil* in the  
 “ *want of Love or Gratitude*, must increase  
 “ in proportion to the *Causes of Love or*  
 “ *Gratitude* in the Object: by the *Causes of*  
 “ *Love*, they mean *those Qualities in the*  
 “ *Object* upon Observation of which Love  
 “ or Gratitude arise in every good Temper.  
 “ Now the *Causes of Love* toward the DE-  
 “ ITY are infinite; therefore the want of  
 “ the highest possible Degree of Love to  
 “ him, must be infinitely evil.—To be  
 “ excited more by *smaller Motives or Causes*  
X 2
“ than

SECT. " than by greater ; to love those who are  
 VI. " less *lovely*, while we neglect him in whom  
 ~~~~~ " are *infinite Causes of Love*, must argue  
 " great *Perverseness* of Affections. But the
 " *Causes of Love* in the DEITY, his infinite
 " *Goodness* toward all, and even toward
 " ourselves, from whence springs all the
 " Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely
 " above any *Causes of Love* to be found in
 " *Creatures* : Therefore to act from Love
 " to them without *Intention* to please God,
 " must be infinitely evil."

IF this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between *habitual* and *actual Intention* will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments require *actual Intention*. An *habitual Intention* is not a present act of Love to the DEITY, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to *Creatures*, which this Argument requires ; but a prior general *Resolution* not at present repeated.

To find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by *Reflection*.

How we
 compute the
 Goodness
 of Tem-
 per.

II. THERE is in Mankind such a *Disposition* naturally, that they desire the Happiness of any known *sensitive Nature*, when it is not inconsistent with something more strongly

strongly desired ; so that were there no *Op-positions of Interest* either private or publick, and *sufficient Power*, we would confer upon every Being the highest Happiness which it could receive. S E C T. VI.

BUT our *Understanding* and *Power* are limited, so that we cannot know many other Natures, nor is our utmost *Power* capable of promoting the Happiness of many: our Actions are therefore influenced by some *stronger Affections* than this general *Benevolence*. There are certain *Qualities* found in some Beings more than in others, which excite stronger *Degrees* of *Good-will*, and determine our *Attention* to their Interests, while that of others is neglected. The Ties of *Blood*, *Benefits* conferred upon us, and the Observation of *Virtue* in others, raise much more vigorous *Affections*, than that general *Benevolence* which we may have toward all. These *Qualities* or *Relations* we may call the *Causes* of *Love*.

HOWEVER these *Affections* are very different from the general *Benevolence* toward all, yet it is very probable, that there is a *Regularity* or *Proportion* observed in the Constitution of our Nature ; so that, abstracting from some acquired *Habits*, or *Associations of Ideas*, and from the more sudden *Emotions* of some particular Passions, *that Tem-*


SECT. per which has the most lively *Gratitude*,
 VI. or is the most susceptible of *Friendship*
 with virtuous Characters, would also have the strongest *general Benevolence* toward indifferent Persons: And on the contrary, where there is the weakest *general Benevolence*, there we could expect the least *Gratitude*, and the least *Friendship*, or *Love toward the Virtuous*. If this *Proportion* be observed, then we may denote the Propensity of mind, or the disposition to receive or to be moved with any tender or kind Affections by the *Goodness of Temper*. Then,

THE *degree of kind Affection* toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended *Causes of Love* in him, and of the *Goodness of Temper* in the Observer.

WHEN the *Causes of Love* in two objects are apprehended equal, the *Love* toward either in different Persons is as the *Goodness of Temper*.

WHEN the *Goodness of Temper* is the same or equal, the *Love* toward any Objects will be proportioned to the *Causes*.

THE *Goodness of any Temper* is therefore as the *Quantity of Love*, divided by the apprehended *Causes*. And since we
 cannot

cannot apprehend any Goodness in having SECT.
 the *Degree of Love* above the *Proportion* VI.
 of its Causes, the most virtuous Temper 
 is that in which the *Love* equals its *Cau-*
ses, which may therefore be expressed by
 Unity *.

HENCE it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our *Fellow-Creatures*, from whom also we our selves, and all others had received the greatest *Benefits*; there would be less Virtue in any small Degree of *Desire of his Happiness*, than in a like *Degree of Love* toward our Fellow-Creature. But *not loving* such a Being, or having a *smaller Degree of Love*, must evidence a much greater *Defect* in Virtue, than a like *want of Love* toward our Fellow-Creatures. For the *Causes of Love* being very great, unless the *Love* be also very great, there must be some depravation of the Temper, some want of the natural Proportion, or of that calm Deliberation and calm Affections, toward Objects of the Understanding.

III. To apply this to the DEITY is very obvious. Our *Affections* toward him arise in the same manner as toward our Fellows, in *The general Rules applied to the Love of God.*

* See *Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. 11.* last Paragraph.

SECT. proportion to our *Attention* to the *Causes*
 VI. of *Love* in him, and the *Goodness* of our
 ~~~~~ *Temper*. The Reflection on his Goodness  
 raises *Approbation* and *Complacence*, his  
*Benefits* raise *Gratitude*, and both occasion  
*Good-will* or *Benevolence*. "His *Happi-*  
*ness* is perhaps imagined wholly de-  
 "tached from all Events in this World,  
 "absolute, and unvaried in himself." And  
 yet the same *Inclination* of Mind might  
 remain in us, tho' we had this Opinion.  
 When the *Happiness* of a Friend is in *Suf-*  
*pense*, we desire it; when he has obtained  
 all that which we desired, the same *Incli-*  
*nation* of Mind seems to remain toward  
 him, only without that *Uneasiness* accom-  
 panying Desire of an *uncertain* Object:  
 Thus *Gravity* may be said to be the same  
 when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as  
 when it caused descent.

UPON this Scheme of the divine Hap-  
 piness, it is not easy to account how our  
 Love to him could excite us to promote the  
*Happiness* of our *Fellows*. Our frequent  
*Contemplation* of such an amiable excellent  
 Nature, might indeed tend to *reform* or  
*improve* our Temper, by presenting an Ex-  
 ample engaging our Imitation.

IF we imagine that the DEITY has such  
*Perceptions* of *Approbation* or *Dislike* to-  
 ward

ward Actions as we have our selves, then S E C T. VI.  
indeed our *Love* to him would directly ex-  
cite us to do whatever he approves, and  
shun what he condemns. We can scarce  
avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring  
of Events *disapproved*, must be uneasy to  
any Nature, and that the observing *ap-  
proved Actions* must be delightful.

If we imagine that the *divine Happi-  
ness*, or any part of it is connected with  
the Happiness of his Creatures, so that  
their Happiness is constituted the Occasion  
of his; then indeed our *Love to the DEITY*  
will directly excite us to all manner of *be-  
neficent Actions*. 'Tis true, many good  
Men deny these two last Opinions, yet it  
is probable, when their Minds are diverted  
from *Speculations*, by Opportunities of Ac-  
tion, there recurs some Imagination of *Of-  
fence*, *Uneasiness*, and *Resentment* in the  
DEITY, upon observing *evil Actions*; of  
*Delight* and *Joy* in beholding good Ac-  
tions; of *Sorrow* upon observing the *Mi-  
sery* of his Creatures, and *Joy* upon seeing  
them happy: So that by their *Love to the  
DEITY* they are influenced to beneficent  
Actions, notwithstanding their *speculative  
Opinions*. In our Conceptions of the DEITY,  
we are continually led to imagine a Resem-  
blance to what we feel in our selves.

WHOEVER

SECT. WHOEVER maintains these Opinions of  
 VI. the DEITY to be true, must also suppose  
 “ a particular *Determination* of all Events  
 “ in the Universe ;” otherwise this *part* of  
 the divine Happiness is made *precarious* and  
*uncertain*, depending upon the *undetermined Will* of Creatures.

THE Diversity of Opinions concerning  
 the *divine Happiness*, may lead men into  
 different ways of accounting for the *Influence*  
 which the *Love of God* may have  
 upon our Actions toward our Fellows : But  
 the Affections toward the DEITY would  
 be much the same upon both Schemes.  
 Where there were the same just *Apprehen-*  
*sions* of the *divine Goodness* in two Per-  
 sons, the *Love* to the DEITY in both  
 would be proportioned to the *Goodness of*  
*Temper*. Though the highest possible *De-*  
*gree* of Love to a perfectly good DEITY,  
 would evidence no more *Virtue of Tem-*  
*per*, than a proportioned *Love to Creatures* ;  
 yet the having only *smaller Degrees* of  
 Love to the DEITY, would evidence a  
 greater *Defect* of Goodness in the Tem-  
 per, than any want of *Affection* toward  
 Creatures.

HERE it must be remembered, that in  
 arguing concerning the *Goodness of Temper*  
 from



from the *Degree* of Love directly, and the *Causes* of Love inverſly, *actual Attention* to the *Causes of Love* is ſuppoſed in the Person. For 'tis plain, that in the beſt Temper no one *Affection* or *Idea* can al-

SECT. VI.

ways continue preſent, and there can be no *Affection* preſent to the Mind, toward any Object, while the *Idea* of it is not preſent. The bare *Absence* therefore of Affection, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no *evil* in the Temper, farther than want of *Attention* may argue want of *Affection*. In like manner, in the *beſt Temper*, there can be no Love toward an Object *unknown*: The want therefore of Love to an *Object unknown*, can argue no evil in the Temper farther than *Ignorance* may argue want of *Affection*. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good DEITY, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the *ſtrongeſt Love and Gratitude* toward him, muſt have a Temper void of all Goodneſs; but it will not follow, that the Mind is void of Goodneſs which is not *always thinking* of the DEITY, or actually *loving* him, or even does not know him. How far the want of *Attention* to the DEITY, and *Ignorance* of him, may argue an *evil Temper*, muſt be ſhown from different *Topicks*, to be conſidered hereafter.

IV. BUT

SECT. IV. BUT previously to these Inquiries we

VI. must consider " what *Degrees* or Kinds of

*What Degrees of Affection necessary to Innocence.* " Affection are necessary to obtain the " simple *Approbation* of *Innocence*." 'Tis plain, the *bare Absence* of all *Malice* is not enough. We may have the general *Benevolence* toward a mere *sensitive Nature*, which had no other desire but *Self-Love*; but we can apprehend no *moral Goodness* in such a Being: Nay, 'tis not every *small Degree* of kind Affections which we *approve*. There must be some *proportion* of kind Affections to the *other Faculties* in any Nature, particularly to its *Understanding* and *active Powers* to obtain *Approbation*. Some Brutes evidence small *Degrees* of *Good-will*, which make them be *approved* in *their Kind*; but the same *Degrees* would not be approved in a *Man*. There is an higher *Degree* expected in Mankind, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them *innocent*. It is not easy to fix precisely that *Degree* which we approve as *innocent* by our moral Sense. Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved; such as *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Pity*, *Friendship*: And yet when we take a more *extensive* View of the Tendency of some Actions proceeding even from these *Affections*,

we

we may often condemn these Actions when S E C T. VI. they are apprehended as pernicious to *larger Systems* of Mankind. In the same manner we often condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they appear to be *pernicious to Mankind* in general. In like manner, *Self-Preservation* and pursuing *private Advantage* abstractly considered, is *innocent*: But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any case to the Safety of *others*, it is condemned.

MANKIND are capable of large extensive Ideas of *great Societies*. And it is expected of them, that their *general Benevolence* should continually direct and limit, not only their *selfish Affections*, but even their *nearer Attachments* to others: that their Desire of *publick Good*, and Aversion to *publick Misery*, should overcome at least their Desire of *positive private Advantages*, either to themselves or their particular Favourites; so as to make them abstain from any Action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to *Mankind*, however *beneficial* it might be to *themselves*, or their *Favourites*. To undergo *positive Evil* for the sake of *positive Good* to others, seems some degree of Virtue above *Innocence*, which we do not universally expect: But to reject *positive* attainable

SECT. able good, either for our selves or our particular Favourites, rather than occasion any considerable *Misery* to others, is requisite to obtain the Approbation of *Innocence*. The *want* of this Degree we condemn as positive evil ; and an Agent must rise above it by *positive Services* to Mankind, with some *Trouble* and *Expence* to himself, before we approve him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence : Whoever refuses them is below *Innocence*. But we do not *positively condemn* those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the *positive Good* of others, unless the private Interest be *very small*, and the publick Good *very great*.


BUT as the Desire of *positive private Good* is weaker than Aversion to *private Evil*, or Pain ; so our *Desire* of the positive Good of others, is weaker than our *Aversion* to their Misery. It seems at least requisite to *Innocence*, that the stronger *publick Affection*, viz. our Aversion to the Misery of others, should surmount the weaker *private Affection*, the Desire of positive private Good ; so that no prospect of

\* In many Questions of this Nature we must have recourse with *Aristotle* to a *Sense*, which is the last Judge in particular Cases.

Good to our selves, should engage us to S E C T. VI.  
 that which would occasion præpollent *Misery* to others. It is in like manner requisite to *Innocence*, that our Aversion to the *Misery* of *greater or equal Systems*, should surmount our Desire of the *positive Good* of these to which we are more particularly attached.

How far it may be necessary to the Character of *Innocence* to submit to smaller *private Pains* to prevent the *greater Sufferings* of others, or to promote some great *positive Advantages*; or how far the Happiness of *private Systems* should be neglected for the Happiness of the *greater*, in order to obtain the *Approbation of Innocence*, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any *general Rules*; nor indeed is it necessary. Our business is not to find out "at how *cheap* a Rate we can purchase "*Innocence*, but to know what is *most noble, generous and virtuous* in Life." This we know consists in sacrificing all *positive Interests*, and bearing all *private Evils* for the publick Good: And in submitting also the Interests of all *smaller Systems* to the Interests of the whole: Without any other *Exception* or *Reserve* than this, that every Man may look upon himself as a *Part* of this System, and consequently not sacrifice an *important private Interest* to a  
*less*

SECT. *less important Interest* of others. We may

VI. find the same sort of Difficulty about all  
 our other Senses, in determining precisely what Objects are *indifferent*, or where Pleasure ends, and Disgust begins, tho' the higher Degrees of the *grateful* and *ungrateful* are easily distinguished.

It is also very difficult to fix any precise *Degree* of Affection toward the DEITY, which should be barely requisite to Innocence. Only in general we must disapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehension of the perfect Goodness of the DEITY, and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, has not *stronger Affections* of *Love* and *Gratitude* toward him, than those toward any other Being. Such Affections would necessarily raise frequent *Attention* and *Consideration* of our Actions; and would engage us, if we apprehended any of them to be offensive to him, or contrary to that *Scheme of Events* in which we apprehended the DEITY to *delight*, to avoid them with a more firm Resolution than what we had in any other Affairs. *Positive Virtue* toward the DEITY must go farther than a *resolute abstaining from Offence*, by engaging us with the greatest Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as *positively pleasing*, or conducive to those Ends in which we apprehended the DEITY delights. It is  
 scarce.

scarce conceivable that any *good Temper* can want such Affections toward the DEITY, when once he is known, as were above supposed necessary to *Innocence*. Nor can we imagine *positive Degrees* of Goodness of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward the DEITY do not arise proportionably.

WHAT is here said relates only to the *Apprehensions of our moral Sense*, and not to those Degrees of Virtue which the DEITY may require by *Revelation*: And every one's Heart may inform him whether or no he does not *approve*, at least as *innocent*, those who omit many good Offices which they might *possibly* have done, provided they do a great deal of good; those who carefully abstain from every *apprehended Offence* toward the DEITY, though they might possibly be more frequent in Acts of *Devotion*. 'Tis true indeed, the *Omission of what we know to be required* is positively evil: so that by a *Revelation* we may be obliged to farther Services than were requisite previously to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this *Revelation* is known: But we are here only considering our *moral Sense*.

V. Now let us inquire how far *simple* Ignorance of a DEITY, or *unaffected* Atheism is Evil.

SECT. *ism* evidences an *evil Disposition*, or *Defect*  
 VI. of good Affections below *Innocence*.



1. AFFECTIONS arising upon *apparent Causes*, or present *Opinions*, though false, if they be such as would arise in the *best Temper*, were these *Opinions true*, cannot argue any present *want of Goodness* in any Temper, of themselves: the *Opinions* indeed may often argue a *want of Goodness* at the *time* they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no *Cause of Malice*, or of the ultimate Desire of the *Misery* or *Non-existence* of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of Dislike, and Desire of Misery or Non-existence, as the Means of greater Good, or of lessening Evil.

2. No Object which is entirely *unknown*, or of which we have no *Idea*, can raise *Affection* in the best Temper; consequently *want of Affection* to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Case of those who never heard even the *Report of a DEITY*, if ever there were any such: Or who never heard of any *Fellow-Creatures*, if one may make a Supposition like to that made by *Cicero* \*. And this is perhaps the Case, as to the *DEITY*, of any unfortunate Children, who may have some

\* De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2. cap. 37. Ex Aristotele.



little *Use of Reason*, before they are in-  
 structed in any *Religion*.

SECT.  
 VI.  



IF there really were an *Innate Idea* of a DEITY so imprinted, that no Person could be without it ; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily to receive this *Idea*, as soon as we can be called moral Agents: then no *Ignorance* of a DEITY can be innocent ; all *Atheism* must be affected, or an Opinion formed, either through *evil Affection*, or want of good *Affection* below Innocence. But if the *Idea of a DEITY* be neither imprinted, nor offer itself previously to any *Reflection*, nor be universally excited by *Tradition*, the bare *Want* of it, where there has been no *Tradition* or *Reflection*, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who make *Virtue* and *Vice* relative to a *Law*, may say, “ Men are required “ to reflect, and thence to know a DEITY.” But they must allow *Promulgation* necessary, before Disobedience to a *Law* can be criminal. Now previously to *Reflection* it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know the *Legislator*, or to know the *Law requiring him to reflect*, therefore this *Law requiring him to reflect*, was not antecedently to his *Reflection* published to him.

THE Case of *human Laws*, the Ignorance of which does not excuse, is not parallel

SECT. rallel to this. No Person under any Civil VI. Government can be supposed ignorant that there are *Laws* made for the whole State. But in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to *Reflection* may be ignorant of the DEITY, or that there are *Laws of Nature*. If any Subject could thus be *unapprized*, that he lived under Civil Government, he should not be accounted *Compos Mentis*. The Supposition indeed in both Cases is perhaps wholly *imaginary*; at least as to Persons above Childhood. One can scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly unapprized of a *governing Mind*, and of a *Right* and *Wrong* in Morals. Whether this is to be ascribed to *innate Ideas*, to *universal Tradition*, or to some *necessary Determination* in our Nature, to imagine a designing *Cause* of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a *moral Sense*, let the curious inquire.

3. SUPPOSE an Idea formed in a *benevolent Mind*, of other *sensitive Natures*, *Desire* of their Existence and Happiness would arise.

4. A GOOD *Temper* would incline any one to wish, that other Natures were *benevolent*, or morally Good, since this is the chief *Happiness*.

5. A GOOD *Temper* would desire that the S E C T.  
Administration of Nature were by a *bene-* VI.  
*volent or good Mind.* 

6. ALL Desire of any Event or Circum-  
stance inclines any Mind to search into the  
*Truth* of that Event or Circumstance, by  
all the *Evidence* within its power to ob-  
tain.


7. WHERE there is such *Desire*, and  
sufficiently obvious *Evidence* given in pro-  
portion to the *Sagacity* of the desiring  
Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of  
the Truth, if its Desire be strong.

Now from these Propositions we may  
deduce the following Conclusions.

1. SUPPOSING the Idea of a good DEITY  
once apprehended, or excited either by *Re-*  
*port*, or the slightest *Reflection*; if there be  
*objective Evidence* in Nature proportioned  
to the *Capacity* of the Inquirer, for the Ex-  
istence of a good DEITY, *Atheism* direct-  
ly argues want of good Affection below *In-*  
*nocence.*

2. IF there be only the simple *Tradi-*  
*tion* or *Presumption* of a governing Mind  
once raised; and if there be *Evidence* as

SECT. before for his *Goodness*, to conclude the

VI. DEITY *evil* or *malicious*, must argue want  
 of *good Affection* as before.

3. SUPPOSE the Idea of an *evil* DEITY once excited, and some Presumptions for his *Malice* from *Tradition*, or slight *Reflection* upon particular *Evils* in Nature; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry, would argue *want of good Affection*; to desire to *reject* this Opinion, or *confute* it by contrary Evidence, would argue *good Affection*: Suppose such contrary *Evidences* obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own *Interest*; to continue in the *false Opinion* cannot be innocent.

*How Ignorance in human Affairs evidences a bad Temper.*

VI. IN like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually known to us.

4. To imagine Fellow-Creatures *morally Good*, either according to *Evidence* upon Inquiry, or even by a rash *Opinion*, evidences *good Affection*.

5. IMAGINING them *Evil* contrary to obvious *Evidence*, argues *want of good Affection* below Innocence.

6. RETAINING and *inculcating* an Opinion either of the *Causes of Love* in others,

others, or of the *Causes of Aversion*, induces an *Habit*; and makes the Temper prone to the *Affection* often raised. Opinion of *Goodness* in the DEITY and our Fellows, increases *good Affection*, and improves the *Temper*: *Contrary Opinion* of either, by raising frequent *Aversions*, weakens *good Affections*, and impairs the *Temper*. S E C T. VI.

THIS may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the *Impiety* of their Fellows, or representing them as *wicked* and *profane*, or *hateful* to the DEITY, and justly given over to eternal Misery: We may see also what a wise *Mark* it is to know the *true Church* by, that “it pronounces Damnation on all others.” Which is one of the Characters of the *Romish Church*, by which it is often recommended as the safest for Christians to live in.

THE same *Propositions* may be applied to our Opinions concerning the *natural Tendencies* of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce *true Opinions*, and *false Opinions* often argue want of good Affection below Innocence. Thus, tho’ in *Assent* or *Dis-sent* of themselves, there can neither be *Virtue* nor *Vice*, yet they may be *Evidences*

SECT. *ces* of either in the Agent, as well as his

VI. *external Motions.* It is not possible indeed  
 for Men to determine precisely in many cases the *Quantity of Evidence*, and its *proportion* to the Sagacity of the Observer, which will argue *Guilt* in him, who contrary to it, forms a *false Opinion*. But Men are no better Judges of the *Degrees of Virtue and Vice* in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all *false Opinions* or *Errors* are innocent, more than *external Actions*: The Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human *Punishments* are only *Methods of Self-Defence*; in which the *Degrees of Guilt* are not the proper Measure, but the *Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick*.

How want  
 of Attention  
 existences a  
 bad Temper.

VII. IT is next to be considered, how far  
 want of *Attention* to the DEITY can argue  
 want of *good Affections*, in any Agent, to  
 whom he is known.

EVERY *good Temper* will have strong  
 Affections to a good DEITY, and where  
 there is *strong Affection* there will be *frequent Reflection* upon the Object beloved,  
*Desire* of pleasing, and *Caution* of offence.  
 In like manner every Person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a  
 Country

*Country, a System, a Species*, will consider S E C T. VI. how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such Attention as he uses in his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them.

ATTENTION to a DEITY apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the *Disposition to Beneficence* in any good Agent various ways; by Prospects of *Reward*, either present or future; by improving his Temper thro' Observation of so amiable a *Pattern*; or by raising Sentiments of *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, to whom we may imagine the publick Happiness to be acceptable. In like manner, the considering a *Species* or *System* may increase our *good Offices*, since *their* Interests are advanced by good Offices to *Individuals*.

BUT then from a like Reasoning to that in *Art. II.* it is plain, that in *equal Moments* of good produced by two Agents, the *Goodness of the Temper* is rather inversely as the several *additional Helps, or Motives* to it. So that where no more good is done, in equal Abilities, by one Agent who had presented to him the joint Motives of Piety toward God and Humanity toward Men, than is done by another from mere Humanity, the latter gives a better Evidence of a  
good

SECT. good Temper. And where higher Motives

VI. of Gratitude to God are presented to one than to another, unless the Good done from these stronger Motives is greater, the Temper must be so much the worse. \*

BUT an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent not only *pernicious to his Fellows*, or to particular Persons, but *offensive to the DEITY*, and pernicious to a *System*, is much more vicious than when the Agent did not reflect upon the DEITY, or a *Community*.

*Nothing in this Scheme supersedes the Duty of Love to the DEITY, and general Benevolence.*

VIII. WE must not hence imagine, that in order to produce greater Virtue in ourselves, we should regard the DEITY no farther, then merely to *abstain from Offences*. Were it our sole Intention in beneficent Actions, only to obtain the *private Pleasure of Self-Approbation* for the Degree of our Virtue, this might seem the proper Means of having *great Virtue* with the least *Expence*. But if the real Intention, which constitutes an Action virtuous, be the *promoting publick Good*; then *voluntarily* to reject the Consideration of any Motive which would increase the *Moment* of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and steadfast in Virtue, must argue *want of good Af-*

\* See Luke x. 12, 13, 14.



*fection.* Good Offices done from mere S E C T. Humanity, while the Motives of *Piety* were VI. not present to the Mind, provided they were not excluded by direct Design, or blameable Inadvertence, may in this particular Case be a better Indication of a good Temper, than Offices only of equal Importance done by another of equal Abilities, from the joint Motives of *Piety* and *Humanity*; yet the retaining designedly and frequently recalling all these *Motives* with a view to increase the *Moment* of publick Good in our Actions, if they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And the *affected Neglect* of these Motives, that so we may acquit ourselves virtuously with the *least Expence* to ourselves, or with the least Moment of publick Good, must evidence *want of good Affections*, and base *Trick* and *Artifice* to impose upon Observers, or our own Hearts. Therefore

SINCE Gratitude to the DEITY, and even Consideration of *private Interest*, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and to strengthen good Affections, the voluntary *Retaining* them with this View evidences Virtue, and *affecting* to neglect them evidences Vice.\* And yet,

If

\* THIS may sufficiently justify the *Writers of Morality* in their proving, “ that Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness “ to

SECT. If the Moment produced by the Con-  
 VI. junction of these Motives, be not greater  
 ~~~~~ than that produced with unaffected Neg-  
 lect of these Motives, from particular good
 Affection, there is less Virtue in the former
 than in the latter.

MEN may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing *Virtue* but “ what is intended chiefly to evidence *Affection* of one kind or other toward the “ DEITY.” Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this *virtuous Intention* is; whether only to evidence *Submission*, or *Submission* and *Love*, or to express *Gratitude* by compliance with the Divine Will, or to express a disinterested *Esteem*, or to obtain our own Happiness by means of the Divine Favour. This last

“ to the Agent.” ’Tis also plain from universal *Experience*, that a *Regard to the Deity*, frequent *Reflection* on his Goodness, and consequent *Acts of Love*, are the strongest and most universally prevailing *Means* of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever *Institution* therefore does most effectually tend to raise Mens *Attention*, to recall their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to *instruct* them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than the busy Part of the World without Assistance would probably apprehend, must be so *wise* and *good*, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even though it had no other *Authority* than *human* to recommend it. Every one will understand that by this is meant a *publick Worship* on set Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce, and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of *Piety* and *Humanity*.

Intention

Intention may influence a very corrupt Mind S E C T. VI.
 in some things. And the former more gene-
 rous Intentions must really increase the Good-
 ness of every Action, and are the highest Vir-
 tues of themselves. But let them not assert,
 against universal *Experience*, that we *approve*
 no Actions which are not thus intended to-
 ward the DEITY. 'Tis plain, a *generous com-*
passionate Heart, which, at first view of the
 Distress of another, flies impatiently to his
 Relief, or spares no Expence to accom-
 plish it, meets with strong *Approbation*
 from every Observer, who has not per-
 verted his *Sense of Life by School-Divinity,*
 or *Philosophy*. Joining frequently and ha-
 bitually the Acts of Piety with those of Hu-
 manity is, no doubt, the *Perfection* of Good-
 ness and Virtue. But we must not deny the
Reality of Virtue in these Actions, which
 are not of the most perfect Sort.

To be led by a *weaker Motive*, where a
stronger is alike present to the Mind, to love
 a Creature *more* than God, or to have *strong-*
er Desires of doing what is grateful to Crea-
 tures than to God, when we equally attend
 to both, would certainly argue great *Per-*
version of our Affections; or to study the
particular Good of one, more than that of
 a *System*, when we reflected on both: But
 as no *finite Mind* can retain at once a
Multi-

SECT. *Multiplicity of Objects*, so it cannot *always*

VI. retain any one Object. When a Person therefore not thinking at present of the DEITY, or of a *Community*, or *System*, does a beneficent Action from *particular Love*, he evidences *Goodness of Temper*. The bare *Absence* of the Idea of a DEITY, or of *Affections* to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would be a Crime to *fall asleep*, or to think of any thing else: If the *bare Absence* of this Idea be no evil, the Presence of *kind Affections* to Fellow-Creatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to any Action, and at the *same time* Love to a *Creature* excited to the Omission of it, or to a contrary Action, we must be very criminal if the former do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil in which *pleasing the DEITY*, is not directly and chiefly intended. Nay, that Temper must really be very *deficient* in Goodness, which ever needs to recall the Thoughts of a Divine *Command* and its *Sanctions*, or even the Thoughts of the Interests of greater Societies or *Systems*, before it can be engaged into any particular Acts of Kindness. Accordingly we find in Nature that the particular kind *Passions* generally move the Mind first. And upon Reflection, more *extensive Motives* begin to occur, and Regards to the great Head of the rational *System*.

tem. The frequent recalling these Thoughts, S E C T. VI. indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, and increases the *Moment* of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and with this *View* frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best *Helps* to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that Temper *entire* and *complete*, which has not the *strongest Affection* toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.

BEINGS of such Degrees of *Knowledge*, and such *Extent* of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of the DEITY, if their Temper be good. They must form *general Conceptions* of the whole, and see the *Order, Wisdom, and Goodness* in the *Administration of Nature* in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the DEITY, the *universal MIND*, is as *natural* a Perfection to such a Being as Man, as any Accomplishment to which we arrive by cultivating our natural Dispositions; nor is that Mind come to the *proper State* and *Vigor* of its kind, where *Religion* is not the main *Exercise* and *Delight*.


IX. THERE is one very subtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge, "That
" since

*Whether
the DEITY
is the
sole proper
Object of
Love.*

SECT. " since the DEITY is really the *Cause* of
 VI. " all the Good in the Universe, even of all
 ~~~~~ " the *Virtue*, or *good Affection* in Creatures,  
 " which are the seeming *Causes of Love* to-  
 " ward them, it must argue strange *Per-*  
 " *version* of Temper to love those in whom  
 " there is no *Cause of Love*, or who are  
 " (as they affect to speak) *nothing*, or *Emp-*  
 " *tiness of all Goodness*. The DEITY a-  
 " lone is amiable, in whom there is infinite  
 " *Fulness of every amiable Quality*. The  
 " DEITY, say they, not without some Rea-  
 " son, is the *Cause* of every *pleasant Sensa-*  
 " *tion*, which he immediately excites ac-  
 " cording to a *general Law*, upon the Oc-  
 " casion of *Motions* arising in our Bodies;  
 " that likewise he gave us that general *In-*  
 " *clination*, which we modify into all our  
 " different *Affections*; God therefore, say  
 " they, is alone *lovely*. Other Things are  
 " not to be beloved, but only the *Goodness*  
 " *of God appearing in them*; nay some make  
 " the *loving* of them, without considering  
 " God as displaying his Goodness in them,  
 " to be infinitely evil."

IN answer to this it must be owned, that  
 " God's being the Cause of all the Good  
 " in the Universe, will no doubt raise the  
 " highest Love to him in a good Temper,  
 " when it reflects upon it."

BUT

BUT if, had all Men this Apprehensi- S E C T.  
 on that " there was no good in any Crea- VI.  
 " ture," they really would not love them at   
 all. But Men generally imagine with very  
 good ground, that there are *good Beings*  
 distinct from God, though produced by him:  
 And whether this Opinion be true or false,  
 it evidences no evil.

2. As upon this Scheme God is the  
 Cause of all *pleasant Sensation*, so is he  
 the Cause of all Pain: He is, according to  
 them, the Cause of that *Inclination* which  
 we modify into *evil Affection*, as well as  
 into *good*. If then we are to love God on-  
 ly, for what we call *good Affection* in Crea-  
 tures, and not the Creatures themselves, we  
 must also only love God upon observing  
*evil Affections* in Creatures, and have no  
*Aversion* to the *basest Temper*, since God  
 gave the general INCLINATION alike in both  
 Cases.

3. If we may suppose *real Beings* di-  
 stinct from God, that *their Affections* are  
 not God's Affections, if God is not the  
 only *Lover* and *Hater*, if our *moral Sense*  
 is determined to approve *kind Affections*, and  
 our *Love* or *Benevolence* must arise toward  
 what we *approve*; or if we find an *Instinct*  
 to desire the Happiness of every sensitive  
 Z Nature,

SECT. Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures,  
 VI. and we must *approve* any kind *Affections*  
 observed in others toward their Fellows.  
 'Tis true, we must *approve* the *highest*  
*Affections* toward the DEITY, and *condemn*,  
 as a *Deficiency* of just *Affections* toward  
 GOD any Degree which is not superior to  
 our other *Affections*. But still, *Affections*  
 towards Creatures, if they be *distinct Na-*  
*tures*, must be approved.

4. IF to make a Mind virtuous, or even  
 innocent, it be necessary that it should have  
 such sublime Speculations of GOD, as the  
 τὸ πᾶν in the *Intellectual active System* (if  
 we call *one Agent* in many *Passive Organs*  
 an *active System*, then GOD has placed the  
 Bulk of Mankind in an absolute *Incapa-*  
*city* of Virtue, and inclined them perpetu-  
 ally to infinite Evil, by their very *Instincts*  
 and *natural Affections*. Does the *parental*  
*Affection* direct a Man to love the DEITY,  
 or his *Children*? Is it the DIVINITY, to  
 which our *Pity* or *Compassion* is direct-  
 ed? Is GOD the Object of *Humanity*? Is  
 it a *Design* to support the DIVINITY,  
 which we call *Generosity* or *Liberality*?  
 Upon *Receipt of a Benefit*, does our Nature  
 suggest only *Gratitude* toward GOD? *Af-*  
*fections* toward the DEITY may indeed of-  
 ten accompany *Affections* toward Crea-  
 tures, and do so in a virtuous Temper: but  
 these



these are distinct Affections. This Notion S E C T. VI.  
 of making all virtuous Affections to be on-  
 ly directed toward God, is not suggested to  
 Men by any thing in their *Nature*, but a-  
 rises from the long subtle *Reasonings* of Men  
 at leisure, and unemployed in the natural  
 Affairs of Life. ~

5. If there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward the DEITY, or in any thing else, since they are supposed to have none at all.

To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly *imperfect, inconstant, and partial*, in which *Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor, Admiration and Love of the supreme original Beauty, Perfection and Goodness*, are not the *strongest* and most *prevalent* Affections; yet *particular Actions* may be innocent, nay, virtuous, where there is no actual *Intention* of pleasing the DEITY, influencing the Agent.









## Data Due

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